As evidence, the lawsuit cites unnamed "courageous whistleblowers" who allege that WhatsApp and Meta employees can request to view a user's messages through a simple process, thus bypassing the app's end-to-end encryption. "A worker need only send a 'task' (i.e., request via Meta's internal system) to a Meta engineer with an explanation that they need access to WhatsApp messages for their job," the lawsuit claims. "The Meta engineering team will then grant access -- often without any scrutiny at all -- and the worker's workstation will then have a new window or widget available that can pull up any WhatsApp user's messages based on the user's User ID number, which is unique to a user but identical across all Meta products."

"Once the Meta worker has this access, they can read users' messages by opening the widget; no separate decryption step is required," the 51-page complaint adds. "The WhatsApp messages appear in widgets commingled with widgets containing messages from unencrypted sources. Messages appear almost as soon as they are communicated -- essentially, in real-time. Moreover, access is unlimited in temporal scope, with Meta workers able to access messages from the time users first activated their accounts, including those messages users believe they have deleted." The lawsuit does not provide any technical details to back up the rather sensational claims.

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[–] 119 points 9 months ago (18 children)

Well if I can't trust Meta with my information, who CAN I trust

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  • [–] 59 points 9 months ago (16 children)
  • [–] 46 points 9 months ago (12 children)

    Oh okay. My location is 55.752121, 37.617664, my full name is Jeremy, and my password is hunter9. I trust you not to tell this to anybody

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  • [–] 40 points 9 months ago (7 children)
  • [–] 32 points 9 months ago (2 children)

    Oh god damnit chemicalprofet why did you tell this guy i thougjt i could trust you :((

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  • [–] 62 points 9 months ago (1 child)

    15 years ago I’d have called this a conspiracy theory given how the evidence seems to be anecdotal, but given literally every single other thing we’ve learned in recent times about how cartoonishly evil and lying the tech bros truly are, it seems entirely likely.

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  • [–] 2 points 9 months ago

    s/the tech bros/humans/

    Despite "the tech bros" really being that, I'm learning over time about some people surprisingly cowardly and evil, while looking like better versions of me, and some other people looking pretty normal and usual, while being epic and tragic heroes, and some other people looking like a typical Nazi 80 years late to the party, yet more honorable than many, and some other people looking like weak and nice versions of me, while having real warrior spirit.

    You have no idea how big the world is in all dimensions. We are all looking at it via our daily interactions, via news and internet discussions, via games and via books, and we don't see what's deep inside. Well, I suppose, people who read classics can see something.

    And they, these people on top of big tech, being just human, have such powers. What can they do with them? Perhaps we should forgive them for not being wise in deciding to have those powers, and praise them for doing less evil with them than they could.

    So. Perhaps in 15 years you've just grown.

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  • [–] 98 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    The biggest news is that Slashdot is still alive.

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  • [–] 64 points 9 months ago (2 children)
  • [–] 80 points 9 months ago (7 children)

    Assume the same for Telegram and pretty much any chat platform that controls your private keys.

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  • [–] 43 points 9 months ago (4 children)

    Telegram doesnt even pretend to be end to end encrypted.

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (3 children)

    Telegram for iOS lets you create “secret chats” but as far as I know other platforms have eliminated that functionality at the request of governments. And I would assume Apple technically controls the keys on device.

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago (2 children)

    iOS lets you create “secret chats”

    How? Not natively unless I’m mistaken

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  • [–] 11 points 9 months ago*

    The telegram was clear as a day they announced cooperation with the Russian government and they unblocked it. That was way before the whole France fiasco, I doubt they're actually giving up the keys to France. I'm from East and many say that Telegram now is essentially a Russian weapon. Surveillance at home, total free reign (sell drugs, spread CP, etc.) in west.

    If you're American, I believe Telegram is actually safer than Whatsapp, as long as you can ignore the dirty side of it (surface deep web?), hence why Europe wants it under control

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  • [–] 40 points 9 months ago (13 children)

    So, is it basically treating every message as a "group" message where it sends it to some system WhatsApp account and then also to your intended receiver? This is what I'm assuming based on them supposedly being able to see deleted messages. Also would let them say it's technically still "E2EE" since it's indeed E2EE to your receiver, but it's also E2EE to them as well.

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  • [–] 50 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    Ah yes, good old E2E AWA3E.

    "End to end, and we are also an end".

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  • [–] 10 points 9 months ago (7 children)

    If that is the case though, its not E2E it's client server encryption and then server client encryption back. thats just deceptive marketing at that point.

