It's funny how every big tech decision these last few years all sound like a shitty James Bond villain step in a shitty world domination plan, with shitty corpo writing.
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YSK: This feature was disabled with a pushed firmware update.
Its true it was "not supported", but the CPU was/is capable of it.
The big issue here is did AMD disable it accidentally, or did they do it intentionally. If it was intentional why did they not announce it anywhere in the update notes, or anywhere else?
The headline is a little misleading: the feature has disappeared from consumer chips but AMD is not responding when asked why. As the article itself says: it's not clear if this is a deliberate decision, or a bug that has caused this issue.
The headline implies it was a deliberate action. Maybe it was, but at the moment we don't really know. But it is good that Toms Hardware is writing about this and drawing attention to this issue. It's concerning regardless of the reason, and it's also concerning how cagey AMD is being about addressing this issue.
If it's deliberate and not put back, there's also the possibility the government made them remove it and not disclose why. So they can continue to access certain info and back doors and this security was giving them issues.
The government forced email providers to have a backdoor for them. It's the NSA's PRISM program. Been around since at least 2008.
The article isnt very clear on this, but did they actually remove a critical feature from already sold products? Surely they can be sued for that?
Tom's is trash and should be banned. The original Ars article it mentions is better: https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/06/users-cry-foul-after-amd-stripped-memory-crypto-from-its-consumer-cpus/
Sounds like it was never really supported, but available. With the new BIOS update it's no longer available.
If that's the case, AMD shouldn't have problems saying so. Although it's still a very bad move from their part.
Eh, it protects against a certain class of attack when the attacker has physical access e.g. reading memory with memory probes while the computer is (still) on to get passwords etc., i.e. sophisticated attackers like customs, FBI. If they have physical access you're probably hosed anyway, but if you have the presence of mind to shut the machine off (not sleep, hard off if needed) memory encryption becomes irrelevant.
That is not correct. Data can persist in RAM even when powered off, especially if the sticks are frozen. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack
That actually is correct, because if you power your system down ahead of time, this attack is meaningless since there is only a VERY short window where this attack works. From your link:
Attackers execute cold boot attacks by forcefully and abruptly rebooting a target machine and then booting a pre-installed operating system from a USB flash drive, CD-ROM or over the network.
If your attacker only has your cold machine that's been off since well before you hit the checkpoint, they can't do shit with that attack. At best they can boot the system up to verify your system operates as intended, but you don't have to provide any of the credentials to finish booting or unlock the TPM to load the key material into memory.
To add to that, even the original paper written with 1999-2007 era SDRAM/DDR/DDR2 is not optimistic about the scenario of a machine that was already powered down at regular operating temperatures:
with the fastest exhibiting complete data loss in approximately 2.5 seconds and the slowest taking an average of 35 seconds
And that only got worse with more advanced RAM, not to mention that they lost almost all of the data far quicker than that with only a couple % of bits surviving that long. For all practical intents and purposes, cold boot against an already-powered-down machine is a myth, the cooling has to be applied while it's on.
Isn't that attack only viable within minutes of a machine being powered down? That seems like a huge caveat...
Isn't that attack only viable within minutes of a machine being powered down?
Not even, try seconds at most.
All things considered, a cold boot attack is only remotely feasible if the system is powered on when the attack begins. If it's powered off for any length of time, your memory will have decayed past the point of it being usable for the attack.
Ah, thanks, I stand corrected. Still a good practice.
FYI, the cold boot attack is only viable for a handful of seconds before your memory decays enough for it to be worthless for that attack.
Powering your system down yourself prevents this. Just make sure your system doesn't have fastboot enabled or hibernates instead of a true power off.
Hold up, since when did consumer Ryzen CPUs have memory encryption support? I was sure that was always a EPYC exclusive feature.
Create the problem, sell the solution situation?
Or just enshitifcation?
what problem did they create?
The lack of memory encryption....
How's that attempt to get back onto consumers' good side again going for you, AMD?
It feels weird this was even ever a standard consumer feature. I wouldn't even really expect it on enterprise hardware outside of servers. This feels like stuff you only really need to think about if you're being directly targeted by a group with resources.
It seems like it is not a lot of overhead if any at all. Also the hardware design easily accommodates it. So why not if the work is already done?
that could be said about any and all kinds of encryption
Is this different than the ddr5's memory encryption?
I don't think DDR5 has any encryption built in? Maybe you're thinking of the error correction controller that's on the module now? Memory with inline encryption is not very common, and as far as I know, not actually very secure if the CPU/TPM isn't the one holding the encryption key.
What the fuck AMD?
Maybe Intel isn't the only company burning from within...
AMD also recently dropped Linux support from the Vivado free tier. Although the support they had before was really bad
AMDGPU has also had major issues since kernel 6.18 that they (AMD, not the linux kernel team, they know) refuse to acknowledge.
There might be a Linus rant about that one soon...
I didn't know memory was ever encrypted. I mean why would it be?
If I had my way, everyone's drives and ram and whatever would be encrypted from top to bottom with extremely strong keys that only the user had access to. Nobody needs to have access to your stuff except you, and it doesnt matter if you are the most law-abiding citizen in the world who does nothing but eat bread and read the news paper every day, your privacy is sanctamount (whether you agree with this or not). Medical records, bank statements, tax records, private journals, etc. are just a few examples of data that mundane people with "nothing to hide" deserve to have protected to the nines.
Who would want memory encryption for the hoi polloi to be quietly removed and what colour hat would you think they might wear.
Riot in the streets. (/S)
But for real. Technofascists will keep making everything worse until there are consequences. Riot in the streets would certainly send that message. Though there are so many things worth rioting over.
I believe you already are Pissed
"AMD engineer" in this case is actually "senior principal software engineer", which translates to "management". Who was likely told by the VP over his department to STFU based on what the VP was likely told by their legal dept.
Context is important.
AMD has been winning big in the enthusiast space since Ryzen started taking off. Recently, they've made a lot of opaque and anti-consumer moves. I guess they've decided to start burning some of that good-will they've been building... Meanwhile, intel seems to be warming up? As the pendulum swings, I suppose.
Am i correct in my understanding that if I've got a Ryzen CPU running Linux, and assuming I've not gotten hit by this beforehand, I'm safe so long as I don't pull newer microcode packages from the repos?
This Ars article is better. https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/06/users-cry-foul-after-amd-stripped-memory-crypto-from-its-consumer-cpus/
It looks like it's from a BIOS update. I'm not sure if the microcode packages will do it too.
Do you know if you actually had this enabled and working?
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