In the US, if cops get into a phone before a warrant, even if a warrant is issued later, all evidence from the phone is suppressed as illegally obtained.
This is a bigger concern with respect to intelligence agencies who conduct mass surveillance.
In the US, if cops get into a phone before a warrant, even if a warrant is issued later, all evidence from the phone is suppressed as illegally obtained.
This is a bigger concern with respect to intelligence agencies who conduct mass surveillance.
If only we could see what apple was doing under the hood. If only companies that constantly pat themselves on the back for being secure could be open source.
Wasn't there a vulnerability in the chips apple uses for USB?
For chips released in 2018 and 2019. To the best of my knowledge anything newer than a iPhone 11 nothing has yet been found and announced. So 7 years ago. That said you know that if there is some unannounced vulnerability and some spyware company or government knows of it, they are not going to report it.
Reminder: if you anticipate being in contact with law enforcement and have any spare moments at all: restart your phone and do not unlock it. This “before first unlock” (BFU) state does not yet have auth keys loaded and secrets decrypted in active memory, and is thus rather more difficult to exploit and gain entry to.
If Apple really cared, they would make it so that a Shortcut that performed the Reboot action was allowed to run on a schedule, unattended. But no, that’s specifically disallowed.
I assume that would just be shutting down the phone. When it boots up it required the passcode, which is what they want to bypass here
No, this preserves the phone in an "after first unlock" state. They specifically dont want a phone to reboot or shutdown because then the encryption keys get dumped from memory and require the password to decrypt the keys.
Yeah... Aka if it was shutdown. It isn't before first unlock state. So if you are going to get arrested, shutting the phone off mitigates all of this
Disclaimer: I only use iPhones for security testing, so this is more from related literature rather than first-hand experience.
IIRC the hardening unattended reboot could offer is already covered better by options like disabling biometric unlock, security key 2FA, enabling lockdown mode, enabling advanced data protection, disabling iCloud, disabling USB accessories, and so forth. Also unattended reboot seems like an easy prank vector or foot gun to render a device permanently inaccessible (i.e., device always reboots immediately after pin entry) requiring recovery mode reset or restore to fix.
A. If you want 2fa to unlock a phone fuck off B. One has to opt in to iCloud. (It's way to fucking motivated and absolutely a forced thing in my opinion though)
If you can't download an app without being signed into an account... You paved the way for Microsoft. Literally were the worst of the worst and made it so. Even the Microsoft store allowed $0 purchase without sign in for years after if not possibly still today. (I don't use them).
That said... Security testing anything should tell you the Apple/Google/Microsoft system is all wayyyy more secure using 2FA and activation locks we all hate because theft is a thing. We shouldn't need an original proof of purchase to unlock a device, yet we do because social engineering makes it that way.
Agreed, I’m pretty used to security key unlocks and still wouldn’t want that friction on a personal device.
Also just for completeness, since I forgot to mention: enabling stolen device protection and findmy/mdm to enable remote wipe.
Most smartphones encrypt the majority of their storage these days.
This means there are two states the phone can be in.
BFU, or Before First Unlock, is the most secure. When you power on the phone it has just enough software in unencrypted storage to come on, initialize its hardware, start some background processes, and display an unlock screen. This is the most secure state for the phone. When you type in your password, the password itself decrypts the actual key which is used to decrypt the main storage. Without that password, the data is essentially useless as it cannot be decrypted. Also, most phones are now set up so that if you try the wrong password 10 times, it will erase the main storage encryption key which means the data is completely unrecoverable forever. In general, it doesn't matter what you can exploit BFU because there's very little running to exploit and the storage encryption key is usually stored in a secure enclave, that is a special part of a chip that is designed to resist tampering.
Once you type in your password the first time, the phone is AFU, or After First Unlock. The key to access main storage is held in memory, it is being actively used to read and write from that storage as software is running on the phone like email, background apps, etc. The prompt to unlock the phone looks exactly the same, but in reality the phone is in a much less secure state. There's plenty of software, both system and apps, running for you to try to exploit.
The point here is that if you set the phone to regularly reboot, or to reboot if you haven't logged in in a day or two, each time it reboots it switches back to BFU state.
And so if some government agency has arrested you and seized your phone, you want that reboot to happen because if the phone automatically reboots before they manage to get into it, it becomes much much harder for them to get in.
Well said, that’s exactly what I was getting at. Apple has a Shortcut command that can switch to BFU - it’s called Reboot - but they specifically prevent users from setting it up to run on a schedule of their convenience. They might be afraid of accidental boot loops, or breaking wake up alarms, or something else - they haven’t published reasoning anywhere I’ve seen. But I think it’s pretty poor of them to restrict the feature.
Well, I expect this to be patched asap now that it has leaked. Apple has been quick to patch things when such leaks happen. Hopefully that’s the case here too.
I have a family member who is a cop, and they told me this was possible months ago. I doubt Apple doesn't know
Apple probably gave them the backdoor
On the assumption Apple wants to facilitate access to such authorities, were I Apple, I'd have either already made available redundant backdoor so disabling any one wouldn't be a problem; or, I'd have others ready to be opened when I need to shut others down.
they're quick IF we always accept that they really did find out about it at the same time as everyone else.
Bring back the power hard switch. Problem solved.
And a removable battery. One I can guarantee the battery will pop off if I accidentally drop it while my hands are in the air.
This is actually an interesting idea. SpikeBoot. An feature which reboots the phone if it gets dropped and not unlocked in 30s.
So, y'all gonna switch to GrapheneOS now?
The companies who sell these bypass devices spend time on graphene too, don’t worry.
The price of iOS exploits would suggest Apple’s doing a pretty good job in this area.
