Archived English version

Archived Spanish version

Venezuela may be one step away from becoming one of the first countries outside the People’s Republic of China to adopt the new generation of Chinese artificial intelligence systems for mass surveillance and political control, according to a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).

The report reveals that in July 2025, the Venezuelan government signed a memorandum of understanding with iFlytek, a Chinese company that has been on the U.S. trade sanctions list since 2019 for its role in the repression of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The agreement to jointly develop Artificial intelligence in Venezuela was negotiated by Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now Venezuela’s interim president.

...

The report, titled “Warning Signals: Venezuela and the Risk of Chinese AI-Enabled Digital Authoritarianism” (pdf), documents that Venezuela doesn’t need to build a surveillance system from scratch — it already has one, built largely on Chinese technology through importing cameras, networks, identity systems and command centres from Chinese firms in the past two decades.

While the resulting architecture is fragmented, unevenly deployed and technically constrained, ASPI's researchers identified six interconnected technological layers in the imported surveillance system: telecommunications, digital identity, central databases, video surveillance, internet control, and now, analytics and artificial intelligence. All of them were built or enhanced with support from companies such as Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC, Hikvision, and Dahua.

...

At the core of this system’s identity layer is the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card), a digital ID linked to social benefits. The report states it had 21.8 million registered users as of January 2023—roughly three-quarters of Venezuela’s population—and served as many as 14.2 million people each month. A layer of central databases could cross-reference identity information, biometric data, and social welfare data.

The report also describes a network of video surveillance and command centres (such as the VEN911 and SIMA systems) capable of monitoring public spaces and coordinating responses in real time, and a telecommunications infrastructure that, by channelling a large portion of the country’s data traffic, functions as an additional checkpoint.

While the above technologies were imported through separate contracts, they reinforce one another and form a partially connected surveillance system, enabling government agencies to identify, monitor, and take action regarding citizens’ behaviour.

...

According to the report, iFlytek's AI technology will further integrate the pre-existing layers of surveillance infrastructure into a more comprehensive system, making it faster, more scalable, and harder to evade.

Facial recognition, voice identification, and automated database cross-referencing tools could be used to identify, locate, and profile individuals without any visible human action, such as attending a protest.

...

If that capability were combined with the network of cameras and the identity records in the Carnet de la Patria, the risk is that the government would no longer need to rely on someone’s visible participation in a protest to identify them, and could instead preemptively flag individuals based on patterns of association, movement, or activity on social media even before any specific incident occurs.

...

Added to all this is a pattern of opacity. As has been the case for years with technology agreements between Venezuela and the People’s Republic of China, the details of the memorandum with iFlytek have not been made public in their entirety; this makes it difficult to ascertain the actual scope of the agreement, which is why the report recommends demanding the full publication of these agreements.

...

The agreement with iFlytek was signed months before Maduro’s capture by U.S. forces in January 2026. Delcy Rodríguez, who negotiated it directly at the time, now serves as the U.S.-backed interim president. However, the report notes that during her tenure, the Venezuelan surveillance apparatus has not been dismantled. This is the same conclusion reached by the UN International Fact-Finding Mission, which documented that the surveillance infrastructure remained in place following the change in government.

The authors argue that, despite this, there is a window of opportunity. The interim government’s current dependence on the U.S. could be used to demand the cancellation of the memorandum with iFlytek before this technological escalation is implemented.

...

Archived English version

Archived Spanish version

Venezuela may be one step away from becoming one of the first countries outside the People’s Republic of China to adopt the new generation of Chinese artificial intelligence systems for mass surveillance and political control, according to a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).

The report reveals that in July 2025, the Venezuelan government signed a memorandum of understanding with iFlytek, a Chinese company that has been on the U.S. trade sanctions list since 2019 for its role in the repression of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The agreement to jointly develop Artificial intelligence in Venezuela was negotiated by Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now Venezuela’s interim president.

...

