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[–] 121 points 4 months ago (65 children)

LLMs are not sentient, but this gimmick doesn't prove that.

There's nothing to indicate the human brain can't be implemented in a Turing machine too.

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  • [–] 32 points 4 months ago (13 children)

    Which you can precisely define, right?

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  • [–] 9 points 4 months ago (11 children)

    Statement: "There is no indication that the human brain cannot be modeled as a turing machine"

    To disprove this, evidence to the contrary is required. It's not at all the same as saying "The human brain can be modeled as a turing machine". In that case they would need to prove that.

    We simply do not know. Humans cling to their idea of somehow being "special" very hard with thought experiments like chinese room, and at all points neglect that there is no evidence that a human brain is actually different.

    Generally I'd argue that the continuous nature of animal brains makes them quite fundamentally different from the very much discrete states of anything we program, but that still doesn't mean it'd be impossible to simulate.

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  • [–] 4 points 4 months ago* (9 children)

    Many abilities and properties we thought to be exclusive to human consciousness were later proven in animals. Such as the capacity for empathy, thinking ahead, and recognizing yourself in a mirror.

    Does that mean animals are partially conscious? Or can we accept that the definition is fuzzy at best, making this a moving target?

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (7 children)

    I was clearly asking from the position of recognising consciousness in other humans. Or is that not your position?

    Solipsism is pointless and boring. By that logic, nothing at all can be proven or disproven.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (6 children)

    I personally suppose humans all (or 99%+, there are always statistical outliers) have a consciousness actually, but that doesn't mean I can use it as a fact when making an argument. For example, if you do use it as a fact, then why doesn't monkeys have a consciousness, pigs, cats, muskitoes, trees, planks, too, etc etc etc.

    Math is based on the idea that 1+1=2 and you take that as granted. I can live with that, it seems reasonable. All humans have a consciousness? Not accepting that if you infer that just because a machine can mimic a human brain, it thus also will have even the possibility to have a consciousness.

    Do you think a machine can have a quala, the experience we "experience" because we have a consciousness?

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (5 children)

    This was your position: "we have 'quala' (consciousness)" in regards to humans. That's what I've challenged in my reply.

    Now you've wildly moved the goalposts twice in just two comments. The first (solipsism) I've rejected, but gave you the benefit of the doubt that you just needed a reminder on your own position.

    Now you did it again. I'm not playing this game. Stick to a point, anything else is just rudely wasting the time of people actually interested in having a good-faith exchange of ideas.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago* (4 children)

    Dude where did I say we (humans) have quala?

    Nowhere.

    I do think most of us do, but that there is absolutely no real proof of it.

    Now who's moving the goalpost with that eh.

    Do feel free to stop wasting my time anytime you like.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (3 children)
  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (2 children)

    Followed up with:

    we cannot prove consciousness (except our own of course) so it'd be you who must prove it can be implemented in a turing machine. Not me.

    So yeah I think humans have it, but we cannot prove anyone else than ourselves do.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (1 child)

    I don't have to address what other things you also said. I challenged that point, which you believe to be true, with relevant interesting facts.

    If you don't want to defend a thing you said, it's much less obvious and embarrassing to just stop responding.

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  • [–] 7 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    Is there evidence or more like philosophical musings that consciousness is an ill-defined weird magical thing and quantum physics is similarly a weird magical thing and thus it's a kind of fitting assertion that they are related?

    At least to the extent I've seen the point presented, it seems to feel more like musings than scientific effort.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago*

    There is some limited empirical evidence to support the hypothesis, yes.

    For example:

    Through state-of-the-art spectroscopic techniques, specifically two-dimensional electronic spectroscopy (2DES), we've detected quantum coherent processes in the microtubules within neural structures. This provides empirical support to our hypothesis about the role of quantum mechanisms in cognition. Furthermore, we provide substantial empirical evidence for quantum mechanisms underlying cognitive processes, including decision-making and memory recall, and present a quantum model of consciousness.

    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/374724769_Quantum_Consciousness_Empirical_Evidence_for_Quantum_Mechanisms_in_Human_Cognition_and_Consciousness

    https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2025.1676585/full

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  • [–] 7 points 4 months ago (31 children)

    I don't think that is the case.

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  • [–] 10 points 4 months ago (30 children)

    There's nothing that indicates the human brain has super-turing computation

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  • [–] 6 points 4 months ago (28 children)

    Except that we've never done it, and we struggle to even define what consciousness is. But, other than that, sure.

