I don't trust Microsoft, why should I start trusting IBM/Canonical or Poettering now.
If the possibility is there they will happily lock you out of your own hardware.
I don't trust Microsoft, why should I start trusting IBM/Canonical or Poettering now.
If the possibility is there they will happily lock you out of your own hardware.
Secureboot is worthless if the Microsoft keys are still enabled. It should only allow code that you sign yourself to boot.
If the end user can arbitrarily sign code themselves that is bootable then it kind of defeats the purpose of secure boot.
The whole idea is that it makes it impossible to start if the chain of trust is broken.
It keeps someone from booting code that hasn't been signed with my key. That's the whole point of secure boot. If someone else has the key, then it's not secure anymore.
The chain of trust starts with the owner of the hardware, not some random corporation that happens to make an OS. The owner can, if they wish, outsource the root of the chain of trust to a corporation, but that should be an active decision on their part, not something that happens just because the hardware was shipped with some random OS preloaded.
The thing is in such a case secureboot doesn't help and is unnecessary. Secureboot only does anything for the concept of "trusted suppliers".
If the system has available signing keys for itself, well, hypothetical malware could sign itself using those same keys The OS security mechanisms are the only things protecting that, and in which case the signature validation is redundant.
You can have trusted boot, e.g. LUKS volume sealed to TPM PCRs, but secureboot just doesnt make sense as a mechanism for a user to only trust themselves.
If the end user can arbitrarily sign code themselves that is bootable then it kind of defeats the purpose of secure boot.
They can & it doesn't. They can change the platform key to become the platform owner & control the public keys they keep in the code signing databases. Secure Boot gives the platform owner control over authorized code signers of boot processes.
It'll start as an option and slide into compulsory later. It's the Systemd way.
You can already secure boot if you want. But like always, you gotta set it up yourself in a complicated manner :D
It’s Linux. In what world do you imagine there wouldn’t be 87 forks that went in a different direction.
Linux cannot be controlled, at least as it stands today.
When Linus disappears I have some fears. But jerk as he may be, he’s also incredibly effective at keeping it open.
In what world do you imagine there wouldn’t be 87 forks that went in a different direction.
In every world. Linux is not just the codebase, it's all the developer work going into it daily. Hundreds of forks and downstreams can pick whichever direction they want, most of that work will still be directed one way.
But this proposal for a full auth-chain isn’t a proposal by Linus and many thousands contributors. It’s the proposal of a commercial entity that doesn’t control Linux in any way.
Yes, this commercial entity founded by people who have a literal track record of doing exactly that

Volunteer adoption of a system found to be better by distro maintainers is not the same as forced adoption of a system distro maintainers don’t find to be better.
"Found to be better" because of commercial resources and support pouring in and outcompeting grassroots alternatives to gain market share. Do you share the same lukewarm acceptance for what chromium is doing for web browsers?
Who decides what SecureBoot considers trustworthy? If SecureBoot is controlled by someone else then it can be used against the user. The aversion to SecureBoot is justified.
Secureboot uses certificates to verify integrity. The user is able to install new certificates. So I'd say it is the user? I'm not an expert though and their may be hardware out there that doesn't allow new certificates.
The user is able to install new certificates.
That's true today, but there's no guarantee it will be true in the future. Google is already pushing for all software running on Android to be cryptographically verified and they (Google) are the only ones that control the signing keys. This means that they intend to kill off F-droid and all other software delivered outside the Google store.
If Google is able to pull it off on Android, everyone else will try to do it on desktop OSes too - Linux included.
That’s true today, but there’s no guarantee it will be true in the future.
It's in the specification.
The platform key establishes a trust relationship between the platform owner and the platform firmware. The platform owner enrolls the public half of the key (PKpub) into the platform firmware. The platform owner can later use the private half of the key (PKpriv) to change platform ownership or to enroll a Key Exchange Key. See “Enrolling The Platform Key” and “Clearing The Platform Key” for more information.
The platform owner clears the public half of the Platform Key (PKpub) by deleting the Platform Key variable using UEFI Runtime Service SetVariable(). The data buffer submitted to the SetVariable() must be signed with the current PKpriv - see Variable Services for details. The name and GUID of the Platform Key variable are specified in Globally Defined Variables. The platform key may also be cleared using a secure platform-specific method. When the platform key is cleared, the global variable SetupMode must also be updated to 1.
It's a matter of clearing the platform key & enrolling your own platform key. I've done this before.
Typically, computers with Secure Boot let us clear the platform key from the boot menu. (You can choose to purchase only those that do.) Some computer vendors ship Secure Boot in setup mode or let the customer provide public keys to ship preloaded.