The report, titled “Warning Signals: Venezuela and the Risk of Chinese AI-Enabled Digital Authoritarianism” (pdf), documents that Venezuela doesn’t need to build a surveillance system from scratch — it already has one, built largely on Chinese technology through importing cameras, networks, identity systems and command centres from Chinese firms in the past two decades.

While the resulting architecture is fragmented, unevenly deployed and technically constrained, ASPI's researchers identified six interconnected technological layers in the imported surveillance system: telecommunications, digital identity, central databases, video surveillance, internet control, and now, analytics and artificial intelligence. All of them were built or enhanced with support from companies such as Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC, Hikvision, and Dahua.

...

At the core of this system’s identity layer is the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card), a digital ID linked to social benefits. The report states it had 21.8 million registered users as of January 2023—roughly three-quarters of Venezuela’s population—and served as many as 14.2 million people each month. A layer of central databases could cross-reference identity information, biometric data, and social welfare data.

The report also describes a network of video surveillance and command centres (such as the VEN911 and SIMA systems) capable of monitoring public spaces and coordinating responses in real time, and a telecommunications infrastructure that, by channelling a large portion of the country’s data traffic, functions as an additional checkpoint.

While the above technologies were imported through separate contracts, they reinforce one another and form a partially connected surveillance system, enabling government agencies to identify, monitor, and take action regarding citizens’ behaviour.

...

According to the report, iFlytek's AI technology will further integrate the pre-existing layers of surveillance infrastructure into a more comprehensive system, making it faster, more scalable, and harder to evade.

Facial recognition, voice identification, and automated database cross-referencing tools could be used to identify, locate, and profile individuals without any visible human action, such as attending a protest.

...

If that capability were combined with the network of cameras and the identity records in the Carnet de la Patria, the risk is that the government would no longer need to rely on someone’s visible participation in a protest to identify them, and could instead preemptively flag individuals based on patterns of association, movement, or activity on social media even before any specific incident occurs.

...

Added to all this is a pattern of opacity. As has been the case for years with technology agreements between Venezuela and the People’s Republic of China, the details of the memorandum with iFlytek have not been made public in their entirety; this makes it difficult to ascertain the actual scope of the agreement, which is why the report recommends demanding the full publication of these agreements.

...

The agreement with iFlytek was signed months before Maduro’s capture by U.S. forces in January 2026. Delcy Rodríguez, who negotiated it directly at the time, now serves as the U.S.-backed interim president. However, the report notes that during her tenure, the Venezuelan surveillance apparatus has not been dismantled. This is the same conclusion reached by the UN International Fact-Finding Mission, which documented that the surveillance infrastructure remained in place following the change in government.

The authors argue that, despite this, there is a window of opportunity. The interim government’s current dependence on the U.S. could be used to demand the cancellation of the memorandum with iFlytek before this technological escalation is implemented.

...

• The contract, procured by public-sector cooperative govdigital eG, covers Berlin, ​Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and ​Rhineland-Palatinate, with other states able to join
• Pricing ‌is ⁠structured in five tiers based on active users, ranging from up to 50,000 to more than 500,000. No school authority has to commit to a set volume up front, so each can begin with its current users and grow from there
• The maximum value of ​the framework ​agreement is €67.5 ⁠million, according to the federal government's official procurement portal
• The solution is ​based on IONOS Nextcloud Workspace, combining ​file ⁠storage, document collaboration and communication tools, the companies said
• The platform will run exclusively in ⁠German ​data centres on open-source ​technology, without non-European dependencies

...

Archived

The commercial fallout for Real Madrid may be temporary, but the precedent for censoring speech beyond China’s borders is far more consequential.

Archived version (removepaywall.com)

A footballer’s joke about an internet meme has become a demonstration of China’s ability to influence speech far beyond its borders. During a casual interview, French football star Kylian Mbappé described a meme depicting his face superimposed onto Mao Zedong’s body as showing a “Chinese dictator.” The joke was directed at himself, playing on fans’ perceptions of his influence over the teams he plays for. Yet within days, three Chinese sponsors had terminated their partnerships with him, Chinese broadcasters had suspended football coverage, and Mbappé, La Liga, and Real Madrid had all issued apologies.

