Venezuela may be one step away from becoming one of the first countries outside the People’s Republic of China to adopt the new generation of Chinese artificial intelligence systems for mass surveillance and political control, according to a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
The report reveals that in July 2025, the Venezuelan government signed a memorandum of understanding with iFlytek, a Chinese company that has been on the U.S. trade sanctions list since 2019 for its role in the repression of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The agreement to jointly develop Artificial intelligence in Venezuela was negotiated by Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now Venezuela’s interim president.
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The report, titled “Warning Signals: Venezuela and the Risk of Chinese AI-Enabled Digital Authoritarianism” (pdf), documents that Venezuela doesn’t need to build a surveillance system from scratch — it already has one, built largely on Chinese technology through importing cameras, networks, identity systems and command centres from Chinese firms in the past two decades.
While the resulting architecture is fragmented, unevenly deployed and technically constrained, ASPI's researchers identified six interconnected technological layers in the imported surveillance system: telecommunications, digital identity, central databases, video surveillance, internet control, and now, analytics and artificial intelligence. All of them were built or enhanced with support from companies such as Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC, Hikvision, and Dahua.
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At the core of this system’s identity layer is the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card), a digital ID linked to social benefits. The report states it had 21.8 million registered users as of January 2023—roughly three-quarters of Venezuela’s population—and served as many as 14.2 million people each month. A layer of central databases could cross-reference identity information, biometric data, and social welfare data.
The report also describes a network of video surveillance and command centres (such as the VEN911 and SIMA systems) capable of monitoring public spaces and coordinating responses in real time, and a telecommunications infrastructure that, by channelling a large portion of the country’s data traffic, functions as an additional checkpoint.
While the above technologies were imported through separate contracts, they reinforce one another and form a partially connected surveillance system, enabling government agencies to identify, monitor, and take action regarding citizens’ behaviour.
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According to the report, iFlytek's AI technology will further integrate the pre-existing layers of surveillance infrastructure into a more comprehensive system, making it faster, more scalable, and harder to evade.
Facial recognition, voice identification, and automated database cross-referencing tools could be used to identify, locate, and profile individuals without any visible human action, such as attending a protest.
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If that capability were combined with the network of cameras and the identity records in the Carnet de la Patria, the risk is that the government would no longer need to rely on someone’s visible participation in a protest to identify them, and could instead preemptively flag individuals based on patterns of association, movement, or activity on social media even before any specific incident occurs.
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Added to all this is a pattern of opacity. As has been the case for years with technology agreements between Venezuela and the People’s Republic of China, the details of the memorandum with iFlytek have not been made public in their entirety; this makes it difficult to ascertain the actual scope of the agreement, which is why the report recommends demanding the full publication of these agreements.
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The agreement with iFlytek was signed months before Maduro’s capture by U.S. forces in January 2026. Delcy Rodríguez, who negotiated it directly at the time, now serves as the U.S.-backed interim president. However, the report notes that during her tenure, the Venezuelan surveillance apparatus has not been dismantled. This is the same conclusion reached by the UN International Fact-Finding Mission, which documented that the surveillance infrastructure remained in place following the change in government.
The authors argue that, despite this, there is a window of opportunity. The interim government’s current dependence on the U.S. could be used to demand the cancellation of the memorandum with iFlytek before this technological escalation is implemented.
...
Venezuela may be one step away from becoming one of the first countries outside the People’s Republic of China to adopt the new generation of Chinese artificial intelligence systems for mass surveillance and political control, according to a report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
The report reveals that in July 2025, the Venezuelan government signed a memorandum of understanding with iFlytek, a Chinese company that has been on the U.S. trade sanctions list since 2019 for its role in the repression of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The agreement to jointly develop Artificial intelligence in Venezuela was negotiated by Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now Venezuela’s interim president.
...
The report, titled “Warning Signals: Venezuela and the Risk of Chinese AI-Enabled Digital Authoritarianism” (pdf), documents that Venezuela doesn’t need to build a surveillance system from scratch — it already has one, built largely on Chinese technology through importing cameras, networks, identity systems and command centres from Chinese firms in the past two decades.
