To be clear, I'm not advocating for online age verification. I'm very much against it in any form. I'm just curious from a technical standpoint if it's possible somehow to construct an accurate age verification system that doesn't compromise a user's privacy? i.e., it doesn't expose the person's identity to anyone nor leaves behind a paper trail that can be traced to that person?

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[–] 137 points 11 months ago (14 children)

In principle it should be possible to do a zero-knowledge proof.

This means that the website asking for age verification asks a yes/no question like "Is this user 18+?" and the age verification service (like a digital ID provided by the government or whatever) answers "yes" or "no" accordingly, but without telling anything else about the user. Also, the verification service should ideally not know who asked for the age verification.

So the site you want to visit only knows the thing they need to know: Whether you are 18+ or not. Nothing else. And the age verification service only knows somebody asked for age verification and provided the answer, but do not know which site you visited.

This is all possible, but I don't have high hopes this is the intended implementation of any government seeking age verification, so don't get your hopes up.

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  • [–] 22 points 11 months ago (3 children)

    There are some pretty strong arguments that even zk proof is a flawed way of preserving privacy though, in a variety of ways. It prevents pseudonymity by enabling one-user-one-account, and it leaves users vulnerable to being coerced to reveal their full online activities by handing over cryptographic keys.

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  • [–] 13 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    Got ready to read some bullshit,

    Vitalik Buterin

    nevermind. But damn, what a great read. I haven't given much thought to on-chain ID in years and he lays it out pretty well. Still sounds like encrypted tokens are the way to go, but we all need to have multiple forms for it to protect anonymity.

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  • [–] 23 points 11 months ago (3 children)

    The one who asked the verification service also shouldn't know who the verification service is, imho.

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  • [–] 31 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    I'm not sure that is feasible, because in order to trust the answer, I feel the asker must know and trust the one providing the answer. It sounds like you're imagining a system with many different ID providers? What prevents me from creating my own provider that just answers "Yes", even for people under 18? If the site asking does not know it is my fake ID service providing the answer, I'm not sure they can trust any answer.

    But I won't pretend to be an expert on this topic, so perhaps it is feasible somehow.

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  • [–] 7 points 11 months ago

    the asker must know and trust the one providing the answer.

    This is possible if there's a central authority for that that everyone can agree to trust, like the government records directly. The issue is ensuring the rest of the chain remains anonymous so the only thing the authority gets is the request that an undisclosed service is verifying John Doe is 18+ and nothing else. And that's not something many governments are going to want to allow with the increasingly alarming amount of authoritarian leadership.

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  • [–] 1 point 11 months ago*

    Or the government sets up an age verification service that doesn't store logs and only reports numbers in aggregate. The restricted site sends you and a unique id off to the government service, you verify there and it hands back the id & a yes/no token to the site.

    The government already has nearly all the tools to make this happen. They already have id verification services to use & web front ends to copy. Just build the public API and insist restricted sites use it.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    doesn't this just raise the authentication requirements? like in the uk we got added checks for who was could work, and lots of deliveroo drivers shared the login + password of someone they knew who was verified.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago

    You could make it single-use tokens and rate limit individual users when they request too many tokens in a short time. Someone could still share their tokens with a friend, but it doesn't scale to where thousands are verifying with some stranger's id.

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  • [–] 43 points 11 months ago (7 children)

    The problem is not the system or the idea of age verification

    The problem is that no one on earth can be trusted with that level of monitoring, control and power.

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  • [–] 16 points 11 months ago (5 children)

    Nah you can totally trust me, I'm too lazy to do anything nefarious

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  • [–] 13 points 11 months ago (3 children)

    Great! .... the solution to our problems ... let's all trust edgemaster72

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  • [+] 3 points 11 months ago* (last edited 6 months ago) (1 child)
  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago

    Like I implied, the problem isn't the HOW to do it.

    The problem is in giving any one person, government, corporation or company this amount of power and control.

    And because it's so powerful, no one who had it would want to give up control by making it anonymous or in objectively protecting privacy for the user.

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    [–] 16 points 11 months ago

    It can. Zero knowledge proofs have been around a while and are ideal for this.