Whether these apologies will restore their commercial relationships in China remains uncertain. Chinese authorities and businesses may eventually decide that resuming cooperation serves their interests. What is already apparent, however, is the precedent established for freedom of expression. A French athlete, speaking in a non-political context outside China, has publicly apologized for referring to a historical political leader as a dictator.

...

There is no solid evidence that Chinese authorities individually instructed these companies to terminate their agreements. In China’s political and commercial environment, however, businesses have incentives to anticipate official sensitivities and demonstrate loyalty before being asked. Once one company publicly takes a position, others may perceive a need to respond with comparable or greater severity. Silence, or a comparatively restrained response, can become a reputational liability.

...

China’s Foreign Ministry subsequently elevated the controversy into a matter of national dignity. “Any rhetoric or action that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people will naturally be rejected across the sectors in China,” spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared.

...

Such rhetoric presents the Communist Party’s preferred interpretation of history as inseparable from the feelings of the Chinese population, leaving little room for disagreement among Chinese citizens themselves. Yet Chinese society is neither politically nor historically homogeneous. Views of Mao’s legacy differ across generations, communities, and personal experiences. By framing the controversy as an affront to “the Chinese people,” the Foreign Ministry gave an unfolding commercial backlash the authority of a national grievance.

...

Respect for Chinese people does not require agreement with the Chinese government’s interpretation of history. Nor should maintaining friendships and commercial relationships entail allowing the CCP’s political sensitivities to determine what foreigners may say about Chinese political figures.

Now that apologies have been made publicly, the significance of the controversy extends beyond those directly involved. Other athletes, entertainers, businesses, and media organizations may begin avoiding historical references, political subjects, or even casual jokes, because the potential commercial consequences are difficult to predict. Such anticipatory self-censorship is difficult to measure.

...

Chinese authorities and commercial institutions can unilaterally decide what “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.” They also have the power to determine when a controversy has been sufficiently addressed, whether an apology is acceptable, and when normal business relations should resume.

...

China’s influence over international speech therefore cannot be understood solely by counting canceled contracts, suspended broadcasts, or public apologies. Its more enduring effect lies in the ability of political restrictions originating in China to shape the conduct of institutions and individuals operating in societies that do not formally recognize those restrictions.

Real Madrid may eventually recover its commercial standing in China, but the consequences for freedom of expression are far harder to undo.

...

The commercial fallout for Real Madrid may be temporary, but the precedent for censoring speech beyond China’s borders is far more consequential.

Archived version (removepaywall.com)

A footballer’s joke about an internet meme has become a demonstration of China’s ability to influence speech far beyond its borders. During a casual interview, French football star Kylian Mbappé described a meme depicting his face superimposed onto Mao Zedong’s body as showing a “Chinese dictator.” The joke was directed at himself, playing on fans’ perceptions of his influence over the teams he plays for. Yet within days, three Chinese sponsors had terminated their partnerships with him, Chinese broadcasters had suspended football coverage, and Mbappé, La Liga, and Real Madrid had all issued apologies.

Whether these apologies will restore their commercial relationships in China remains uncertain. Chinese authorities and businesses may eventually decide that resuming cooperation serves their interests. What is already apparent, however, is the precedent established for freedom of expression. A French athlete, speaking in a non-political context outside China, has publicly apologized for referring to a historical political leader as a dictator.

...

There is no solid evidence that Chinese authorities individually instructed these companies to terminate their agreements. In China’s political and commercial environment, however, businesses have incentives to anticipate official sensitivities and demonstrate loyalty before being asked. Once one company publicly takes a position, others may perceive a need to respond with comparable or greater severity. Silence, or a comparatively restrained response, can become a reputational liability.

...

China’s Foreign Ministry subsequently elevated the controversy into a matter of national dignity. “Any rhetoric or action that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people will naturally be rejected across the sectors in China,” spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared.

