cross-posted from : https://lemmy.zip/post/71321898

Netzpoltik details that police are able to gain access in this way either through physical access to someone’s phone or by intercepting verification codes via a state-sanctioned phishing attack or intercepting SMS messages via telephone surveillance

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[–] 159 points 2 months ago (14 children)

Interesting they highlight Signal again as though this is a vulnerability.

If someone else has access to a linked device... that's you fucking up access controls.

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  • [–] 2 points 1 month ago (3 children)

    I want a version of Signal that doesn't allow linked devices. Linking devices is a clear vulnerability.

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  • [–] 11 points 1 month ago (2 children)

    Im going to go out on a limb here and suggest something that should be obvious - you don't have to link devices

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  • [–] 1 point 1 month ago (1 child)

    But "Law enforcement" can do it by spoofing sms. I want one account, one device.

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  • [–] 4 points 1 month ago

    Signal does not use SMS.

    The vulnerability they call out in the article is a phishing attack. A phishing attack requires the user's input. There is no defense, no security, no techniques or technology to prevent you from handing the key to your safe to someone else.

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  • [+] -21 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (9 children)

    It's a vulnerability precisely because people always swarm to defend Signal in stories like this, as though using Signal means the authorities (or other bad actors) can't read your messages. Seems like every six months there's some story involving Signal users getting hacked, and every time there's a rush of wellacshuallys explaining why it wasn't really Signal's fault. (that last one is particularly egregious because I remember people defending it as "it wasn't Signal, it was their partner who they subcontracted and gave your personal data to", which is crazy levels of mental gymnastics.)

    Security is more than just encryption. If you flag something up as "hey use this if you want to hide from the Government" and have a personal phone number attached to it, that's like a red rag to a bull.

    (edit: LOL, it's hilarious how many people think they're making great rebuttals in the replies when all they're doing is proving my point. One child even flew directly into screaming at me. Signal fanbois are even worse than Apple supporters)

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  • [–] 29 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    IT DOESN'T ADVERTISE ITSELF AS A SECURE PLATFORM!!!!!!

    It says PRIVACY. If you are dancing ass naked inside your house but you have your windows open... guess what?

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  • [–] 12 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    A lot of these types use 'perfect being the enemy of good' as their attack vector. If it's not private and anonymous why bother? If you can't cut out all big tech companies, if you can't stop buying any American goods, if you can't feed all the poor or house all the homeless, etc. It's an effective way to attack progression by making people believe they should just stop fighting, they'll never win. You nailed it, Signal is private, it doesn't claim to be anything else.

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  • [–] 2 points 1 month ago

    You just pointed something out there that I haven't really considered. But its also the difference between abolitionists and reformists too- namely, abolition should be the goal, but don't let that stop you from making reforms too.

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  • [–] 31 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    as though using Signal means the authorities can’t read your messages.

    Nobody who understands the topic thinks this.

    Signal exists to prevent the contents from being read off the wire and from having the capability of compelling Signal's parent company from turning over stored messages.

    It doesn't exist to hand hold you so you don't get phished, or prevent you from running it on a vendor phone full of spyware. You're responsible for making sure your hardware is secure and that you're not socially engineered.

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  • [–] -2 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    Nobody who understands the topic thinks this.

    Yes, and articles like this are important so people who DON'T understand don't think this.

    You don't think the tens of millions of people who use signal all understand that just because everyone says it's super secure, doesn't mean they can't be hacked or phished, right?

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  • [–] 11 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago)

    Why are you lying about what security guarantees Signal say they offer?

    https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/9932632052378-How-to-protect-yourself-on-Signal

    https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/9932566320410-Staying-Safe-from-Phishing-Scams-and-Impersonation

    Even your example of the Twilio hack is far less relevant now since they added transparency logs, which means it is much harder to impersonate you without detection even if the hacker can control the telco

    https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/10223569377562-Automatic-Key-Verification

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  • [–] 74 points 2 months ago

    The headline makes people think signal is somehow broken.

