Or you can change the encryption to argon2 in the settings with salted hashes.
Granted it's probably not per item but at least something.

I store my keypass database on several flash drives in different physical locations and update them several times per year to make sure that even if I do lose the copy I have, the versions on the flash drives, not at my physical location, are decently up to date, and so if I do lose any of the password data, it will be only for a couple of months worth if that.

If I add things that are extremely important, such as a new mortgage provider, or some sort of financial data into my keypass database, then I do an unscheduled immediate update to all of my flash drives in different physical locations to make sure that they all have that, but if it's just a social media account, and I was to lose access to it, and not have the password for it, then... I wouldn't be too upset about it.

In the absolute worst possible case, I stand to lose 3 months worth of data. It's not often that I have to tweak stuff in my password manager, so that would be very few changes.

Sure, but at the end of the day even if you don't update your vaultwarden server or you rely on an insecure storage sync system like dropbox, your actual vault is encrypted with a key that only you know. Even if your server is hacked or the kdbx is leaked, your passwords are safe until someone breaks AES.

Contrast that with hosted services, who could very easily attach their own keys to your encryption key (whether now or in the future at the behest of the state) and you'd be none the wiser. E2EE doesn't matter much when the other end is controlled by someone else.

I'm not disagreeing that most people just want something to work without thinking about, and for that reason I'm glad that services like bitwarden and lastpass and protonpass exist. My intent was not FUD, just shining a light on the fact that keeping your passwords secure does not require trusting a company.

And simultaneously less secure because it’s up to you to handle keeping your vault synced between various devices and most people are significantly worse at keeping systems secure than the professionals at the password managers.

It is not less secure.

If the Bitwarden servers are compromised (either by hacking or by being forced to by the government of the country where they are hosted) then code could be run which would allow the attacker to receive your plaintext password and that is used to decrypt your data.

If a user is so horrible at syncing that they accidentally synced their database file to a public Twitter post, it is still protected by AES-256 which can't be broken by a simple subpoena.

In either case, syncthing is pretty simple to use and is the common recommendation for the kind of small personal file sync that you need here. It also adds an additional security layer, on top of the unbreakable AES-256 encryption, to the whole setup.

"Properly implemented" is doing the heavy lifting in that sentence.

Four paragraphs down from your quote is this:

Their attacks ranged from integrity violations affecting specific, targeted user vaults to the complete compromise of all vaults within an organisation using the service. In most cases, the researchers were able to gain access to the passwords – and even make changes to them. 

If E2EE were properly implemented, the above would be impossible.

This is what Bitwarden claims to do, and yet we have a paper showing that with a compromised server there exists a vulnerability:

Their attacks ranged from integrity violations affecting specific, targeted user vaults to the complete compromise of all vaults within an organisation using the service. In most cases, the researchers were able to gain access to the passwords – and even make changes to them.

I also use KeepassXC, and it's great. I'm interested in setting up Syncthing between my Android, Linux desktop, and NAS. Do you have any tips or articles/resources that you used to set it up?

Is your data in KeePass encrypted?

You have no idea how many times I’ve made that exact statement.

Yes, if you arent self hosting the web interface or using the desktop client.

according to recent findings, it is.

I just sync it using my Nextcloud instance. No issues.

I use an offline password manager, and sync an encrypted database with nextcloud. It's convenient enough, and secure enough for me. Easy to sync between my phone, desktop, and laptop. And I only need to remember two passwords, the nextcloud one, and the manager one. I don't think you can have it more secure and convenient all the same, at least not with current tech.

Just use Syncthing with your trusted host

Bitwarden with a vaultwarden docker container on my home server. Access over a VPS.

About 1password publishing their pentesting results. Why put it behind a 'give me your email address' wall?

That alone is enough for me to instantly disregard them as an option.

Bitwarden did so too.

But IMO your assumption is a bit of interpreting bad/malicious faith into it.
I see it more like they are the more publicly known brands/services that do this and underwent the audit.
I have read the TLDR by the authors (linked a few times in the comments) and the answer by bitwarden.
Bitwarden said the, fixed the issue, are in the progress of doing it or are accepting it as "this is intended/a trade-off".
What is a bit sad is that they had more vulnerabilities than other vendors. But I trust them more as they are mostly OSS.

What if there's a nuclear war end the house gets vaporized?

To protect against this scenario I have this small portable computer that I keep in my pocket. They're quite popular these days.

I host a pi hole via diet pi already, vault warden is packaged for diet pi already, project for the weekend!

This is what all the listed password manager claim.

What was done here was tricking the client through the server to do things. So the fixes went into the client application.

If it's something that you don't really care about others seeing, that's a prime candidate for cloud storage and more power to you.

This topic is about password lockers. I'm pretty sure you don't want some schlub who happens to work at Cloud Password Lockers Inc. to be able to get at your PayPal account.

If you're at the point where that's a possibility that you need to defend against then you probably already have better security than using a password manager.

That's very true.

Maybe I don't know, but I liked his idea and would like to assemble it myself.