...

Such rhetoric presents the Communist Party’s preferred interpretation of history as inseparable from the feelings of the Chinese population, leaving little room for disagreement among Chinese citizens themselves. Yet Chinese society is neither politically nor historically homogeneous. Views of Mao’s legacy differ across generations, communities, and personal experiences. By framing the controversy as an affront to “the Chinese people,” the Foreign Ministry gave an unfolding commercial backlash the authority of a national grievance.

...

Respect for Chinese people does not require agreement with the Chinese government’s interpretation of history. Nor should maintaining friendships and commercial relationships entail allowing the CCP’s political sensitivities to determine what foreigners may say about Chinese political figures.

Now that apologies have been made publicly, the significance of the controversy extends beyond those directly involved. Other athletes, entertainers, businesses, and media organizations may begin avoiding historical references, political subjects, or even casual jokes, because the potential commercial consequences are difficult to predict. Such anticipatory self-censorship is difficult to measure.

...

Chinese authorities and commercial institutions can unilaterally decide what “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.” They also have the power to determine when a controversy has been sufficiently addressed, whether an apology is acceptable, and when normal business relations should resume.

...

China’s influence over international speech therefore cannot be understood solely by counting canceled contracts, suspended broadcasts, or public apologies. Its more enduring effect lies in the ability of political restrictions originating in China to shape the conduct of institutions and individuals operating in societies that do not formally recognize those restrictions.

Real Madrid may eventually recover its commercial standing in China, but the consequences for freedom of expression are far harder to undo.

...

The commercial fallout for Real Madrid may be temporary, but the precedent for censoring speech beyond China’s borders is far more consequential.

Archived version (removepaywall.com)

A footballer’s joke about an internet meme has become a demonstration of China’s ability to influence speech far beyond its borders. During a casual interview, French football star Kylian Mbappé described a meme depicting his face superimposed onto Mao Zedong’s body as showing a “Chinese dictator.” The joke was directed at himself, playing on fans’ perceptions of his influence over the teams he plays for. Yet within days, three Chinese sponsors had terminated their partnerships with him, Chinese broadcasters had suspended football coverage, and Mbappé, La Liga, and Real Madrid had all issued apologies.

Whether these apologies will restore their commercial relationships in China remains uncertain. Chinese authorities and businesses may eventually decide that resuming cooperation serves their interests. What is already apparent, however, is the precedent established for freedom of expression. A French athlete, speaking in a non-political context outside China, has publicly apologized for referring to a historical political leader as a dictator.

...

There is no solid evidence that Chinese authorities individually instructed these companies to terminate their agreements. In China’s political and commercial environment, however, businesses have incentives to anticipate official sensitivities and demonstrate loyalty before being asked. Once one company publicly takes a position, others may perceive a need to respond with comparable or greater severity. Silence, or a comparatively restrained response, can become a reputational liability.

...

China’s Foreign Ministry subsequently elevated the controversy into a matter of national dignity. “Any rhetoric or action that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people will naturally be rejected across the sectors in China,” spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared.

...

Such rhetoric presents the Communist Party’s preferred interpretation of history as inseparable from the feelings of the Chinese population, leaving little room for disagreement among Chinese citizens themselves. Yet Chinese society is neither politically nor historically homogeneous. Views of Mao’s legacy differ across generations, communities, and personal experiences. By framing the controversy as an affront to “the Chinese people,” the Foreign Ministry gave an unfolding commercial backlash the authority of a national grievance.

...

Respect for Chinese people does not require agreement with the Chinese government’s interpretation of history. Nor should maintaining friendships and commercial relationships entail allowing the CCP’s political sensitivities to determine what foreigners may say about Chinese political figures.

Now that apologies have been made publicly, the significance of the controversy extends beyond those directly involved. Other athletes, entertainers, businesses, and media organizations may begin avoiding historical references, political subjects, or even casual jokes, because the potential commercial consequences are difficult to predict. Such anticipatory self-censorship is difficult to measure.