    They'll try not to have that because data gathering is what they're after, not keeping little Timmy from seeing some tits.

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  • [–] 57 points 11 months ago* (5 children)

    Even if it works, it’s a solution without a problem. If I can afford internet access, I am mature enough to see anything on the internet, and I am mature enough to decide which users can access my internet-connected network and whether they can have access to the whole internet. That’s all the age verification needed ever.

    The request for age verification by each website is purely about unnecessary control and censorship.

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  • [–] 1 point 11 months ago* (4 children)

    Internet access is like $1 in most countries (Sim card data).

    I don't know about you, but the tooth fairy gave me enough money to pay for internet access before my skull was old enough to finish growing adult teeth...

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  • [–] 9 points 11 months ago (3 children)

    And you had the capacity to pay for internet access?

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    You fucking walk 20 meters from your doorstep to buy a soda and a gig of data, yeah

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  • [–] 12 points 11 months ago*

    No, It should be a browser setting. If parental controls are enabled, access should be denied to the site.

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  • [–] 10 points 11 months ago

    It is possible, but the real goal is about removing anonymity altogether

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  • [–] 15 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    Yes. Look up "zero knowledge proofs"

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  • [–] 8 points 11 months ago*

    It's possible with certificates and 2fa issued by a government, which already have all your data, that would only verify that you are over 18.

    We already have that in Spain, sort of. We have a government app where you have a digital id stored and you can make it create a verify qr that only shows if the user is over 18 or under 18, no more data. The qr only last 5 minutes active.

    It is necessary? Not for internet access. That's a duty of the one paying for internet in the household, not the government. If they have underage kids under their responsibility it's their duty to make sure that they get good education about what to see and what not and restrict access if needed. Having the government to universally interfere everyone it's just plain bad.

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  • [–] 14 points 11 months ago* (last edited 11 months ago) (1 child)

    Its possible.

    Open source front-interfacing app + a secure element thing in the backgound.

    You download an app. You verify your identity, then the app sets up a OTP thing with the shared secret seed lasting for 30 days. But every 30 seconds the OTP changes. Everyone doing a verification in these 30 days gets the same exact secret seed.

    The seed hides in the secure element of your device. (it won't be impossible to extract, but the average kid is not gonna be able hack a secure element) Every 30 seconds, it releases the new OTP to the Open source app. The app doesn't connect to the internet once the OTP has already been set up. So nobody knows if you actually view the OTP code.

    So the government only knows you have the verification OTP set up not which websites you visited, the website only knows you have a valid OTP from the government, but you could be any of the people in the past 30 days (which the company don't even have access to).

    Even if the company and government cooperates, they could only pin down the time of website registration and that you are one of the millions of people that did the verification and requested a OTP Seed.

    (Idk the exact terminology for these things, but hopefully I make sense)

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  • [–] 7 points 11 months ago

    The seed hides in the secure element of your device. (it won't be impossible to extract, but the average kid is not gonna be able hack a secure element).

    But only one person needs to "hack" it on their device to publish the key, allowing everyone to use it without "hacking" their own device.

    You can't store a key on a device and keep it safe from the owner.

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  • [–] 5 points 11 months ago*

    The government knows who you are. They know your age, your address and know you exist (probably).

    You go to a site that requires ages verification. You say:please verify me with the government portal. You go to that portal to get a temporary id code to give to the site. The website says to the gov portal give me the name and age of the user with this temp ID. You approve that access. Portal sends age (or an is over 16/18/21 etc flag) to the site.

    • Gov portal doesn't need to know who the site is.
    • You don't provide a unique ID to the website, just a temporary one.
    • as if codes are temporary, you must have access to the id/login now, not just at some point
    • Site only gets the data you approve/it requested,.not everything.

    The process can do with some streamlining, but should work in practice?

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  • [–] 5 points 11 months ago (11 children)

    I'm inclined to say no. Reducing the problem down to its most basic parts: Alice is authorized to talk to Bob, but Bob doesn't know that. How can Alice prove it?