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  • [–] 9 points 4 months ago (27 children)

    There's fundamentally not much difference between our brain and a fly's, at the cellular level. We have fully simulated a fly's brain already. When given a virtual body, it promptly started acting like a fly.

    I don't think LLMs are conscious or sentient. However, consciousness is likely just an internal illusion. There's no obvious reason we can't scale up from a fly to a human brain, other than difficulty. At that point you have a fully virtual brain that believes itself to be conscious, and can demonstrate sentience.

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  • [–] 13 points 4 months ago (12 children)

    I'll believe it when it happens. There's a huge different between simulating 139,000 neurons and 50 billion neurons.

    Besides, the authors looked at taste and touch sensory. That's not exactly predicting the entire behavior of a fly, and the authors (of which there were many), admitted they don't know if it can actually predict neural activity. Source

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  • [–] 5 points 4 months ago (11 children)

    I'm not expecting anything any time soon either. Though I can see someone like musk pumping far too much money into it at some point.

    My point was however that the difference is just one of scale. We don't need to predict the firings, just run it and compare it to nature. From what I've read, it behaves like a fly, including walking and grooming itself. This means there is no magic mystical difference between a real fly's brain and a virtualized one.

    Projecting further, there is no difference, other than scale, between our brain and the fly. Implying there is nothing mystical about consciousness.

    If a human brain can be conscious, then a virtualized human brain can be conscious. If a virtualized brain can be conscious, then so can the computer it runs on.

    The question then becomes do we WANT consciousness in an AI, what would it look like, and how can we detect/measure it?

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  • [–] 3 points 4 months ago (2 children)

    Except if this is the case, free will does not exist. If the world is purely deterministic, you've never made a choice. No one has. We are in the middle of a mathematical computation that has been predicted from the start of the universe.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    That is pretty much my view on things. I don't like it, but it's what the evidence suggests. However, my internal thoughts still assume I have free will. It's a useful lie.

    Discworld's Death put it quite well, in Hogfather.

    All right," said Susan. "I'm not stupid. You're saying humans need... fantasies to make life bearable."

    REALLY? AS IF IT WAS SOME KIND OF PINK PILL? NO. HUMANS NEED FANTASY TO BE HUMAN. TO BE THE PLACE WHERE THE FALLING ANGEL MEETS THE RISING APE.

    "Tooth fairies? Hogfathers? Little—"

    YES. AS PRACTICE. YOU HAVE TO START OUT LEARNING TO BELIEVE THE LITTLE LIES.

    "So we can believe the big ones?"

    YES. JUSTICE. MERCY. DUTY. THAT SORT OF THING.

    "They're not the same at all!"

    YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND GRIND IT DOWN TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE AND THEN SHOW ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF MERCY. AND YET—Death waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD, AS IF THERE IS SOME...SOME RIGHTNESS IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH IT MAY BE JUDGED.

    "Yes, but people have got to believe that, or what's the point—"

    MY POINT EXACTLY.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (6 children)

    This means there is no magic mystical difference between a real fly's brain and a virtualized one.

    That’s not true. You might simulate fly intelligence, but you aren’t simulating a fly. Flys are an entity driven by their phenomenological experience of the world (as all us nervous systems are). It would be a rather strange thing to say that a fly is only the pattern of behavior you recognize as a fly’s behavior.

    Note that flies also have this capacity to self-evolve over generations. There is no single fly that you can point to and say, “that’s the right one. Copy It.” So, your “fly simulations” are always at best a behavioral approximation. Given enough time, say a decade or century, this ought be obvious by the fact that your simulation no longer accurately resembles the most modern flies.

    Projecting further, there is no difference, other than scale, between our brain and the fly.

    That’s just not true. Consider “What The Frog Eye Tells The Frog Brain.” Put briefly, the eye encodes and transmits semantic information — as opposed to the more common belief that it transmits raw visual information. That said, there a trillions of differences between how that might work in a human versus in a frog, let alone a fly.

    I think you’ve discovered “neurons work similarly across species,” which is like saying “thing does same thing when used in other location.” This doesn’t tell you how neurons work to drive that behavior, it doesn’t tell you what it’s like to experience your neurons firing that way, it doesn’t tell you why the neurons were developed that way topologically over time… At best, it helps you develop a timebound understanding of fly automata to neural architecture. That’s without any understanding of phenomenology to neural architecture, and likely without being able to decompose the neural system into any semblance of semantic information processing.