...

Chinese authorities and commercial institutions can unilaterally decide what “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.” They also have the power to determine when a controversy has been sufficiently addressed, whether an apology is acceptable, and when normal business relations should resume.

...

China’s influence over international speech therefore cannot be understood solely by counting canceled contracts, suspended broadcasts, or public apologies. Its more enduring effect lies in the ability of political restrictions originating in China to shape the conduct of institutions and individuals operating in societies that do not formally recognize those restrictions.

Real Madrid may eventually recover its commercial standing in China, but the consequences for freedom of expression are far harder to undo.

...

Archived version

...

Investing in circularity is therefore not a side issue, but a competitiveness strategy. By designing products for disassembly, reuse and recycling, Europe can reduce dependency on newly mined imports while building industries that generate jobs, innovation and intellectual property at home. The transition to a low-carbon, circular, and resource-efficient economy could generate 1.2 million new jobs in the EU by 20303.

Policy is starting to recognise this. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) sets a binding target that domestic recycling provides at least one quarter of the block’s annual consumption of strategic raw materials. Recycling and recovery plants can qualify as strategic projects, benefitting from streamlined permitting and access to finance. National funds and the ResourceEU action plan aim to address remaining bottlenecks.

...

Archived version

...

Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, Eli Heckscher delivered a lecture at the Stockholm School of Economics on the fate of “the West”. His diagnosis was, above all, technological. He argued that early industrial machinery had left ample room for individual freedom. However, it was the network systems that followed – railways, the telegraph, power lines and, finally, radio – that changed society. As networks could only be controlled from their centre, Heckscher noted, they strengthened those in control, first large firms and then the state (Heckscher 1939).

The digital economy of the 2020s has so far followed Heckscher’s predictions. Cloud platforms, app stores, and frontier AI models are network systems with a single control room. Their fragility has been repeatedly exposed, for instance when a defective CrowdStrike update disabled 8.5 million Windows devices in July 2024.

...

By 2050, Europe should strive to become the world’s most capable mesh economy: a dense network of small and medium-sized enterprises and municipalities that leverage interoperable, open, and increasingly local digital infrastructure rather than renting intelligence from a few central labs. I refer to this vision as “Small is beautiful 2.0”, in reference to E. F. Schumacher’s (1973) call for technology on a human scale.

...

Schumacher lost the argument in the 1970s because mass production economics were against him. With generative AI, however, the conditions are changing. Open-weight models running on local hardware can now accurately answer most chat and reasoning queries.

...

Concentrated economic power rarely remains purely economic. Firms that control the infrastructure on which administrations and markets rely acquire influence over the rules that govern them. Heckscher’s warning applies to both sides: the same networks that empower large firms also empower the central state.

...

If the mesh is the destination, the choices made about digital policy now will be crucial.

• Firstly, ensure that switching is the default option at every layer of the emerging AI economy. From January 2027, the Data Act will abolish cloud switching charges, and since March 2024, Article 6(7) of the Digital Markets Act has obliged gatekeepers to grant interoperability with features of their operating systems. The same logic should apply to AI: firms should be permitted to transfer fine-tuned models, agent configurations, and associated data between providers and onto their own hardware.

• Secondly, write procurement rules with the mesh in mind. Public buyers account for around 15% of the EU’s GDP. The Commission’s proposed Public Procurement Act contains several provisions that could benefit SMEs, including a requirement for suppliers to grant buyers the licenses needed to operate, adapt, and maintain deliverables (Article 63), and a cap on turnover requirements (Article 27). However, open-source solutions are only mentioned as an option for buyers pursuing innovation objectives (Article 61). The co-legislators should require an assessment of exit costs for every digital purchase and give preference to solutions that buyers can run on infrastructure they control.

• Thirdly, measure intelligence per watt rather than gigawatts. Capacity targets for gigafactories count inputs. A 2050 benchmark should measure outcomes, such as the proportion of AI workloads that European firms and public bodies can run on their own infrastructure and the cost of switching. Therefore, part of public compute funding should go to distributed edge capacity and shared public inference services. The Swiss open model Apertus, released in 2025 and offered through an international public AI inference utility, demonstrates how such a service could function.