Secure Boot has always been for enabling the owner to enforce integrity of the boot process through cryptographic signatures. Linus Torvalds thought the feature makes sense.
Linus: I actually think secure boot makes a lot of sense. I think we should sign our modules. I think we should use the technology to do cryptographic signatures to add security; and at the same time inside the open source community this is so unpopular that people haven’t really worked on it.
It’s true that secure boot can be used for horribly, horribly bad things but using that as an argument against its existence at all is I think a bit naive and not necessarily right. Because if you do things right then it’s a really good thing. I would like my own machine to have the option to not boot any kernel, or boot loader, that is not signed by this signature.
That's right. The user (or administrator if it's a work machine) installs or removes acceptable certificates into firmware database. Typically a device you buy in the past 15 years or so comes with Microsoft certificates preinstalled, but it doesn't have to stay like that.
AFAIK, the allowing the user to install and remove certificates is a x86_64 thing only, arm will happilly fuck you over, x86_64 UEFI implementations ARE REQUIRED TO add that feature to be spec compliant, this was a intentional decision by Intel and AMD to keep x86_64 open to new OS and not locked down to Windows which could one day be a sinking ship, so that x86_64 would not be at the mercy of Microsoft's success and attachment to the platform
I have seen some platforms locked to Microsoft first party keys only. They boiled the frog by starting with it being optional, able to enroll your own keys, and Microsoft signing third party bootloaders, but now there exists a Microsoft-only certificate regime that at least some vendors have selected, or at least made a selectable option. The pitch being that Windows shops that don't trust their users can be assured they aren't deviating from the blessed windows os their IT trusts.
Can't say it's obvious how to change certificates on my motherboard. Just updated the BIOS and had to turn off SecureBoot so it could boot into my Linux install (MSI B450 Tomahawk Max).
Can't wait to not be able to VR game with my Nvidia GPU on Linux cuz they can't be arsed to properly sign their damn proprietary drivers.
Nvidia can't meaningfully sign their Linux drivers. A distribution can, in theory, include Nvidia drivers in their build and sign it, but the logistics of out of tree drivers is just impossible.
Redhat toys with the concept of a whitelisted ABI for some limited range of kernels, but I've never seen a driver actually roll with that.
Basically Linux would need to embrace some form of ABI, and there's been zero interest in doing so.
An alternative to secureboot that isn't secureboot but behaves like it. Wonderful 🙄
Another Poettering "masterpiece" ready to be gobbled up by his fanbase who will flock towards the new and shiny toy that forgoes the things that actually work fine or aren't solving an actual problem with 99% of whatever it's used by. Great 🙄 🙄 🙄
EDIT:
No doubt this will be his opportunity to force everyone off grub and use systemd as the bootloader across major distros. As valid as it may be to succeed grub, surely systemd is not the answer to this.
Oh wow. I thought I couldn't despise that piece of shit any more than I already did. Fuck you, Lennart Poettering, may you burn in some fiery place in the afterlife you useless corporate lickspittle.
Because if there's one thing Linux users think about their systems .. it's "hey why does this thing let me do what I want?"
There’s a universe of difference between changes you intended to make in your system, and changes you didn’t intend because a state actor attacked you based on your social media criticism.
Unlike with closed source software, you can always decide you don’t want your software to be secure.
What you should be worried about is not software but hardware.
Uhhhh...wha?
This would be a big deal for hardware manufacturers or product manufacturers in securing their devices. Only a tiny, tiny fraction of Linux users are just desktop jockeys.
I was referring to this
If this technology is successful, the end result could be that we would see our Linux laptops one day being as locked down as an Iphone or Android device.
What if the thing that you want is to have SecureBoot-enforced hardware attestation?
That would be beneficial to users as well. I'm not understanding the downside here.
I guess you're not thinking of "locked down" in terms of independent developers finding the iOS and Android "play by our rules and be distributed thru our app store or we'll make it hard for users to run your software" to be a barrier to distribution.
Bruh...that's not even the point of the company or what he's talking about. You're being paranoid, first off.
Second, you want secure devices? You can't have that right now with Linux very easily. There is no chain of trust coming from the hardware aside from TPM, which is kind of a joke. This guy wants to make a standard way of certifying a chain of trust which would allow an ecosystem of devices to maintain some semblance of trust amongst itself and other devices. This would make things like networks, edge devices, forward deployed hardware, and running sensitive data in less than secure locations more secure.
