I'm trying to create a web app that involves sharing of user-generated content, but one of the goals is that the service host operator should be blind to the content. Only authorized users should be able to see the content shared with them. This implies the content must be encrypted at rest, and users must hold custody of their private signing key.

I figure the situation requires an open source browser extension to hold onto a user's keys and decrypt content for them. The web app would still be able to browse all of the site's metadata, but any plaintext content must be siloed in the extension. The reason for using an extension is that the source code would be open source and independently verifiable, while building the same functionality into the web app would require trusting the host to serve the code you expect.

Do you think that's a reasonable tradeoff or is this asking too much from users?

The other option would be just requiring users to download an open source app for content viewing.

EDIT: Perhaps an important followup: are you OK placing trust in the host to never access your confidential data if it means you don't have to install additional client software or worry about verifying that client software's authenticity?

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[–] 38 points 2 months ago (11 children)

An extension is probably not needed. JavaScript and local storage allow you to do this kind of stuff. Proton Drive and Mail accomplish this without an extension.

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  • [–] [S] 12 points 2 months ago (10 children)

    I've answered this question in many other threads at this point, but since you're now the top comment:

    Proton Drive and Mail still require you to trust them to serve you Javascript that doesn't snoop on your plaintext content. They don't have any way of proving that their web app isn't taking your plaintext emails (which you can read in your browser and therefore they are visible to Javascript on that page) and sending it back to their server.

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  • [–] 11 points 2 months ago (8 children)

    Is their JS code open source? If so, I don't see any real differences between an extension and JS code. Unless extensions have less privileges or something. The user will have to either trust the code or inspect it themselves regardless if it's an extension or JS code.

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  • [–] [S] 10 points 2 months ago (5 children)

    The difference is that JS code served by a web server can change at the server's whim, and there is no standard way to verify that it matches what you expect except by reading it every time you visit the page.

    With an extension, assuming you trust the browser itself, you can check that the extension matches its source, and you only need to do that once per install.

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  • [–] 10 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    That's true. On the other hand, the extension gains a much larger attack surface since it has access to a lot more data (every site you visit vs. only the site that serves the JS code). At the end of the day, people wouldn't use your site if they didn't trust your site, especially if they use it for privacy and integrity reasons, so for most users I think JS is the better option. I suppose there's no reason you can't offer both though.

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  • [–] [S] 4 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    I think that's the prevailing sentiment in this thread. People would rather trust the site to run the code as advertised and get some added convenience rather than verify the code for themselves.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    Perhaps it makes more sense to have an extension that checks that the served javascript is correct? That should be a very simple, basic extension that doesn't increase the attack surface much. Users who care to verify the code can use that and everyone else can live with the convenience.

    Not sure if it makes much sense, it's probably more work than it's worth and maybe leads to doing the same thing twice.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago*

    Just FYI: I think since manifest 3 or so you do need explicit permissions to access a sites HTML. And the end user can see which sites the extension has access to. Doesn't make me install more extension than I really have to though.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago)

    Extensions can have more access.

    They can snoop / manipulate across tabs or even scan the local drive and execute system commands... when given the access.

    I had to make one for work once to let a web app run a legacy command prompt system. The web app's search was better, but the users wanted to edit with the old tool.

    It was kind of interesting the way it worked. Not remembering the full details, I created an extension and a batch script and had to register the batch script with a group policy and declare the extension's permission to run that batch script

    Then the users could search a client in the web app and press a button to bring up their profile in the prompt app.

    Not a recommended approach for public facing apps.

    *Edit: No! It wasn't a batch script... exactly... it was a C# app compiled to .dll that accepted client id as an argument

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  • [–] 9 points 2 months ago* (2 children)

    I think you can get away with using the web crypto apis and storing the private key in indexeddb. If you want users to be able to change devices or recover after blowing away their client storage, allow the user to download their private key and save it to a password manager.