• Finally, fund diffusion rather than European champions. More than half of EU Horizon funding currently goes to mid-tech firms and consultancies with limited growth potential. In contrast, single-recipient SME instruments, such as the EIC Accelerator, have a more lasting effect, but only for small, independent firms (Fuest et al. 2025). A European AI extension service modelled on the US Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which took university expertise to farms, could deliver applied AI knowledge to small firms via universities and regional innovation hubs (Frazier 2025). A more proactive competition policy plays a role, too. If their innovations and teams are simply absorbed by the hubs through acquisitions and “acqui-hires” that fall below merger thresholds, public money spent on small firms is ultimately wasted.

...

Scale as a means, not an end in itself

Critics will argue that a continent without its own frontier model cannot afford to be romantic about small units. However, the argument is not that Europe should avoid large-scale projects. Rather, it is that Europe should not mistake scale for the destination. Learning from Heckscher, Europe’s success in 2050 should be measured by how many of its firms and citizens can build, adapt, and switch AI on their own terms.

...

Archived version

...

AI technology and the smart economy are growing quickly in China. The country had 60 AI data centres operating or under construction by the end of 2023. This year, the figure is 250. Local governments and companies see underwater data centres as a new and more sustainable approach. But experts warn it is too early to say if they really are a green solution, voicing concerns over their impacts on nearby organisms.

...

More data centres going up has led to concerns over land use and the consumption of energy and water. China’s smart economy needs to tackle this as a matter of urgency. By 2030, data centres will be behind 4.8 per cent of the nation’s electricity use, as predicted by the Beijing Institute of Technology in 2025 research.

...

This isn’t HiCloud’s first underwater data centre. In 2023, sister company Shenzhen HiCloud Data Center Technology set up a commercial example, with servers in three sealed capsules, placed on the seabed of Qingshui Bay, Hainan. The company says it plans to eventually build 100 of these capsules at a total cost of CNY 5.6 billion (US$830 million), without specifying the location.

..

Local governments have high hopes for the new technology, but there’s little understanding of how it might affect ecosystems. HiCloud’s data centres in Shanghai pump seawater into a heat exchanger, where it absorbs heat from inside the facility and is pumped back out, now warmer.

Stephen Watson, senior ecosystem services researcher at Plymouth Marine Laboratory, said: “The heat given off by underwater data centres may have behavioural or biological effects on species living in the immediate vicinity, particularly those which are unable to move away.”

...

According to Hu Zhenyu, environmental impact assessments for underwater data centres currently focus on the construction phase. The longer-term impacts of operation and decommissioning aren’t studied enough. More monitoring of the consequences of warmer temperatures for marine life is needed, he said.

...

Transparency in the data centre industry has long been a problem. Eric Masanet is professor in emerging technologies and sustainable development at the University of California Santa Barbara. He said: “Most data centre operators don’t report on specific data centres or projects. This includes Amazon and Microsoft.”

...

It’s not just China. Singapore, Korea and the US are among the countries looking at using seawater to cool data centres. In April this year, Korea’s ocean ministry announced a pilot project in the waters off the country’s industrial powerhouse, Ulsan.

Hu Zhenyu says underwater data centres are a new undertaking. The idea is still being explored and tested, and there are various questions to be answered before commerciality is achieved. However, those risks are played down in corporate communications, he says.

...

Archived version

...

AI technology and the smart economy are growing quickly in China. The country had 60 AI data centres operating or under construction by the end of 2023. This year, the figure is 250. Local governments and companies see underwater data centres as a new and more sustainable approach. But experts warn it is too early to say if they really are a green solution, voicing concerns over their impacts on nearby organisms.

...

More data centres going up has led to concerns over land use and the consumption of energy and water. China’s smart economy needs to tackle this as a matter of urgency. By 2030, data centres will be behind 4.8 per cent of the nation’s electricity use, as predicted by the Beijing Institute of Technology in 2025 research.