While the resulting architecture is fragmented, unevenly deployed and technically constrained, ASPI's researchers identified six interconnected technological layers in the imported surveillance system: telecommunications, digital identity, central databases, video surveillance, internet control, and now, analytics and artificial intelligence. All of them were built or enhanced with support from companies such as Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC, Hikvision, and Dahua.
...
At the core of this system’s identity layer is the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card), a digital ID linked to social benefits. The report states it had 21.8 million registered users as of January 2023—roughly three-quarters of Venezuela’s population—and served as many as 14.2 million people each month. A layer of central databases could cross-reference identity information, biometric data, and social welfare data.
The report also describes a network of video surveillance and command centres (such as the VEN911 and SIMA systems) capable of monitoring public spaces and coordinating responses in real time, and a telecommunications infrastructure that, by channelling a large portion of the country’s data traffic, functions as an additional checkpoint.
While the above technologies were imported through separate contracts, they reinforce one another and form a partially connected surveillance system, enabling government agencies to identify, monitor, and take action regarding citizens’ behaviour.
...
According to the report, iFlytek's AI technology will further integrate the pre-existing layers of surveillance infrastructure into a more comprehensive system, making it faster, more scalable, and harder to evade.
Facial recognition, voice identification, and automated database cross-referencing tools could be used to identify, locate, and profile individuals without any visible human action, such as attending a protest.
...
If that capability were combined with the network of cameras and the identity records in the Carnet de la Patria, the risk is that the government would no longer need to rely on someone’s visible participation in a protest to identify them, and could instead preemptively flag individuals based on patterns of association, movement, or activity on social media even before any specific incident occurs.
...
Added to all this is a pattern of opacity. As has been the case for years with technology agreements between Venezuela and the People’s Republic of China, the details of the memorandum with iFlytek have not been made public in their entirety; this makes it difficult to ascertain the actual scope of the agreement, which is why the report recommends demanding the full publication of these agreements.
...
The agreement with iFlytek was signed months before Maduro’s capture by U.S. forces in January 2026. Delcy Rodríguez, who negotiated it directly at the time, now serves as the U.S.-backed interim president. However, the report notes that during her tenure, the Venezuelan surveillance apparatus has not been dismantled. This is the same conclusion reached by the UN International Fact-Finding Mission, which documented that the surveillance infrastructure remained in place following the change in government.
The authors argue that, despite this, there is a window of opportunity. The interim government’s current dependence on the U.S. could be used to demand the cancellation of the memorandum with iFlytek before this technological escalation is implemented.
...
- The contract, procured by public-sector cooperative govdigital eG, covers Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate, with other states able to join
- Pricing is structured in five tiers based on active users, ranging from up to 50,000 to more than 500,000. No school authority has to commit to a set volume up front, so each can begin with its current users and grow from there
- The maximum value of the framework agreement is €67.5 million, according to the federal government's official procurement portal
- The solution is based on IONOS Nextcloud Workspace, combining file storage, document collaboration and communication tools, the companies said
- The platform will run exclusively in German data centres on open-source technology, without non-European dependencies
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The commercial fallout for Real Madrid may be temporary, but the precedent for censoring speech beyond China’s borders is far more consequential.
Archived version (removepaywall.com)
A footballer’s joke about an internet meme has become a demonstration of China’s ability to influence speech far beyond its borders. During a casual interview, French football star Kylian Mbappé described a meme depicting his face superimposed onto Mao Zedong’s body as showing a “Chinese dictator.” The joke was directed at himself, playing on fans’ perceptions of his influence over the teams he plays for. Yet within days, three Chinese sponsors had terminated their partnerships with him, Chinese broadcasters had suspended football coverage, and Mbappé, La Liga, and Real Madrid had all issued apologies.
Whether these apologies will restore their commercial relationships in China remains uncertain. Chinese authorities and businesses may eventually decide that resuming cooperation serves their interests. What is already apparent, however, is the precedent established for freedom of expression. A French athlete, speaking in a non-political context outside China, has publicly apologized for referring to a historical political leader as a dictator.