    A human is much more complex than a fly. I can’t believe for a second that this approach would work scale to a human’s brain. If you captured and simulated every neuron in the human brain, you’d be left with a feedforward process simulating a particular neural state of a particular person. No feeling, no reflection, no introspection, no semantic meaning. Just a neat toy.

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  • [–] 4 points 4 months ago (5 children)

    "If you captured and simulated every neuron in the human brain, you’d be left with a feedforward process simulating a particular neural state of a particular person. No feeling, no reflection, no introspection, no semantic meaning. Just a neat toy."

    Seems to me you think there's something special about humans, I don't believe there's any proof to that.

    Yes its orders of magnitude more complex then a fly brain, that doesn't mean it's impossible to simulate.

    There's no proof to a soul, our whole existence is our meat which evolved naturally over extreme timescales via random forces and natural selection, I see no reason to believe we could not do the same with our intelligence in a much shorter period of time comparatively.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago* (3 children)

    At what point to you would it move from simulation to essentially the same configuration just in a different container?

    I still think you're conflating the aspect of life we experience as somehow separate from the procedure our brain takes to present that to you.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    I don't understand why you think it'd be out of the question for it to have phenomoligcal experiences, why couldn't we build a way for it to smell if it has the same pathways to be able to interpret that? How would that be meaningfully different?

    Think about hearing aides or other similar "enhancements" wherein were simply adjusting the input in a way and the brain is still able to process it.

    I would agree it wouldn't be the same as a literal human, thinking like Fallout 4 style synths, I consider them people (in universe of course lol) even if they're not literally humans.

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  • [–] 3 points 4 months ago (5 children)

    An illusion is a phenomenological experience, for which you must be conscious. Consciousness can not be an illusion. You must be conscious to experience an illusion at all.

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  • [–] 3 points 4 months ago (4 children)

    It's a case of running out of terms. I was using it here as apparent, but not a "real" thing.

    It's a bit like a lot of visual illusions, we can often all see them consistently, but they don't exist in the image itself.

    In this case, consciousness is likely related to keeping our own mind functioning coherently. Providing a common virtual ground for the various parts of our brain to interact. There is no seat of consciousness, it's akin to the operating system on a computer. Not required, but makes a lot of tasks massively easier.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (3 children)

    If that’s the case, by calling in an illusion, aren’t you just stating that it’s a misunderstood process?

    Consciousness absolutely is something. That might be a procedural “thing,” and I think you’re saying that the notion of an ontological consciousness is a misconception. An Enlightenment Era misconception, if I’m allowed to add that in there…

    To call it an illusion comes across as though you’re asserting what it is. I think you’re really just pointing out that it isnt what a lot of people consider it to be (often implicitly).

    Is that fair?

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  • [–] 3 points 4 months ago (2 children)

    I read it as consciousness being more of a “side effect”, rather than the thing a controls actions and “making choices”. So consciousness would then be more of a passive effect than driving change.

    In that sense the illusion would be that consciousness has any agency, when it is instead a passive experience, a perception of control.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) (1 child)

    There is some evidence that will is preceded by action, not the other way around. Good point.

    However, if the illusion is of agency—then it’s not really an illusion of consciousness. It’s more of a free will problem.

    If the argument is that consciousness is only the misconception within an object that it has agency, then you’re still doing some magic handwaving. How did the object become capable of misconceiving anything? That would mean it was already conscious.

    Edit: if the idea is that consciousness is only a behavioral pattern displayed by lifeforms with an internal self model, I’d need to think on that a bit. That’s pretty interesting.

    I assume the claim would be that the experience of consciousness is one where a physically stateful information-processing system models itself, e.g., as a means to control its body or its behavior.

    when it is instead a passive experience, a perception of control.

    Right, like a blob of cells modeling its holistic self as one—assuming the identity of the model. Then believing, as the model, that they are in control of the model. Is that it?

    Hmm. There’d still be quite a bit of explaining to do… like how a set of cells, none of which with the ability to model, identify, or believe suddenly contain these abilities en mass. That’s called emergence, which I think typically just means we misunderstand how something works.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago

    Yes, I think you have a point that for it to be an illusion “something” has to perceive it.

    I also think your reflection on consciousness being a some sort of process is interesting. Is it a “machine” process where one input+state always results in the same output? Regardless of the answers implication on agency and choice, the mystery is still that I feel aware. I cannot speak for you, but I think you’d tell me the same, even if you cannot prove it to me.