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  • [–] [S] 3 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    IndexedDB is same-origin storage, readable by any script the origin serves. So the keys would not be safe from the host.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    You already have to trust the site anyways. You had to let them give your browser instructions on what to do with the keys so you can use it for e2e communication. If you are not ok with that then stick to compilling OSS yourself

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  • [–] 8 points 2 months ago (6 children)

    I mean no offense by this at all, but I wouldn’t because it would indicate a poor understanding of cryptography to me as a user. Either that or being intentionally misleading. In either case, probably unsafe for the user. There does not need to be an extension to encrypt content such that the server never has access to it. It can be encrypted and sent to the host with a key the server never possesses.

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  • [–] [S] 4 points 2 months ago (5 children)

    And how do you propose the web app provides the code to do that encryption without gaining access to the key?

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  • [–] 6 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (4 children)

    It doesn’t. The code your site provides is downloaded by your client’s browser. It uses a key on their side that is never sent back to your server. Same as if you did it with an extension or application. This is well trodden ground, and used across the internet such that hosts have zero knowledge of their users’ data aside from in its encrypted state.


    Actually, let me give a little ground here. There is a subtle but real benefit to an extension or signed application. With just JavaScript, a server could on a new page load deliver an altered code that would introduce a compromise. If that is the threat you want to mitigate for, you’re onto something. If you’re talking high stakes, and you make it clear this is the threat for which you’re protecting users, then I could be convinced.

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  • [–] [S] 6 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    The point is you can't prove the server won't serve you code that won't take your key and send it somewhere arbitrary.

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  • [–] 7 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    You're saying you don't want users to have to trust the website code that the server offers. So why would the user trust the extension instead?

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    Maybe because you can't make sure the server uses the code it advertises without modification (The source code could be open and safe, but how can you make sure the website is actually using that?), while the extension is open source and could be downloaded directly from Github by the user. And if enough websites start using this system, it could gradually stop being an extra extension for that one website.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    Maybe because you can’t make sure the server uses the code it advertises without modification

    You'd have the server provide the code to your browser, and do the encryption/decryption client-side.

    while the extension is open source and could be downloaded directly from Github by the user.

    I would not install an arbitrary browser extension from Github. That's just bad security hygiene. Extensions have way too many privileges, there's not enough mechanisms to ensure that an extension is used only on the site that it's intended for, and there's no safe way to maintain updates. Heck, even extensions distributed on browser's official marketplaces have been shown to be ridden with malware.

    If you're going to distribute code to run client-side for encryption/decryption, you may as well consider WASM. At least that's sandboxed...

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    You'd have the server provide the code to your browser, and do the encryption/decryption client-side.

    Yes, OP has a problem with this part. You'd have to trust the website to serve you the clean client side JS each time you use it. The proposal requires you to check the source code (which is plain un-minified JS) of the extension to make sure it's doing what's advertised when you download it the first time and with each update, instead of having to check the client side (obfuscated / minified) JS of every website each time you use it.

    I would not install an arbitrary browser extension from Github. That's just bad security hygiene. Extensions have way too many privileges, there's not enough mechanisms to ensure that an extension is used only on the site that it's intended for, and there's no safe way to maintain updates.

    That's true, but auditing that one extension (even on every update), which may be used by other websites in the future, giving it more attention and audits, is a lot easier than checking the client side JS of every website.

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  • [–] 5 points 2 months ago

    is this asking too much from users?

    Installing a browser extension for one site? From usability point of view, how is that any different than installing an app for each service/company?

    I wouldn't, but obviously there seems to be many people who install an app for everything.

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  • [–] 5 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    I wouldn't install a browser extension over an app. And I probably wouldn't install a browser extension for a web app.

    I've read the thread. Your argument for an extension is to make it open source, why couldn't your front end code be open source instead?