    Bob has to assume that anyone asking to talk to him could be Mallory, who isn't authorized to talk to him but will always answer "yes" if asked whether she is. So the authorization he gets has to be from a trusted third party; it can't come from Alice.

    Grace is a trusted third party. If Alice doesn't care about privacy, and is okay with Grace knowing that Alice talked to Bob and with Bob knowing Alice's identity, Alice can just tell Bob, "here's proof that I'm Alice. Show this to Grace and she'll confirm that I can be here." This is SSO, essentially.

    If Alice doesn't want Bob to know who she is, but is ok with Grace knowing that Alice talked to Bob, she can ask Grace to give her a secret code, and give that code to Bob, who can check with Grace to know whether or not that code corresponds to someone who is authorized.

    If Alice doesn't want Grace to know that she's talking to Bob, though, she runs into a problem. Because there's no way for Grace to send Bob a message without knowing who Bob is, he can't ask anonymously, and because there's no way for Grace to confirm that Alice is authorized without knowing who she is, Grace will always know that Alice has asked for authentication to talk to Bob.

    Adding Dave in as a trusted fourth party could solve the problem—Alice asks Dave to check with Grace, and lock his answer in a bag with a unique key that only Dave has. Then Grace could give the bag to Bob, who doesn't need to know who Grace is to pass the bag to Dave and ask him to unlock it. But Alice would be trusting that Dave won't keep records on which bag corresponds to which person.

    I don't think that's a surmountable problem. I'll have to think about it some more.

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago (9 children)

    Here's my idea: Bob gives Alice a token, assigning her an unique random number n. Alice goes to Grace and tells her, "Somebody assigned me number n, can you verify that I'm allowed?" Grace then writes: "User n is allowed, signed Grace". Alice then takes this letter and shows it to Bob. Bob now knows that Alice is allowed, but nothing else. Grace only knows that somebody wanted to know that Alice is allowed, not who that somebody is.

    Of note here: This system does nothing to protect against an allowed user helping a not allowed user to gain access, but I don't think it's possible to protect against traitorous users.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    The problem is that it leaves a paper trail.

    Grace also knows what number n got verified, and the identity of the user n. Later, the website can ask the age-verifying service who user n actually was. It requires that the age-verifying service cooperates with the website, though, but this could be mandated by law, which would create a single point of (privacy) failure.

    PS: i love your writing style. It's so simple and clear :)

    Cryptography is a really complicated subject. You managed to express it very easily understandable.

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  • [–] 1 point 11 months ago (4 children)

    That could very well work, yes; but I think that would require Bob verifying Grace's signature, and that would require trusting that Grace didn't make a unique signature that she only used for Alice, and making a note of who verified it.

    There might be a way to verify those signatures with public keys in a way that didn't require Bob to tell Grace that he was verifying the signature, which is still rattling around in my brain.

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  • [–] 1 point 11 months ago (3 children)

    Bob would have to know and trust Grace beforehand. Grace could be the IRS, for example. The idea here being to have somebody who already knows your age vouch for your age.

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  • [–] 1 point 11 months ago (2 children)

    That's not about Bob trusting Grace specifically (that's a premise of the entire operation), it's about trusting that the letter Alice handed Bob was actually signed by Grace.

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  • See my comment in this thread involving drawing a piece of paper from a box in real life. Since nobody knows which piece of paper you draw from a box, if many people do this at the same time, it's impossible to establish an one-to-one mapping between age-verifying tokens and people's identities.

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  • [–] 9 points 11 months ago (3 children)

    Correct, as a cryptography nerd I can assure you that you MUST at minimum have a trusted verifier which met you in person at some point (such as whatever office you get your physical ID card at) and they have to have your information.

    And then you're trusting both Secure Element hardware and fancy cryptography where both must be flawless in order to protect the end user's side of it, all while the end user now carries much more personal information with them than before

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    The verifier does not know what exactly you are proving, when you are proving it or to whom.

    The service provided by the verifier is equivalent to a stamp on a piece of paper.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    Bad terminology choice, I meant the cert issuer. Need to revise the language later. I was thinking of it in terms of who verifies your IRL identity. The issuer can only issue the cert after you met them and they checked your documentation, etc

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  • [–] 9 points 11 months ago (5 children)

    Yes. There are many solutions.