    Regarding the emergence I think one aspect could be scale, and said emergence might not be binary. I listened to a Lex Friedman(think what you will about him) podcast episode with Michael Levin from Dec 3 which talks about things along these lines. Not directly related perhaps, it might be more geared towards intelligence, but you might also find it interesting.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (5 children)

    There's fundamentally not much difference between our brain and a fly's, at the cellular level.

    There's fundamentally not much difference between the silicon in an n64 and the silicone in a quantum computer..... That doesn't mean you can make a quantum computer out of an old n64.

    However, consciousness is likely just an internal illusion.

    Internal..... as it can only be confirmed by the individual self? Consciousness is an ontological term to define the human condition. There is purposely no exact definition, as an exact definition of consciousness would only be utilized to strip rights away from those who do not fall under the exacting definition. There are however generally agreed upon criteria and criteria that have been hotly debated for hundreds of years.

    There's no obvious reason we can't scale up from a fly to a human brain, other than difficulty.

    To make this claim requires someone to have a limited understanding of what consciousness is, and how it develops. It completely ignores the mind body problem, and treats the human brain as something that can operate outside the body as if it were some sort of computer.

    Consciousness in humans develops and sustains itself as we physically interact with the world around us. This is true in both development in childhood and as we continue to age. As we physically interact with phenomena around us we mentally develop, as our senses start to fail us in age we mentally decline. Even if I were to just cut off your arm, there would be a plethora of changes to the physiology of your brain that would alter the way it functions and the way it is shaped.

    A person born stripped of all physical phenomena would never develop a conscious to begin with, and a if it were stripped away after consciousness had developed they would lose it. Hell, even sticking someone in an area with restricted physical phenomena for a short period of time can drive them insane.

    Consciousness is not purely a metaphysical phenomenon. And from what we currently understand of it can not be recreated purely in a virtual format.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (4 children)

    You’re mixing up two different things. One is normal brain development, and the other is consciousness itself. It’s true that a human being needs certain external stimuli for the brain to develop in a healthy way and for mental experience to be normal and stable. But that does not mean that, without those stimuli, consciousness does not exist.

    A person can still be conscious and yet suffer severe cognitive, emotional, or behavioral changes because of sensory deprivation or an extremely limited environment. What changes is the quality of development, mental functioning, and maybe the kind of consciousness they have, not necessarily the existence of consciousness itself.

    Also, there is no clear way to measure how much, how little, or whether someone has “no” consciousness at all. Because of that, claiming that a lack of stimuli means a lack of consciousness goes beyond what can actually be established.

    So your argument seems to confuse “without stimuli, there is no normal development” with “without stimuli, there is no consciousness.” Those are not the same thing.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago* (3 children)

    One is normal brain development, and the other is consciousness itself. It’s true that a human being needs certain external stimuli for the brain to develop in a healthy way and for mental experience to be normal and stable. But that does not mean that, without those stimuli, consciousness does not exist.

    Human beings require external stimuli for any higher brain development to happen, not just healthy brain development.

    But that does not mean that, without those stimuli, consciousness does not exist.

    Yes.... It does. Any example you would like to share of a conscious individual who lacks access to any and all external stimuli?

    A person can still be conscious and yet suffer severe cognitive, emotional, or behavioral changes because of sensory deprivation or an extremely limited environment.

    Yes, but they did not develop in that extreme deprivation. And even if they did develop in a way that was restricted, they did not lack external stimuli completely.

    Your body literally need to be experience external stimuli to develop the capacity for consciousness.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (2 children)

    Yes, I have to admit that I don’t have any example of consciousness in an individual completely without external stimuli. In fact, I agree with you on the last point you made. My point is that we need to be more precise about what we mean by “external stimuli” exactly.

    We could even say that it may be impossible to isolate the mind completely from all stimulation in the first place. That leads to the real issue: perhaps those external stimuli are always present in some form, even if they are extremely minimal, indirect, or invisible to us at first glance.

    So I correct myself, the argument is not necessarily that consciousness can exist with literally no input whatsoever, but rather that what we call “external stimuli” may include things so subtle that they are easy to overlook. In that sense, the claim becomes less about the absence of stimulation and more about how little stimulation is actually enough to sustain consciousness or mental activity.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (1 child)

    perhaps those external stimuli are always present in some form, even if they are extremely minimal, indirect, or invisible to us at first glance.

