Sounds like a misnomer to me.

all 36 comments

sorted by: hot top controversial new old
[–] 27 points 1 year ago (8 children)

Cause there's no user data stored on EFI, and saying "almost-full-disk-except-for-the-EFI-partition-encryption" is a bit cumbersome and, obviously, pedantic.

  • source
  • hideshow 8 child comments
  • [–] [S] 0 points 1 year ago (7 children)

    Sure, but unencrypted means it can be tampered with. The bootloader can be modified to write your password to disk and once you boot, submit that to a server somewhere - or worse.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 7 child comments
  • [–] 11 points 1 year ago

    That's precisely why secure boot and TPMs exist - the TPM can store the keys to decrypt the drives and won't give them unless the signed shim executable can be verified; the shim executable then checks the kernel images, options, and DKMS drivers' signatures as well. If the boot partition has been tampered with, the drive won't decrypt except by manual override.

    The big problem is Microsoft controls the main secure boot certificate authority, rather than a standards body. This means that either a bad actor stealing the key or Microsoft itself could use a signed malicious binary used to exploit systems.

    Still, it's at least useful against petty theft.

    TPM sniffing attacks seem possible, but it looks like the kernel uses parameter and session encryption by default to mitigate that: https://docs.kernel.org/security/tpm/tpm-security.html

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 4 points 1 year ago (3 children)

    There’s also PXE boot, secure boot, carrying around a live image on a flash drive, etc.

    But any attacker advanced enough to tamper with your EFI partition in an evil-maid scenario has plenty of other options to log and steal your encryption passphrase, so it’s generally a moot point.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 3 child comments
  • [–] [S] -3 points 1 year ago (2 children)

    With that logic there's no need to even encrypt your partitions 🤷

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 10 points 1 year ago

    Absolutely not — the skill level needed to tamper with a bashrc, pull credentials + keys, or generally hunt for sensitive info on an unencrypted disk is worlds apart from the skill level needed to modify an EFI binary.

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 22 points 1 year ago (6 children)

    The "disk" in this terminology is actually referring to the partition, which is the active disk when an OS boots. Different partitions are treated as different disks,, it's not about the physical disk.

    Say you have 2 drives: one could contain only unencrypted portions of boot information, and the second drive could only contain encrypted partitions.

    Then it would meet your definition of how it should work by terminology 😂

  • source
  • hideshow 6 child comments
  • [–] 1 point 1 year ago (5 children)

    There is full disk encryption on Tumbleweeds using TPM and systems boot. It encrypts the ESP (EFI) partition and you supply password or fido2 key to unlock boot loader and disk

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 5 child comments
  • [–] 1 point 1 year ago (4 children)

    That's not what the question is asking...

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 4 child comments
  • [–] 0 points 1 year ago (3 children)

    True, other distros don't have full disk encryption, they have partition encryption.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 3 child comments
  • [–] -1 points 1 year ago (2 children)

    No, not what I'm saying. Any distro can do what you're describing, they just don't. It's not proprietary technology or anything. I could go and make my LUKS whatever open with a key right now, it's just problematic.

    The OP wasn't asking about any of this though, you're just throwing your own unrelated "AKSHUALLY" nonsense into the thread. Question was asked and answered.

    See ya.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 0 points 1 year ago

    Just sharing for awareness because people often assume that because one diatro does not do it, means Linux doesn't do it.

    Like when everyone complains about Linux not having hibernation, it does.

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 20 points 1 year ago (4 children)

    To add to the other comments: it's "full-disk" to distinguish it from "per-file" encryption. And "full-partition" didn't catch on, probably because functionally an unencrypted boot partition makes little practical difference.

  • source
  • hideshow 4 child comments
  • [–] 0 points 1 year ago (2 children)

    I think FDE is different to full partition. If your home partition is encrypted but not your root partition, that's not FDE. I would say FDE is when the partition that you mount to / is encrypted.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 2 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    This is more nitpicking. Yes, there's a difference between partition and disk. But if we want to get technical, it's not disk encryption unless you're using a HDD. SSDs don't have disks.

