I don't think the Lockean argument actually gets you where you want it to go.

Locke's labor theory of property doesn't just say creators own the fruits of their labor. It also says they have the right to alienate that property, to sell it, transfer it, or give it away. Once that transfer occurs, ownership changes hands. That's the entire point of property rights.

This is where your comparison to theater performances breaks down.

A performance is inherently ephemeral. Of course you only buy admission. But books, paintings, sculptures, and other tangible works have been bought and sold for centuries. When Rembrandt sold a painting, he didn't retain the right to dictate who displayed it, resold it, or inherited it. When someone bought a book, the author retained the copyright, but they didn't retain ownership of that physical copy.

That's the distinction your argument glosses over.

Physical media didn't create some bizarre loophole that tricked consumers into believing they owned art. Copyright law has always separated ownership of a copy from ownership of the intellectual property. Buying a novel never meant you owned the copyright. It meant you owned that particular copy.

The "historical anomaly" argument doesn't really hold either. Technology creating new forms of property isn't evidence that those forms are somehow illegitimate. Printing presses, photography, automobiles, patents, and even digital storage all changed what could be owned. Calling something a historical anomaly doesn't make it philosophically suspect.

Where your argument has merit is with services. An MMO, cloud software, or any product that depends on ongoing servers and continuous development is fundamentally different from a finished single-player game or a movie sitting on a disc. Those genuinely require ongoing labor.

But once you start arguing that creators retain moral authority over every copy they've sold forever, you've left Locke behind. You're no longer defending property rights, you're defending perpetual control after the sale. That's a very different philosophical position, and I don't think your conclusion follows from your premise.