    I still think the connection between external stimuli and consciousness are a lot more glaring than what you realize. After all it is how we medically determine consciousness in humans. Our ability to process and respond to external stimuli is a direct reflection of our somatic and autonomic physiology.

    We could even say that it may be impossible to isolate the mind completely from all stimulation in the first place.

    You can, it's called anesthesia.

    In that sense, the claim becomes less about the absence of stimulation and more about how little stimulation is actually enough to sustain consciousness or mental activity.

    Its interdependent on your period of development. In gestation unborn infants produce more grey matter than what is really needed to sustain life and can get by with internal stimuli and the external stimuli provided by the womb. However as we develop we become more dependent on higher and higher levels of interaction with our environment to develop our mental capacity.

    If a person were to be put under anesthesia since early development or e acquired a tbi that made them unresponsive at an early age, they would all likely mentally deteriorate to a persistent vegetative state.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago

    Although I’m not sure one can say with absolute certainty that anesthesia completely isolates the mind from external stimuli, you’re probably right. You’ve brought Helen Keller’s testimony to mind:

    "Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious, yet conscious time of nothingness. I did not know that I knew aught, or that I lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor intellect. I was carried along to objects and acts by a certain blind natural impetus. I had a mind which caused me to feel anger, satisfaction, desire. These two facts led those about me to suppose that I willed and thought. I can remember all this, not because I knew that it was so, but because I have tactual memory. It enables me to remember that I never contracted my forehead in the act of thinking. I never viewed anything beforehand or chose it. I also recall tactually the fact that never in a start of the body or a heart-beat did I feel that I loved or cared for anything. My inner life, then, was a blank without past, present, or future, without hope or anticipation, without wonder or joy or faith."

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    Aren't brains like orders of magnitude faster and more "powerful" than even the strongest supercomputers?

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago

    It's complicated.

    Computers can scale, you can make a computer much larger than a human brain.

    Computers really just do binary math. For those who don't know, it's basically determining whether or not 1 or 0 should change, or stay the same, based on an algorithm. We don't know (or at least, I haven't read that we know) how brains actually store and process information.

    Computers are very fast at doing "simple" calculations with definite answers. A pocket calculator can do math faster than you can with 100% accuracy. On the flip side, analyzing and reacting to incomplete information is the forte of the human brain. We still haven't made a computer than can fit in a car and drive better than some of the dumbest people on the planet manage to do, while fucking around on their phones at the same time.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (3 children)

    Quantum effects are literally one of the things that computers are designed specifically to avoid. We're bumping up against the point where we can make conventional computer chips more dense the same ways we have previously since quantum tunneling causes some noticeable errors in computing when things get too much closer together.

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (2 children)

    Of course! This has been true for almost 30 years!

    But if your argument amounts to, "the soul exists because the brain has got quantum hootnannies in it"; well... :gestures broadly:

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago (1 child)
    1. I said nothing about souls. If I'm talking about souls (without direct prompting), I'm deep in a psychotic episode.

    2. I don't really get what you mean by the gestures broadly thing? I'm very open to an expansion on that thought, but have no current sense of what that means.

    3. It's not just the vague idea of quantum hootnannies, it is the fact that intentionally inducing extra quantum hootnannies in the brain structure of animals has a noticeable impact on the effects of various anesthesia, i.e. the "anti-conciousness drugs".

    I'm not claiming there is definitive proof, I'm simply stating there is some real, empirical evidence that supports the notion that consciousness is an emergent property reliant upon a maybe narrow range of emergent effects from quantum mechanics that are inherently absent from Turing machine computational models.

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  • [–] 1 point 4 months ago

    I spent a couple days on and off reading about this theory, I read a few papers in the field and some of Penrose's work (I didn't go grab his books). So, thanks. It was interesting. I have had some physicists mention to me in passing that quantum consciousness was a junk field, but I hadn't looked into it.

    I agree, this is definitely bullshit.

    1. Penrose himself attempts to dodge this in the first paragraph, but why are we groping for a special theory of consciousness at all?

    2. Quantum mechanics is in everything, without it, fundamental processes (like light passing through your window) can not adequately be explained. Just because something has 'got a quantum' or whatever doesn't instantly make it special from a physical perspective (you don't see scientists tossing out conversation of energy or causality because stuff's 'got a quantum' or whatever).

    3. You might be interested in some of the recent work demonstrating that anesthetics work on plants. Not a microtubule in sight.

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