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago* (6 children)

    Obviously it's deceptive. But if you individually encrypt the messages you're sending, the one you send to the receiver still can't be decrypted by Meta, only the copy sent directly to Meta can, so the copy sent to your intended receiver is still "E2EE."

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago* (4 children)

    I don't agree that would fit the protocol of end to end, that's a common misconception, E2E by design means that it's encrypted from the sender to the intended recipient. When you send a message the intended recipient isn't the server, it's the user you are sending to. That type of system would be called an encrypt in transit or a server client encryption not E2E. If they are classifying it as E2E that would be incorrect.

    A classic example of a server client or encrypt in transit would be HTTPS, the server acts as a middleman between the clients, meaning that it decrypts the message then re-encrypts the message to the designated choice.

    With an e2e system, the message the server transmits is never decrypted, the server already knows the destination based off the public key

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  • [–] 5 points 9 months ago (2 children)

    An e2ee group chat would need every member to have every other member's public key. So for 5 people, your client would sign with your private key and send 4 unique messages encrypted each with 1 other person's public key. Each of them would decrypt their copy of the message with their private key and verify the signature with your public key. So I think what arcterus was saying was that employee who requests access to a user's messages then becomes just another member of a group chat, but the UI just doesn't show it as such. Every message you send is then secretly encrypted, on your client, with their special public key and sent to them to be decrypted. That would still be E2EE.

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  • [–] 2 points 9 months ago* (1 child)

    ok yea, I do agree with that POV on it. A ghost key like that would be within spec, cause yea at that point it would just be another member. I wasn't taking it as an additional group member though, since the whistleblower is stating that they can put in any user id and have access to all messages live, that would mean they would have a ghost user on all messages period regardless of if its a group chat or not.

    That wouldn't be implausible though.

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  • [–] 5 points 9 months ago

    I will say, not too long ago there was some question if I had setup a WhatsApp account with my number due to some emails I was receiving. Not wanting to install the app and unwittingly create an account just by checking if I had one, my wife created a group chat with just her and my number, sent a message, and then we saw it get marked as read by all. Which in an E2EE system should not have been possible without me having the app setup. so I did go ahead and wiped an old and setup the app to make sure I was in control of any account for my number, and I did then receive that group chat. But still, very sketchy.

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  • [–] 2 points 9 months ago

    Except it is still encrypted to the intended recipient. As the other commenter said, WhatsApp is just another "member" of the group that you can't see. Basically all they'd have to do is have a server somewhere functioning as a WhatsApp client. Your client sends the message to your intended recipient. It also then sends the message to their "client." The routing server for the messages can't decrypt the messages. All the messages are still encrypted per-member of the group and can't be decrypted until it hits the ends, but WhatsApp is basically a mole siphoning all your messages and storing them.

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  • [–] 1 point 9 months ago

    I used to store GPG encrypted files in google drive. But then I noticed bitrot in the stored files which made them impossible to decrypt. So I started adding CRC redundancy through DVDisaster. Which worked but became a PITA. So I finally gave up.

    They really want your data.

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  • [–] 1 point 9 months ago*

    simpler than that in most likelihood… meta is the key holder so login and password recovery is simpler (or at least that’s the excuse they give): you login, they send you your key, which they can also access (and decrypt your messages) whenever they like

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  • [–] 77 points 9 months ago (2 children)

    Wait, you are telling me that the company whos entire business is collecting personal information, including people who don't sign up for their services, to leverage for advertising, is keeping their platforms unsecured they can continually grab more information rather than secure it?

    I for one am shocked, absolutely shocked.

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  • [–] 37 points 9 months ago (12 children)

    Call me old fashioned but I really think that for real E2EE the vendor of the encryption and the vendor of the infrastructure should be two different entities.

    For example PGP/GPG on … great! Proton? Not great

    Jabber/XMMP with e2ee encryption great! WhatsApp/Telegram/signal… less so (sure I take signal over the other two every day… but it’s enough to compromise a single entity for accessing the data)

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  • [–] 12 points 9 months ago* (8 children)

    Okay Old Fashioned, but doesn't open source encryption audited by a third party solve this problem? Signal protocol for example? Also proton, I'm guessing, but I'm too lazy to check

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  • [+] 8 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (6 children)
  • [–] 2 points 9 months ago (4 children)

    By this logic, can we trust any open source software, even if they claim to use some third party encryption? They could say they're using a super secure encryption, even show it implemented in their open source code base, then just put the other, secret evil backdoor code base in production? Is there a way for any open source project to prove that the code in their open source repo is the code in production?

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  • [–] 4 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    This is called reproducible builds. With this all builds of a version will be binary-identical. So you can build from the repo and the compare it with the appstore binary and see if the owner was honest.