    At the end of the day, FDE would generally imply that all partitions with user data on them are encrypted. So it would generally include root and home partitions, and generally not include the boot partition, and would likely include partitions like /var and /opt, though not necessarily.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 1 child comment
  • [–] 11 points 1 year ago

    Yeah, my disk's not even full.

  • source
  • [–] 6 points 1 year ago (6 children)

    Well, something has to be. You can have your EFI partition on a separate drive and then the actual drive will be fully encrypted. It's just as good as we can get, the algorithm for decrypting the data obviously can't be encrypted.

    I think there are implementations with encryption logic stored in the BIOS or on a separate chip, but don't quote me on that. And even then, the decryption logic itself will be unencrypted, because, as it happens, computers can't run encrypted code.

  • source
  • hideshow 6 child comments
  • [–] 4 points 1 year ago* (2 children)

    efi partition on a separate disk makes a lot of sense actually, imo the biggest point of fde is that your boot environment doesn't get fucked with from outside your trusted os, so if you put your efi on a read only CD or something and lock your bios to boot into that, that can't really be tampered with easily in software

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 7 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    As bad as secure boot is, that's exactly the use case for it. Frankly, you can both swap the CD and solder a new BIOS flash if you are really interested in boot poisoning, the latter is just a tiny bit harder to do without some sort of trace.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 1 child comment
  • [–] [S] 0 points 1 year ago (2 children)

    Why not have the BIOS decrypt the disk then continue the boot process as normal?

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 9 points 1 year ago (1 child)

    Mainly because then the manufacturer decides on how your stuff is encrypted, no likie.

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 1 child comment
  • [–] 3 points 1 year ago*

    What do you mean?? Our Motherboards come equipped with the latest and greatest Military Grade™ MD5 RealGood™ Encryption Technology.
    What do you mean it's not longer considered secure????? Fake news, we'd never lie to you.

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 5 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (2 children)

    There is FULL disk encryption, I have it on tumbleweed with TPM and systemd boot.

    This is long but further down it explains grub2 boot as luks unlocker was good , but with TPM secrets and systemd boot they can (edit for accuracy) encrypt a binary boot file that goes in ESP (EFI) partition. TPM asks for password before unlocking bootloader.

    https://news.opensuse.org/2023/12/20/systemd-fde/

  • source
  • hideshow 2 child comments
  • [–] 1 point 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 child)

    Share your lsblk output. It's likely that your system still leaves the bootloader unencrypted on the disk, even if the kernels and bootloader config are being encrypted (they aren't encrypted by default on most installs).

    It is theoretically possible to have only one partition that is luks encrypted, but this requires you to store the bootloader in the UEFI, and not all motherboards support this, so distros usually just install it to an unencrypted partition. The UEFI needs to be able to read an unencrypted bootloader from somewhere. That's why it's somewhat absurd to claim that the ESP can be encrypted, because it simply can't.

    From your link:

    One difference is that the kernel and the initrd will be placed in the unencrypted ESP,

  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 1 child comment
  • [–] 2 points 1 year ago

    Yeah, I'm using a large font in reader mode and I think I had the word encrypted showing without un onscreen.

    You are correct, it makes a custom binary in the fat partition that is verified by TPM for unlocking/proceeding, that binary then contains the other parts to move forward.

  • source
  • parent
  • [–] 6 points 1 year ago*

    The partition table isn't encrypted either. What a scam.

  • source
  • [–] 3 points 1 year ago

    Must be because full-ish sounds way too much like foolish, making people think it is a useless thing to do.

  • source
  • [–] 1 point 1 year ago*

    My guess is because that idea became tied to secure boot respectively chassis intrusion quickly, which makes encrypting every last bit unnecessary. There is true FDE baked into SSDs tho - they can store their key in a TPM.

  • source
  • [–] 0 points 1 year ago

    :I who cares..... do you want it to be called system partition encryption? i mean honestly that sounds better imo but its not something that's a big deal

  • source