Last, if you're going to be paranoid, at least educate yourself on the subject. Not a single person who is even vaguely familiar with what this entails is thinking "Oh they're going to lock all our devices rawrawrawr". That's just ridiculous. That could happen now, but...you seeing that out in the components world anywhere? Absolutely not. Because it's no desirable, and that's NOT WHAT HES EVEN TALKING ABOUT.
🤦
Sorry but this whole thing is just snake-oil.
You can verify and sign your whole trust chain down to the last shared library and it doesn't matter when you don't know what the binary blobs on your TPM / CPU / BIOS / NIC are doing.
The only guarantee to a secure system is openness an all of that signing won't help you there.
Right, so because of your limited knowledge and understanding of what the actual needs of an entire industry are, it's all snake oil. Cool.
Meanwhile I'd just love a way to box up a custom machine, use something what he's building, ship it to site, and have it run without issue and have some piece of mind a competitor didn't try to gank the data over USB, or bypass the identity of the motherboard that SHOULD have boot blocks in place, or maybe someone just rips the SSD right out of it and tries to boot it elsewhere.
Fuck the rest of ALL that and the practical needs of security experts and system builders because YOU are worried that it somehow magically it's used for all kinds of other nefarious things.
Cool. Cool.
Yes, that's correct, the last 5 years should have made clear to anybody that the "actual needs of an entire industry" and the needs of the people are diametrically opposed.
Again, nobody here complaining even read the damn article, and has no idea what they're up in arms about.
I hope you're so committed to this anger that you're destroying your motherboard RIGHT NOW 🤣
better than reading the damn article, here are the weasily corporate words directly from mr daan the founder 🤣
So adding all of this technology will certainly make it more easy to be used for either good or bad. And it will certainly become possible to build an OS that will be less hackable than your run of the mill Linux distro.
First, yes, he's correct in talking about the SOFTWARE side of that, so if your anger is with this dude, you better just outlaw software, because anyone can choose to NOT do these things. That's the entire point of open source. Make stupid decisions, and you have zero following.
Second, let me finish his thought for you:
But we will never enforce using any of these features in systemd itself. It will always be up to the distro to enable and configure the system to become an immutable monolith. And I certainly don't think distributions like Fedora or Debian will ever go in that direction.
We don't really have any control over what Microsoft decides to do with Secure Boot. If they decide at one point to make Secure Boot reject any Linux distribution and hardware vendors prevent enrolling user owned keys, we're in just as much trouble as everyone else running Linux will be.
He's very CLEARLY illustrating his intent to prevent the very thing you're shitting your pants about. You're literally inventing a scenario you've thought of yourself, and getting upset about it.
I bet you're super fun to be around.
He’s very CLEARLY illustrating his intent to prevent the very thing you’re shutting your pants about
It will always be up to the distro
We don’t really have any control over what Microsoft decides to do
where is the prevention brother?
Uhhhh...it's open. Didn't know anyone needed precautionary blocks in place or permission.
What in the actual hell is happening in here. Who made you so fearful of everyone? Did somebody hurt you? WHO DID IT???
We know from systemd that these people are willing to use corporate resources to snuff out grassroots alternatives to grow their market share, and we know from the sorry state of boot chains on basically every device that isn't x86 UEFI that corporations are salivating at the idea of implementing trusted computing at the expense of user freedoms, and we know know from the above quotes that the best assurance the founders of this companies have is "we just provide the tools, it's up to the corporations to decide how to use it, teehee!" The only mystery here is people like you here who see all this and think "surely things will go different this time. these are good boys".
How is systemd somehow taking away freedoms at the behest of corporations who asked such a thing?
RedHat putting their thumb on the scale providing full time engineers on this project to gain market share and become the defacto standard that they control doesn't sound like a problem? How do you feel about what chromium is doing to the web?
UEFI is an open standard, buddy. Microsoft is the only player fucking that up
Microsoft is the only player "fucking that up" right. And the other corporations have some sort of god-given goodness to them that make it impossible for them to follow suit?
“Trusted Computing” has existed in the very hardware you own and run for almost 30 years now. Literally nobody but cellphone makers use it in the way you describe. Seems you’re still using it though, so nobody seems to have made the apocalyptic decisions that bring your fearful future to bear.
Nobody but (half of the entire consumer device market) use it in the way described, and this company comes in offering tools to do the same thing to the other half, and you don't see the problem?
A “Trusted Computing” framework - and this is how I know you don’t understand any of this - is only present. It takes software to interact with it to “take your freedoms away” as you put it.
Software that these people are developing.
“…we just provide the tools…”. MY GOD. Where do I even start with this? I can name about a hundred different FOSS tools that break encryption. You mad at the people who made the FOSS encryption tools, or the ones who the FOSS tools to decrypt it?