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago

    If what you're building is worth the hassle of installing the add-on and viewing the content, I suppose. There's not many programs people use PRIMARILY for security. You wouldn't use a note program that has audited security if you can't save notes, for instance.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago* (7 children)

    Can you derive the private key from the password? Like PBKDF2 or something. I guess it's what most E2E sites do. I wouldn't install anything unless it was for work and involved me receiving money.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    Something along these lines is a good idea, but be aware you need extra considerations to keep the e2ee intact. If like most websites you would send the password to the server to login, and if you derive the private key from the password, suddenly the server would have your private key.

    There's probably something you can do with hashing before sending to the server on login, but I don't have enough confidence to be definitive on that.

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  • [–] [S] 1 point 2 months ago (5 children)

    PBKDF2 is exactly what I'm using right now. The other reason for the extension is to prevent the host from ever having access to the key or the plaintext content. Sure, if you trust the host, the web code could be written to never send plaintext content back to the server. But I'm trying to eliminate that kind of trust requirement.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (4 children)

    The user's going to have to trust your code one way or another. Making it a separately downloaded extension/application, rather than some js in the browser page, doesn't change that.

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    Making the client open source means its auditable by the public. Making a server open source doesn't mean anything because you don't know if the host you're talking to is actually running that code.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (2 children)

    It's not the server code which is the question though, it's the client side, which either way is downloaded from somewhere you control (whether in minified js to run in the browser, or binary blob of a desktop app). A malicious developer can quite easily insert different code rather than the published source in either situation.

    I guess if you have a traceable build pipeline which is entirely under control of a trusted cloud provider, that might do it.

    But if so then there's no reason you can't make the web client "binary" available in the same way, as say a webroot zip or a container image. People can run it themselves against your backend api, or audit the frontend code your server is serving against the trusted version.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    Or for the hell of it, write your web client with its encryption code in plain js rather than minifying it or using a framework. Then someone can view source on the web page and literally see the client source which is running.

    Not the most maintainable solution of course, but highly transparent.

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  • [–] [S] 1 point 2 months ago

    or audit the frontend code your server is serving against the trusted version.

    OK but that requires everyone to be a vigilant user. It's much easier for users to just install the software themselves and verify the checksum matches.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago

    Well I heard that safety is always a compromise between convenience and security. I think this would only make sense if you have a provider that you can trust now to provide a clean extension, but you can't trust to not do a rugpull or be forced by agents to suddenly implement a vulnerability. But that is basically specifically targeting you or your group. So this is already incredibly niche.

    For most people, you either trust or you don't, and preferably you only trust a server in a neutral country like Switzerland. If you make it too complicated you diminish the usefulness of the service.

    I believe it would be far more secure to have a native linux app written in e.g. rust to do all this. For an encrypted messenger for example.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago*

    What? Lol no. And a site like that probably shouldn't have signatures. Something like Bernstein authenticators would be way preferable.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago

    In part that sounds like what zeronet did, but that was static p2p websites. User content was signed and distributed by the user. But the code of the website could block and filter the user content. Everything was handled by client-side javascript basically

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago

    No, as there's no use case for me.

    Not all data that I share is sensitive. Server stored stuff, unencrypted is fine for me.

    As for other sorts of sensitive stuff, Signal works perfectly fine for me.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago

    This is a recipe for blindly hosting CSAM.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (1 child)

    Checkout cryptpad, it may inspire you ideas on how to implement an app to hold user-encrypted contents

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    If you want it to work, I think you'll need to start with a group of trusted contacts who run it because they know you and want to use what you've built.

    If it really solves some problems, word will spread out from there.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    If it's a solid extension which could be used by other websites, and it's explained clearly like in your post by the website which needs it, then probably yes.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    Hell no. I don't install any extensions for any reason other than uBlock and a pw manager. Just because you say "trust me, bro" doesn't make your extension secure or privacy - focused.

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  • [–] -4 points 2 months ago

    Https already encrypts content during transit. Just use login/password/totp/passkey.

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