I'm sure they do spend time on Graphene OS, but that's not the same as being successful in cracking it.
I remember one cybersec company got hit with an internal communications leak that suggested they could get into any GrapheneOS device before the Pixel 9, AFU or BFU. They were still having trouble with BFU Pixel 9. But this was a year or two ago.
Device wipe before capture/seizure seems to be the highest guarantee.
As someone with a Pixel 8 running Graphene OS, I'd love for you to cite the source so I could read it.
https://www.androidauthority.com/cellebrite-leak-google-pixel-grapheneos-security-3611794/
Appears I was partially misremembering, they were able to get into older phones on older security patches.
Most of these exploits involve side channel attacks which are much closer to the hardware. Graphene definitely does a lot more to make that difficult, but typically devices are getting pwned within a few months even with graphene.
Having graphene on relatively new hardware is a really good practice, but it obviously isn't a complete security posture on its own. Not having sensitive, compromising or incriminating stuff on your daily carry phone is much more important.
I wonder if they spend time on Linux mobile devices, considering how niche they are.
But then again, security through obscurity is not real security, and I'm not aware of any reasonable way to run something like QubesOS on a phone in any way that would be usable.
I'm sure they spend time on Linux in general, since it is the most common operating system (and includes Android, so even bigger). I doubt they spend much, if any, effort on the specific subset of systems that make a Linux phone different from another Linux device.
Smartphones had been vulnerable for pretty much it's entire existence, and most of time, while true software do play a role, it's been more about stuff such as bootloader exploits.
Sadly Linux phones on it's state are insecure by design.
Does graphite disable faceid and touchid?
On Graphene, Lockdown mode disables biometric login until you unlock it manually with your passcode, but the device is still in the less secure AFU (After First Unlock) state.
You can also set it to restart the device if not used within a set time period. Various settings from 10 minutes to 72 hours. So if you haven't touched your device within that time period, it will shutdown and restart, going back to the more secure BFU (Before First Unlock) state.
That's no different than iOS in that regard then (minus the configurable restart time). But that's about what I'd expect, not sure you could have a useable phone if it didn't have an AFU state at all.
It's almost like there's only two ways to actually accomplish this type of thing. You can do the same basic thing but use different names to differentiate where/how that function is used.
Lock it and require the passcode where the decryption key is still in memory because the system is running, or shutdown/restart the device so the decryption key isn't in memory anymore.
What would a third option even look like?
Are you. Understanding a standard shut down does what you want?
What are you babbling about? Of course, that's why I already said it. Twice.
Both comments I have made in thi thread have mentioned shutting down or restarting the device to put it back into a BFU state.
Since you clearly didn't actually read the comments you are replying to... I'll include the relevant parts from both below:
You can also set it to restart the device if not used within a set time period. Various settings from 10 minutes to 72 hours. So if you haven’t touched your device within that time period, it will shutdown and restart, going back to the more secure BFU (Before First Unlock) state.
Lock it and require the passcode where the decryption key is still in memory because the system is running, or shutdown/restart the device so the decryption key isn’t in memory anymore.
You still didn't answer the question I posed though... before replying in way that seems to indicate you either can't, or refuse to actually read before responding condescendingly.
Since you seem to think there should be another choice instead of doing the same two things to protect the device/data... what would a third option look like? Other than locking and disabling biometrics, or a shutdown/restart putting the device back into BFU mode.
Or are you just stuck thinking a shutdown and reboot are technically different things? Even though that makes no difference here since they both put a device into BFU.
You can disable. You can also two factor it e.g. fingerprint and pin, with also a long password for BFU.
The fingerprint is the way in they are using. Bio entries are owned by the police if arrested. Finger/face/eye. Passwords/passcodes are not.
(Basically they own your body, not your mind without a warrant)
They are not supposed to own my body except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
/hj
Lockdown mode disables biometrics while still leaving your device on, say if you know you're going to talk to the police and don't want to be forced to provide biometrics to unlock the device. And you can setup an automatic reboot after a set time period where it would return to a BFU state automatically.
Let me clarify: when I meant two factor, I mean both. You need both the print AND the pin to unlock. So its more convenient than a full passphrase (for first unlock) but still requires knowledge not just biometrics.
Genuine question here. I don't really get the idea of using print and then a pin. If I want more security, then I use the pin alone, if I want more convenience, then I use a print. Can someone please give me an example in which using both actually makes sense? I honestly don't see how using both would benefit security, it certainly does not benefit convenience.
I can see the use of 2 factor with a PIN and then a hardware key like a yubikey, or a pin and then a password, that does make sense to me, focused on security alone and doing away with convenience.
The benefit is if your PIN was compromised your phone would still be inaccessible, barring them having you physically. It's another layer of defense. Similar to a yubikey, if someone had your phone but not the extra hardware. Although I think using a yubikey every time I wanted to use my phone would be prohibitively inconvenient.
Also, I don't think PIN and password would be considered 2 Factor. That's essentially just a longer password.
In GrapheneOS you can set it so it requires both a password and a fingerprint
but that's only needed when apple doesn't give access to the phone which they just do when there's a warrant
cops have no problems getting in iphones there's just a little delay sometimes
they still have all the hacking technology too
[citation needed]
Apple's been pretty good at patching vulnerabilities and a pain in the ass for cops trying to get into phones, with the only actually better option being GrapheneOS.
I don't have a phone.
So you dont play Diablo?
Yes you do
No, I don't
Yes, you do
Have you ever talked to me on the phone?
AND
Do I have a phone?
Is the same answer for both questions.
Cops in USA? Is this only for USA? If yes, I don't care. The article tittle suggests police all over the world.
Is there a different iPhone outside of the us?
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