I'm wary of the people that provide turn key solutions to deploy it at scale
The only people who want this are people make and produce hardware platforms that ship out into the world so they can ensure they are T2B secure. It seems you don’t know much about security, so I’ll let you in a little secret…(If it claims to be secure, it means there are hardware controls in place)
And if the user (that's what we call the person who owns the device, if you don't know much about these things) doesn't want it?
How do you address mail to your bunker? Is there e like...a sublevel addition or something?
I unfortunately accept the reality of our corporate dominated technology landscape, I'm just confused about your downright enthusiasm for the same.
🤣
There's zero corporate about it. You're actually in denial and possibly crazy. My God.
This entire announcement is literally about an creation of a for-profit company to deliver hardware attestation in linux as a product 🤣
Again...read what the guy is saying. You can't do something like this without BOTH the OSS community AND a company to back it up. It's just not possible for legal reasons, financial reasons, and so on. The aim is to replace the existing bullshit Microsoft created, and make an open standard that is backed by a presence that keeps it there. Not something you can just fund and keep moving in a git repo alone.
Only being able to install "allowed" apps is not great for freedom.
Not even how that works FFS. You're not the target audience here.
Y'all really need to start reading more about things before jumping to ridiculously uninformed conclusions and making comments. My gosh.
I wonder if this would allow an anti-cheat system to get acceptable trust of a system without having to access ring 0.
Of course, we'd then need the OS / kernel images to be signed. I think most gamers run stock kernels anyway.
I just don't want see the garbage that is the Android Play Store where apps refuse to run because we run an OS that isn't profitable to Google.
I just don’t want see the garbage that is the Android Play Store where apps refuse to run because we run an OS that isn’t profitable to Google.
I think the possibility that this could happen is dangerously high.
Everything starts with good intentions. Everything ultimately leads to locking end users out of their personal freedoms.
Everything starts with good intentions.
No it doesn't.
When it comes to privacy, politics, and capitalism, almost nothing starts with good intentions.
Most everything starts for the short term benefit of whoever starts it and any investors putting money into it, at the expense of everyone else and ignoring any future negative consequences unless profit can be extracted from them.
It hurting people the starter doesn't like (even if it will come back to hurt the starter in the long time) is also a very important factor, though secondary to the short term profit one.
Since the user is the one doing the cheating, most likely no, unfortunately.
That would actually be the wrong thing to want. In an ideal system trust would always begin by the owner of the hardware, where possible, not the software or vendor they decide to trust.
First the person that bought the system should take the ownership by overwriting the previous owners keys, and from there start signing the vendors key, they decide to put their trust in. Because it is important that the system is trustworthy to the end user/owner first.
Any anti-cheat mechanism relies on not trusting the person that owns the hardware, and why would that be good?
Anti-cheats do NOT need to be client-side… Polar is server-sided, yet it has practically killed cheating in Minecraft.
This is needed. Servers need it, and it would be a nice feature to enable for personal systems. We would need to be able to build our own images with our own keys to really make this worthwhile. Especially with programs in my bin dir I’ve compiled or downloaded.
Do I trust Lennart to not do something asinine to turn this into a shit show? I do not. This would be better if it was someone who has security experience and system design cred.
I can't imagine anyone sane would hold onto the belief that it will remain just "a nice feature to enable" after looking at the historical encroachment of commercial interests in mobile phone boot chain setups. I tell you the truth that after widespread adoption this WILL turn into a "not nice feature that you cannot disable", and you can forget about enrolling your own keys as well.
Im fine with anything that is gpl as long as its through the whole stack starting at hardware.
I forgot already but doesn't he work for MSFT now?
I swear the moment he got a new job is when he came out with run0
He was there for a brief period. According to Wikipedia he was there from 2022-2026 and seems to have left to create his new company in early 2026.
Anyway, somebody working for Microsoft isn't proof positive that they share the values of Microsoft (unless you're in upper admin); you're not guilty by association. People generally need to work to eat in this capitalist hellscape, and FOSS doesn't tend to pay well.
Fuck no. He's fucking done enough.
I say that as a long-time Linux user, a developer and a security researcher. He's set us back a decade with his metastatic cancer.
In the comments they clarify that is mostly targeted at servers and IoT first. In the enterprise world attestation is absolutely needed. And on personal devices? I'd be very happy if I had a secure boot chain for full disk encryption working out of the box. At least for portable devices...
The anti MS morons who don't understand secure boot and just regurgitating we hate this because it's associated with them are out 🙄
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