    It’s not. Just be careful and monitor your account. And don’t let anyone gain physical control of your device.

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  • [–] 70 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    What's described in the article is the same method Russia was using to compromise Ukrainian Signal accounts. It's just phishing.

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  • [–] 11 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    I think you're the only person here so far who read the linked article.

    I also found the netzpolitik article that was referenced but not linked to in the original article.

    This describes police adding a linked device to a person's WhatsApp account while gathering evidence (translated with Google Translate).

    On January 12, 2020, Mr. and Mrs. P. were questioned. During the questioning, they voluntarily handed over the mobile phones they were carrying to the interviewing officers for a brief period so that messages from their daughter contained on the devices could be viewed and, among other things, photographed.

    While the photographs were being taken, the computer-based application WhatsApp Web was covertly activated via a website made available online by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), allowing the messages to be read on a BKA computer (sic!). This did not involve any intrusion via a Trojan horse or similar software.

    The only link to Signal here is the nation state campaign which used social engineering via a phishing message from 'Signal Support'.

    This nation state campaign was originally reported by a researcher at Citizen Lab.

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  • [–] 7 points 2 months ago

    I did notice some comments that may be from people who did not read and understand the article. These attacks are not sophisticated or hard to defend against, which is probably why the German police want to limit public awareness.

    I find their view shortsighted/narrow; the attacks they're using (including SIM swapping) are also widely used by criminals for fraud and identity theft. Police agencies should not discourage the public from being more cybersecurity-aware.

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  • [–] 78 points 2 months ago (15 children)

    Open source FIDO2 keys, KeePassXC, and Aegis.

    SMS 2fa has always been a bad deal

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  • [–] 50 points 2 months ago (9 children)

    I'll never understand why people accept SMS 2FA as any kind of security. Might as well put it as an ad in a newspaper. 🤦🏻‍♂️

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  • [–] 52 points 2 months ago* (8 children)

    Because many services only have SMS as 2FA option. Especially government services.

    Also it is impossible to use google without enabling the SMS 2FA option. No matter what, with only 2FA authenticator app or email, they will lock down the account by saying "unable to verify".

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    You can have a Google account without 2FA, but you need to create it using a factory-reset old Android phone (Android 8 or so).

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  • [–] 7 points 2 months ago

    I never set a phone number on two of my google accounts and they still work fine. Those accounts are old. Google didn't ask for a phone number to sign up back then.

    I recall seeing something about them planning to get rid of SMS 2FA last year. It looks like it's still an option though.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (3 children)

    You can remove SMS 2FA from a Google account if you have passkeys or hardware security keys registered

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago

    But with a always on VPN they constantly ask to verify our identity, even with passkey or phone number.

    Even when I successfully verify my passkey, they will still sent a SMS code to my recovery number. It's almost impossible to bypass that step and try another method button redirect again to the same phone verification page. If I didn't give my number, then this message appears, "there is not enough information to prove this is your account. try again later."

    Maybe VPN is a factor that triggering their security system.

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  • [–] 12 points 2 months ago* (4 children)

    Signal doesn’t offer anything except sms 2fa and requires a phone number. It’s a terrible choice considering LEO can do what they did here and just get legal access to MITM your sms messages, spoof the 2fa, and take over your account, impersonating you. The other ones aren’t encrypted. So none of these they broke into are great choices for truly secure messaging.

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  • [–] 9 points 2 months ago

    They can only impersonate you that way if your contacts dismiss the warning about your safety number changing. If you're being directly targeted by the government of a wealthy country, using a specific app isn't enough to prevent surveillance; you'll need some actual opsec.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago

    Signal offers direct key verification (which you need to do out of band) or transparency log key verification (your device can check that senders who you add by number hasn't had their key change)

    The attack here was getting an unlocked device in hand and using the internal sync feature without the user's knowledge, and the solution to that is always to check your phone after an untrusted person handled it unlocked (or with Cellebrite type devices) - or to simply not offer access to the Signal app while unlocked (perhaps even uninstalling it first).