    Maybe the absolutely easiest to implement is just a signed message from an authority (gov.). You click a button on the website that requires verification, get a new tab to a gov. site with no identifiers from the site redirecting you and get a message you copy. The copied message is then pasted in to the site requiring verification. The site can then verify the message at their servers.

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  • [–] 14 points 11 months ago* (last edited 11 months ago)

    Hey benign and honorable govt!

    Please tell the website "kill-your-govt .net" that I am old enough to join the revolution!!!

    Kthxbai

    edit: if this was pasted in both directions AND we trust that there is no identifying information in either 'secret' message, might work. Normies will not like the ctrl-c/ctrl-v workflow though.

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  • [+] 5 points 11 months ago (2 children)
  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago* (last edited 11 months ago)

    How about

    Middleman anonimizer, pornhub sends the message to a middleman, the middleman puts its own token on the request, sends that to the gov, the gov responds yes/no to the middleman on the authenticity of the message, the middleman forwards the response to pornhub. The gov doesn't see pornhub, pornhub only gets the yes/no response, the middleman only sees the message with no ID and the response as well as the site.

    Requires a separate middleman maintained by who the fuck knows. Pornhub keeps your IP, the gov keeps your name, the middleman only knows the number of visitors on pornhub.

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    [–] 14 points 11 months ago (12 children)

    Nope, you always need a middle man to do the verification. That middle man has too much information.

    Also, if you could solve for the middle man, there is no way to know the user belongs to the ID. It can easily be stolen.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    We could just make the middle man somebody who already needs that information, e.g. the IRS.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago

    You could, but that wouldn't address OPs question. The IRS is known for giving info to other parts of the government to aid in prosecution. And the gov has shown they are terrible at cyber security, so you might as well just post your browser history on the web.

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  • [+] -19 points 11 months ago (9 children)

    I figured you were wrong so I asked an AI and it confirmed what the people below you were saying, you really do seem to be talking straight out of your ass

    Yes, it is technically possible to build an accurate, high-confidence age-verification system that does not compromise privacy in the traditional sense (i.e., no central database of IDs, no name/address/DOB stored by the site, no paper trail that can be subpoenaed or leaked). The core tool that makes this feasible is zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), specifically age-based ZK proofs.

    How a privacy-preserving age check actually works in 2025

    1. User proves age to a trusted credential issuer once
      • Government digital ID (e.g., EU eIDAS wallet, some U.S. mobile driver’s licenses, Yoti, ID.me, etc.)
      • The issuer cryptographically signs a statement like “This private key belongs to someone born before 2007-11-27” without ever revealing the exact birthdate. User generates a zero-knowledge proof
      • Using their phone or browser, they create a proof that says:
        “I have a valid credential signed by [Trusted Issuer] that confirms I am 18+ (or 21+).”
      • Nothing else is revealed: no name, no exact age, no birthdate, no issuer identity if you want to go fully anonymous. Website verifies the proof in <1 second
      • The site checks the cryptographic signature and that the policy (“18+”) is satisfied.
      • It learns literally nothing else about the person.

    Real-world implementations that already exist or are in late-stage pilots (November 2025):

    • Worldcoin’s World ID “age 18+” orb-verified credential + ZK proof
    • Polygon ID / zkBridge systems used by some adult sites
    • SpruceID + Ethereum Attestation Service kits
    • Gitcoin Passport + ZK age attestations
    • Proof-of-Humanity + age minimum circuits
    • Yoti + ZK prototype (demoed 2024–2025)

    Remaining practical hurdles (why it’s not universal yet)

    • User has to have a compatible digital credential in the first place (adoption still <30% in most countries)
    • Friction: first-time setup takes 2–10 minutes instead of 3 seconds
    • Most adult sites don’t want to pay the (tiny) gas/verification fee or integrate the SDKs
    • Regulatory gray zone in some jurisdictions that still mandate “know your customer” records

    Bottom line
    Technically: Yes, 100% possible today with zero-knowledge age proofs.
    Practically: It exists, works, and is slowly rolling out, but the porn industry and most social platforms still prefer cheap/frictionless (but privacy-invasive) methods or just do nothing.