...
There is no solid evidence that Chinese authorities individually instructed these companies to terminate their agreements. In China’s political and commercial environment, however, businesses have incentives to anticipate official sensitivities and demonstrate loyalty before being asked. Once one company publicly takes a position, others may perceive a need to respond with comparable or greater severity. Silence, or a comparatively restrained response, can become a reputational liability.
...
China’s Foreign Ministry subsequently elevated the controversy into a matter of national dignity. “Any rhetoric or action that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people will naturally be rejected across the sectors in China,” spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared.
...
Such rhetoric presents the Communist Party’s preferred interpretation of history as inseparable from the feelings of the Chinese population, leaving little room for disagreement among Chinese citizens themselves. Yet Chinese society is neither politically nor historically homogeneous. Views of Mao’s legacy differ across generations, communities, and personal experiences. By framing the controversy as an affront to “the Chinese people,” the Foreign Ministry gave an unfolding commercial backlash the authority of a national grievance.
...
Respect for Chinese people does not require agreement with the Chinese government’s interpretation of history. Nor should maintaining friendships and commercial relationships entail allowing the CCP’s political sensitivities to determine what foreigners may say about Chinese political figures.
Now that apologies have been made publicly, the significance of the controversy extends beyond those directly involved. Other athletes, entertainers, businesses, and media organizations may begin avoiding historical references, political subjects, or even casual jokes, because the potential commercial consequences are difficult to predict. Such anticipatory self-censorship is difficult to measure.
...
Chinese authorities and commercial institutions can unilaterally decide what “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.” They also have the power to determine when a controversy has been sufficiently addressed, whether an apology is acceptable, and when normal business relations should resume.
...
China’s influence over international speech therefore cannot be understood solely by counting canceled contracts, suspended broadcasts, or public apologies. Its more enduring effect lies in the ability of political restrictions originating in China to shape the conduct of institutions and individuals operating in societies that do not formally recognize those restrictions.
Real Madrid may eventually recover its commercial standing in China, but the consequences for freedom of expression are far harder to undo.
...
The commercial fallout for Real Madrid may be temporary, but the precedent for censoring speech beyond China’s borders is far more consequential.
Archived version (removepaywall.com)
A footballer’s joke about an internet meme has become a demonstration of China’s ability to influence speech far beyond its borders. During a casual interview, French football star Kylian Mbappé described a meme depicting his face superimposed onto Mao Zedong’s body as showing a “Chinese dictator.” The joke was directed at himself, playing on fans’ perceptions of his influence over the teams he plays for. Yet within days, three Chinese sponsors had terminated their partnerships with him, Chinese broadcasters had suspended football coverage, and Mbappé, La Liga, and Real Madrid had all issued apologies.
Whether these apologies will restore their commercial relationships in China remains uncertain. Chinese authorities and businesses may eventually decide that resuming cooperation serves their interests. What is already apparent, however, is the precedent established for freedom of expression. A French athlete, speaking in a non-political context outside China, has publicly apologized for referring to a historical political leader as a dictator.
...
There is no solid evidence that Chinese authorities individually instructed these companies to terminate their agreements. In China’s political and commercial environment, however, businesses have incentives to anticipate official sensitivities and demonstrate loyalty before being asked. Once one company publicly takes a position, others may perceive a need to respond with comparable or greater severity. Silence, or a comparatively restrained response, can become a reputational liability.
...
China’s Foreign Ministry subsequently elevated the controversy into a matter of national dignity. “Any rhetoric or action that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people will naturally be rejected across the sectors in China,” spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared.
...
Such rhetoric presents the Communist Party’s preferred interpretation of history as inseparable from the feelings of the Chinese population, leaving little room for disagreement among Chinese citizens themselves. Yet Chinese society is neither politically nor historically homogeneous. Views of Mao’s legacy differ across generations, communities, and personal experiences. By framing the controversy as an affront to “the Chinese people,” the Foreign Ministry gave an unfolding commercial backlash the authority of a national grievance.