    There is no app which is fully secure against an untrusted third party getting physical access to your unlocked phone, especially not if you have a weak PIN or just fingerprint unlock

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  • [–] 31 points 2 months ago* (1 child)

    Seems like signal could send a notification 24 hours after any new device is added to remind the user that it was done. Make it so it has to be dismissed on each device so dismissing it on one doesn’t make it vanish on the rest.

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  • [–] 97 points 2 months ago

    Signal failed to prevent soneone from accessing my unlocked phone and starting Signal! Everything was right there!

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  • [–] 50 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    The burglar broke in by knocking on the door and waiting for someone to come to the door and open it and then asking if they could come in and were let in and asked if they could just take stuff and the person said sure go nuts.

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  • [–] 24 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    A problem many aren't aware of, in an area that shares telecommunications info, two people within that area can be identified by the state sending encrypted messages by seeing when one person sends and another instantly receives a message. It could be easy enough to obscure that I would think by working differing lag times in.

    I think it was in the intercept a few years back. I think this is it.

    https://theintercept.com/2024/05/22/whatsapp-security-vulnerability-meta-israel-palestine/

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  • [–] 20 points 2 months ago

    Signal in this was clickbait they literally just say oh well if someone can link in their device they can see 45 days of message history

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  • [–] 40 points 2 months ago (7 children)

    To me, this proves that the police can still get the information they need without us handing over our encryption keys and requiring 'service providers' to MITM for them.

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  • [–] 17 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    Except they had to get the keys, at least for Signal, as described in the article. Only you can allow a new device. If you get a notification for a new device and you go "sure, let me flash that code for you", you're giving the key. And a moron.

    Can't say about the other services.

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  • [–] 5 points 1 month ago (2 children)

    Yeah, what I'm saying is that this proves there's no need for chat control. Law enforcement can already get what they want by being sneaky.

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  • [–] 4 points 1 month ago (1 child)

    There's also no need for chat control because there is almost always enough information anyway, but the police doesn't act on it. Their incompetency and lack of resources won't be helped by adding even more information to sift through.

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  • [–] 7 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    for signal, that is still required. if you look, they used linked devices to get the messages

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  • [–] 8 points 1 month ago

    The article also mentions using linked device access. Clever. Fuck the police, though.

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  • [–] 18 points 2 months ago (5 children)

    Telegram and whatsapp never had encryption. Also - they just give your messages on law enforcement request, always have.

    Signal - how does it work with signal again?

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  • [–] 19 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    They are a bit vague on this but I suspect all of these attack vectors start with LEOs having physical access to the unlocked phone. They then set up a trusted desktop without the phone owners knowing.

    Which is clever, to be fair. Whether or not that's legal is already a court case. The law is so frightfully grey.

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  • [–] 12 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    Its also a failure of the user's access control and operating security.

    Once a third party has access to the secure environment, that environment is and will always be compromised.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (1 child)

    Is the user made aware of this by the operator (signal, telegram, et al)?

    If not, it's a big haul to get to competency. The operator should be educating users on how to limit compromise.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago
    1. It NEVER advertises itself as such.

    2. IIRC Signal DOES warn you about this, first when you make an account, and then when you try to save media files, and when you try to start a group chat. The others aren't remotely secure anyway and I have no interest in attempting to defend them.

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  • [–] 14 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    Is everyone here really whining about social engineering? It's basic comp sec, weakest link are the people.

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  • [–] 6 points 2 months ago

    Heck the state

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  • [–] 6 points 2 months ago

    They reaaally want us to thibk Signal is equal to Whatsapp don't they

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  • [–] 2 points 1 month ago

    I might be mistaken but I don’t think Signal uses SMS alone to gain access to a chat so the attack vector for the Signal part based on what the article is saying is that the police are just getting access to a device that’s already authorised (and has the keys) then just adding in another device which they control. This sounds like Signal functioning as expected. The article does refer to police not wanting to give away too many details to maybe there’s something that hasn’t been disclosed, but the cited methods (assuming SMS is off the table for Signal) sound like normal behaviour.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (23 children)

    you know what would solve this? simplex.