    So the top reply in your screenshot (“you always need a middle man with too much information”) is outdated — cryptography has already solved the “middle man” problem. The real blocker now is deployment inertia, not theory.

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  • [–] 12 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    Read back what you wrote. Your first line was about a trusted credential provider. Thats a middle man. Then you talk about creating a proof. Guess what, that phone and browser are known to spy on you excessively. That's another middle man. And odds are that same phone or browser it what you will use to access something that needs the verification. So the same phone or browser has all parts of the information.
    And of course it's pointless because anyone could steal an ID and get themselves a key. Or steal your phone... so it wouldn't even prove anything.

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  • [–] 0 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    I'll address the second objection first regarding the phone or browser. You're always going to rely on some technology for the solutions that use cryptography, you just can't do those calculations long-hand realistically. That said, look up frameworks like CTAP that allow a potentially untrusted user terminal, like a browser, to interact with a trusted hardware token. Those hardware tokens can be made fairly tamper-proof, see FIPS authorized Yubikeys, such that the phone is pretty much removed from the attestation process. Yes these can still be stolen, but they make hardware keys that are fingerprint authenticated and the biometric stays on the device. Doesn't get much more self-sovereign than that.

    The existence of a trusted credential provider is a challenge. Fully self-sovereign credentials need to either be trust on first use or validated against a larger system everyone participates in. Even if we had some system of birth certificates tied to a distributed ledger, we would have to trust the third party recording that certificate in the first place, be it a hospital, doctor, or state entity. These trust and proof systems don't create the trust, they just allow us to extend that trust from one claimant to a verifier. Whether you place that trust in the state, an individual, or an independent third party is up to you.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago

    So, you have fully backed my response. OP didn't ask if it was possible with some caveats. I understand a (at a high level) the technical options that can get close to what OP asked for, but it fundamentally just isn't possible without caveats.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago (2 children)

    The big flaw in this strategy is that once you have set up a signed anonymous key from the government and you can make zero knowledge proofs with it, there's nothing stopping you from distributing that key to every kid who wants it. If it's in the browser or an app, etc. you can publish that signed key for anyone who wants to be over 18.

    PKI only works if the owner of the private key wants it to be private. It's effective for things like voting or authenticating because the owner of the key doesn't want anyone else to be able to impersonate them. But if it's only for age...

    At that point, it might as well just be a file that says "I pinky promise that I'm over 18" that the government has signed and given to you.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    Could tie it to something like a biometric. That and storing it on a write-only device would keep it from being shared too wide. The trickiss to tie it to a true multi-factor and not just something you have (if unencrypted) or something you know (if ASCII armored).

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago

    Then it adds barrier to entry. If it costs money it will be a problem for the more vulnerable population. If it is free and you can have as many as you want it is gonna be abused, if there is a limit it again starts to be a problem.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago

    I'd say it's impossible. Minors will ALWAYS find a way around it, even if it involves government IDs. The actual trick is finding if a "are you 18?" box is enough or not.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago

    It's only possible as long as you trust the people you're giving your information to. So...no.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago* (2 children)

    It is doable, i think. Consider:

    You go to your local library. They verify you're above the age limit (like they do at supermarkets when you try to buy alcohol: either look you in the face and recognize you're clearly old enough, or have to show them some kind of id, details vary.)

    You pick a code (put your hand in a box and draw a piece of paper at random). Nobody knows what code you picked except you. If lots of people do this at the same time, it's impossible to accurately map codes to people's identity.

    You scan the code (like QR code) with your social media app that you use, and it associates the code with your account. Now everybody knows you have a valid code associated to your account, but nobody knows your identity.

    (The code could work something like a cryptographic signature, where you can show that you have a valid code without actually revealing the code, so others can't simply copy it. That's a technical detail that you need to leave to the programmers to accurately understand.)