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  • [–] 5 points 9 months ago (1 child)

    Unfortunately even the best intentioned and best audited project can be compromised. So that is not a guarantee (sure, much better than closed source but that is a given)

    You may be forced by a rubber hose attack (or legal one) to insert vulnerabilities in your code… and you have the traffic… a single point to attack… signal/proton/etc

    Is it possible with two different vendors? Sure it is but it is way more complicated

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  • [–] 33 points 9 months ago

    No surprised at all tbf.

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  • [–] 57 points 9 months ago (24 children)

    If I am not adding my own private key to the app, like in Tox, I don't trust their encryption.

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  • [–] 42 points 9 months ago (19 children)

    Tox also isn't that great security wise. It's hard to beat Signal when it comes to security messengers. And Signal is open source so, if it did anything weird with private keys, everyone would know

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  • [–] -4 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    And Signal is open source so, if it did anything weird with private keys, everyone would know

    Well, no. At least not by default as you are running a compiled version of it. Someone could inject code you don't know anything about before compilation that for example leaked your keys.

    One way to be more confident no one has, would be to have predictable builds that you can recreate and then compare the file fingerprints. But I do not think that is possible, at least on android, as google holds they signature keys to apps.

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  • [–] 16 points 9 months ago (1 child)

    Signal has reproducible builds and here's the instruction how to check it on Android https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md

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  • [–] 1 point 9 months ago

    If they have, then good. Wasn't sure it was doable with current google's signing process. Highly unlikely someone hasn't tampered with them then (far easier to target the site displaying the "correct" fingerprint).

    However, my original point still stands. Just because it is open source doesn't in itself mean that a bad actor can't tamper with it.

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  • [+] -28 points 9 months ago (14 children)

    Well, Whatsapp uses signal. Bad timing

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  • [–] 9 points 9 months ago (12 children)
  • [–] 8 points 9 months ago (5 children)

    WhatsApp is using Signals protocol for communication: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/

    I don't fully understand what it entails, but from what I understand is that yes, WhatsApp is using the same encryption and message flow that signal uses, but you're still using Meta's app, and they can just read the plaintext message from there.

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  • [–] 16 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    To my knowledge, under Signal, the encription keys are locally generated and stored, and the traffic flows between end points as a closed packet.

    This does not seem to be the case here, as the keys are generated and stored outside your equipment and, thus, are viable to be used by a third party to access packets.

    But I admit I speak heavily burdened by technical ignorance.

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago (2 children)

    My understanding is they're sending a request to your device that then decrypts and uploads messages, not storing the keys outside your device.

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  • [–] 9 points 9 months ago (1 child)

    Unless proof is given, assume troll

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  • [+] -6 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago)

    Read the article? An app using signal does not imply that your data is still encrypted from corporations or government. Your neighbour joe is not very likely to break already established SSL, so using signal feels like someone is trying to sell me a bridge. Sense of false security. In fact, that was probably their goal all along.

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  • [–] 0 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    Read more than just the title ffs

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  • [–] 1 point 9 months ago (2 children)

    I did and nowhere is Signal mentioned in the article.

    You state Whatsapp uses Signal. So, again: how?

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  • [–] -3 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (1 child)

    The article does not describe what encryption it uses, it described how they're abusing it. Whatsapp using Signal protocol is public knowledge.

    What I'm trying to say is that a company using signal for it's messaging app does not imply your data is safe from that company or governments.

    You recommending an app purely because of Signal protocol under an article about how an app abuses signal protocol is pretty fucking ironic (aka. bad timing)

    EDIT: Alright TikTokkers, I looked up the source on Google so that you don't have to spend 30 seconds: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/

    You can stop downvotting me now.

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  • [–] 1 point 9 months ago

    Yes we know that it used the Signal protocol in 2016 but there is no doubt it drifted a lot since. A lot of changes were made to Signal since and we don't know how WhatsApp protocol evolved. You can't assume they're still equivalent now. And one is open source with reproducible builds while the other is not.

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  • [–] 25 points 9 months ago (1 child)

    What's stopping the app from keeping your private key and still not encrypting anything?

    I'm not trying to be difficult here, I just don't see how anything outside of an application whose source you can check yourself can be trusted.

    All applications hosted by other people require you to react positively to "just trust me bro".

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago

    Or, if the app has the private key for decryption for the user to be able to see the messages, what's stopping the app from copying that decrypted text somewhere else?

    The thread model isn't usually key management, it's more about the insecure treatment of the decrypted message after decryption.

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  • [–] 165 points 9 months ago (2 children)
  • [–] 19 points 9 months ago

    What?!! No. The owner of WhatsApp would never lie to us.

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