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  • [–] 12 points 2 months ago (11 children)

    "Just get everyone in your life to move to ______ and that will solve all your problems"

    A suggestion as old as time

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  • [–] -1 points 2 months ago (10 children)

    it's one of the most secure message apps available.

    messages are signed, encrypted and passed through servers, never left on the server. unless you were the intended recipient you will not decrypt it.

    it's the truecrypt of instant messaging.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago (9 children)
  • [–] 0 points 2 months ago (8 children)

    signal has a closed source server that can't be audited.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (7 children)
  • [–] -1 points 2 months ago (6 children)

    what does it need a database for?

    simplex is literally a message broker. no data remains on the server.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (4 children)

    Signal doesn't keep messages either. Do you know what they can serve FBI every time they ask? Nothing but number at first seen date. They don't have your metadata.

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  • [–] 0 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    then why does it have a database?

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  • [–] 0 points 1 month ago (2 children)

    Here's what he documentation says;

    Messages persist in memory or in a database until they cross a threshold of time, typically on the order of days.

    ... Or wait...

    Oops, that was from Simplex, who has a database, that didn't come from Signal's documentation

    https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/master/protocol/overview-tjr.md

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  • [–] 2 points 1 month ago (1 child)

    cherry picking.

    By default, routers do not retain access logs, and permanently delete messages and queues when requested. Messages persist in memory or in a database until they cross a threshold of time, typically on the order of days.[0] There is still a risk that a router maliciously records all queues and messages (even though encrypted) sent via the same transport connection to gain a partial knowledge of the user's communications graph and other meta-data.

    what this means is don't blindly trust a random public router.

    if you host your own router, you can set the threshold to hours or seconds. you can also ensure that your router isn't maliciously storing records.

    simplex uses an in-memory queue to store messages for delivery. if the server was extracted for legal measures, this means the messages are erased and difficult if not impossible to collect.

    for signal, they are written to disk. this means there is evidence of communications between users. even if you host your own signal server, it will be there.

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  • [–] -1 points 1 month ago* (last edited 1 month ago)

    Liar

    You're claiming Signal does these things when it doesn't, and claim Simplex doesn't do what's in the documentation

    By the way, the Simplex CEO supports nazis

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  • [–] 7 points 2 months ago (10 children)

    Oh really? Simplex would block someone from accessing your phone and thus Simplex' data?

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  • [–] -1 points 2 months ago* (9 children)

    give me a list of messaging apps that stop attacks that leverage physical access.

    use a better os that has encryption and kill codes if that's your concern.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago (8 children)

    give me a list of messaging apps that stop attacks that leverage physical access.

    you know what would solve this? simplex.

    um...

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (7 children)

    either through physical access to someone’s phone OR by intercepting verification codes via a state-sanctioned phishing attack OR intercepting SMS messages via telephone surveillance

    why are you so against people using a more secure way to communicate?

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago (5 children)

    the only time they mention signal is when they explain they used linked devices to obtain signal messages. not SMS! if you lose your phone or whatever, and log in on a new device, your messages won't magically reappear, they are lost, and all your contacts get a warning that your safety numbers have changed.

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  • [–] 0 points 2 months ago (4 children)

    simplex messages stay on your phone. you can't switch phones and have them follow you because there's no way to sign in because there's no account for you to sign in with.

    simplex doesn't require a phone number or email. the trust is made between users, keeping users safer because it requires physical access between users. sure you can share your code over SMS or otherwise, but that's a user issue that breaks usage policy, not a problem with the software.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (3 children)

    simplex messages stay on your phone

    I think that's what I said with signal too. the exception is you can have your messages follow you, if you still have the old phone, because the app supports transferring the data.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (2 children)

    if it can transfer the data, there's more opportunity to successfully steal it.

    convenience will always negate security.

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    [–] 12 points 2 months ago

    That's not really surprising tbh.

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