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago

    Depends on how reliable you need this system to be. For example, do you need to handle the scenario where an adult verifies their age to access a website, then lets a minor use that website in their place? That would be a much harder problem to solve than if you just need to verify that an adult was present on the other end at one point in time. For the latter, device-based age verification seems to be trivial to set up from a technical standpoint while fulfilling that criterion.

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago

    Yes, it is, see quark ID as an example of decentralized open source project by the city of Buenos Aires, in Argentina, which leverages zero knowledge proofs:

    https://quarkid.org/
    https://github.com/ssi-quarkid

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  • [–] 5 points 11 months ago*

    It's possible but it would defeat the purpose of age verification

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  • [–] 5 points 11 months ago

    Yes, but your government doesn't want that.

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  • [–] 4 points 11 months ago*

    Zero-knowledge proof. Medium has a practical example, though unfortunately the article logs user data, so beware on that.

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago (3 children)

    There are tonnes of ways but honestly, the easiest way is to do it at the ISP level. Have an internet connection you don't want used for adult material? Have an opt in service at the ISP to block XXX rated sites and maybe social media. If you are old enough to pay for your own internet you should not be required to jump through hoops to access what you want, but kids should not be thrown onto the internet without guardrails. Some kids will get around it but it would be an active choice, so most kids would not. And to be clear, this would be done at the ISP level where you already have verification of age built in to billing, so no additional privacy concern. Honestly, the fact that this is not the solution is what tells me all of this filtering is not about protecting kids, it is about centralisation and control along with pork barrelling for age verification companies.

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  • [+] 1 point 11 months ago (2 children)
  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    Yeah, there is a massive difference between a 9 year old and a 14 year old. Someone who is 17 is not necessarily significantly different from an 18 year old, yet we have to draw the line somewhere. I think if you own and pay for the service it should be up to you at a service level, not up to the government to demand a random third party company be accessed to verify ID and so on. That third party company stands to make money while also being a wonderful target for hackers.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago

    There are no registration or registry with individuals' information if guardians use parental controls and adult sites and apps identify themselves as adult for those controls, check what their kids are doing online, and talk with them about dangerous people or content they might see to teach them how to stay safe.

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  • [–] 2 points 11 months ago (1 child)

    We could go by width of feet... You take a foot picture, it goes to another user temporarily while they sign in. If they think that's an adult then you're in. Then they take a foot photo and the next random user sees their image and they have to judge if the image is an adult. But the image could also be a fake. If they identify a false positive they have to wait 5 minutes. And so on. If others need to login they could judge the same image already identified as adult. If they think its not an adult then that user's logins is set to wait 5 minutes while two other users are snown the image. If those two users think its an adult then the user who said it was not an adult get to wait for 15 minutes. If however those two guys agree with it not being adult then that user gets permanently banned.

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  • [–] 3 points 11 months ago (1 child)
    1. Sign up for age verification platform and upload your government ID on the platform (let's call this platform Age Verifier).
    2. Age Verifier confirms you're an adult, and lists you as an adult in their system.
    3. Age Verifier purges your government ID and any PII on you. The only thing they keep is your basic account details and the fact that they've confirmed you're an adult.
    4. The next time you login to an adult site, you verify yourself by logging into Age Verifier's platform. The adult site confirms with Age Verifier that you're an adult, and you're good to go.

    This system probably works, but it's not without its downsides. We'll need a way to confirm that your government ID and PII is actually deleted on Age Verifier's platform. A way to deal with this might be to make sure Age Verifier is never driven by profit so they'll never need to look into selling people's data. Maybe it could be ran by a non-profit? Or perhaps it can be ran by the government? But if you don't trust the government, that could be an issue.

    And I can also see an issue where one guy who keeps creating different Age Verifier accounts, verifying that the account is an adult, and then selling that account to people.

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  • [–] 5 points 11 months ago*

    We’ll need a way to confirm that your government ID and PII is actually deleted on Age Verifier’s platform.

    IMO this is the hardest part to ensure in a transparent manner.

    And I can also see an issue where one guy who keeps creating different Age Verifier accounts, verifying that the account is an adult, and then selling that account to people.

    The token needs to be time and device sensitive. Should be possible via a hash

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