...

This isn’t HiCloud’s first underwater data centre. In 2023, sister company Shenzhen HiCloud Data Center Technology set up a commercial example, with servers in three sealed capsules, placed on the seabed of Qingshui Bay, Hainan. The company says it plans to eventually build 100 of these capsules at a total cost of CNY 5.6 billion (US$830 million), without specifying the location.

..

Local governments have high hopes for the new technology, but there’s little understanding of how it might affect ecosystems. HiCloud’s data centres in Shanghai pump seawater into a heat exchanger, where it absorbs heat from inside the facility and is pumped back out, now warmer.

Stephen Watson, senior ecosystem services researcher at Plymouth Marine Laboratory, said: “The heat given off by underwater data centres may have behavioural or biological effects on species living in the immediate vicinity, particularly those which are unable to move away.”

...

According to Hu Zhenyu, environmental impact assessments for underwater data centres currently focus on the construction phase. The longer-term impacts of operation and decommissioning aren’t studied enough. More monitoring of the consequences of warmer temperatures for marine life is needed, he said.

...

Transparency in the data centre industry has long been a problem. Eric Masanet is professor in emerging technologies and sustainable development at the University of California Santa Barbara. He said: “Most data centre operators don’t report on specific data centres or projects. This includes Amazon and Microsoft.”

...

It’s not just China. Singapore, Korea and the US are among the countries looking at using seawater to cool data centres. In April this year, Korea’s ocean ministry announced a pilot project in the waters off the country’s industrial powerhouse, Ulsan.

Hu Zhenyu says underwater data centres are a new undertaking. The idea is still being explored and tested, and there are various questions to be answered before commerciality is achieved. However, those risks are played down in corporate communications, he says.

...

Archived version

Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) yesterday called for Taiwan and Europe to build trusted supply chains in artificial intelligence (AI) and drones, saying closer cooperation could strengthen economic and national security.

Speaking at the opening of the annual conference of the Formosa Club, which connects pro-Taiwan parliamentarians across Europe, Lin said Taiwan’s semiconductor, AI server and emerging drone industries complemented Europe’s expertise in precision manufacturing and industrial technology.

“These require trusted partners because they directly involve national security and critical infrastructure,” he said.

...

Russia’s war against Ukraine had demonstrated how excessive economic dependence could become an instrument of coercion, Lin said, adding that Taiwan offered a partnership grounded in trust and shared values.

Taiwan was developing a complete drone supply chain encompassing hardware, critical components and cybersecurity standards, he said.

As an example of industrial cooperation, Lin cited a proposed technology park in Poland planned by the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association.

The project would focus on AI data centers, smart cities and electric vehicles, he said.

Lin described economic cooperation as one pillar of Taiwan’s “integrated diplomacy,” alongside partnerships with fellow democracies.

...

Archived version

Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) yesterday called for Taiwan and Europe to build trusted supply chains in artificial intelligence (AI) and drones, saying closer cooperation could strengthen economic and national security.

Speaking at the opening of the annual conference of the Formosa Club, which connects pro-Taiwan parliamentarians across Europe, Lin said Taiwan’s semiconductor, AI server and emerging drone industries complemented Europe’s expertise in precision manufacturing and industrial technology.

“These require trusted partners because they directly involve national security and critical infrastructure,” he said.

...

Russia’s war against Ukraine had demonstrated how excessive economic dependence could become an instrument of coercion, Lin said, adding that Taiwan offered a partnership grounded in trust and shared values.

Taiwan was developing a complete drone supply chain encompassing hardware, critical components and cybersecurity standards, he said.

As an example of industrial cooperation, Lin cited a proposed technology park in Poland planned by the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association.

The project would focus on AI data centers, smart cities and electric vehicles, he said.

Lin described economic cooperation as one pillar of Taiwan’s “integrated diplomacy,” alongside partnerships with fellow democracies.

...