...
Respect for Chinese people does not require agreement with the Chinese government’s interpretation of history. Nor should maintaining friendships and commercial relationships entail allowing the CCP’s political sensitivities to determine what foreigners may say about Chinese political figures.
Now that apologies have been made publicly, the significance of the controversy extends beyond those directly involved. Other athletes, entertainers, businesses, and media organizations may begin avoiding historical references, political subjects, or even casual jokes, because the potential commercial consequences are difficult to predict. Such anticipatory self-censorship is difficult to measure.
...
Chinese authorities and commercial institutions can unilaterally decide what “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.” They also have the power to determine when a controversy has been sufficiently addressed, whether an apology is acceptable, and when normal business relations should resume.
...
China’s influence over international speech therefore cannot be understood solely by counting canceled contracts, suspended broadcasts, or public apologies. Its more enduring effect lies in the ability of political restrictions originating in China to shape the conduct of institutions and individuals operating in societies that do not formally recognize those restrictions.
Real Madrid may eventually recover its commercial standing in China, but the consequences for freedom of expression are far harder to undo.
...
The commercial fallout for Real Madrid may be temporary, but the precedent for censoring speech beyond China’s borders is far more consequential.
Archived version (removepaywall.com)
A footballer’s joke about an internet meme has become a demonstration of China’s ability to influence speech far beyond its borders. During a casual interview, French football star Kylian Mbappé described a meme depicting his face superimposed onto Mao Zedong’s body as showing a “Chinese dictator.” The joke was directed at himself, playing on fans’ perceptions of his influence over the teams he plays for. Yet within days, three Chinese sponsors had terminated their partnerships with him, Chinese broadcasters had suspended football coverage, and Mbappé, La Liga, and Real Madrid had all issued apologies.
Whether these apologies will restore their commercial relationships in China remains uncertain. Chinese authorities and businesses may eventually decide that resuming cooperation serves their interests. What is already apparent, however, is the precedent established for freedom of expression. A French athlete, speaking in a non-political context outside China, has publicly apologized for referring to a historical political leader as a dictator.
...
There is no solid evidence that Chinese authorities individually instructed these companies to terminate their agreements. In China’s political and commercial environment, however, businesses have incentives to anticipate official sensitivities and demonstrate loyalty before being asked. Once one company publicly takes a position, others may perceive a need to respond with comparable or greater severity. Silence, or a comparatively restrained response, can become a reputational liability.
...
China’s Foreign Ministry subsequently elevated the controversy into a matter of national dignity. “Any rhetoric or action that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people will naturally be rejected across the sectors in China,” spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared.
...
Such rhetoric presents the Communist Party’s preferred interpretation of history as inseparable from the feelings of the Chinese population, leaving little room for disagreement among Chinese citizens themselves. Yet Chinese society is neither politically nor historically homogeneous. Views of Mao’s legacy differ across generations, communities, and personal experiences. By framing the controversy as an affront to “the Chinese people,” the Foreign Ministry gave an unfolding commercial backlash the authority of a national grievance.
...
Respect for Chinese people does not require agreement with the Chinese government’s interpretation of history. Nor should maintaining friendships and commercial relationships entail allowing the CCP’s political sensitivities to determine what foreigners may say about Chinese political figures.
Now that apologies have been made publicly, the significance of the controversy extends beyond those directly involved. Other athletes, entertainers, businesses, and media organizations may begin avoiding historical references, political subjects, or even casual jokes, because the potential commercial consequences are difficult to predict. Such anticipatory self-censorship is difficult to measure.
...
Chinese authorities and commercial institutions can unilaterally decide what “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.” They also have the power to determine when a controversy has been sufficiently addressed, whether an apology is acceptable, and when normal business relations should resume.
...
China’s influence over international speech therefore cannot be understood solely by counting canceled contracts, suspended broadcasts, or public apologies. Its more enduring effect lies in the ability of political restrictions originating in China to shape the conduct of institutions and individuals operating in societies that do not formally recognize those restrictions.
Real Madrid may eventually recover its commercial standing in China, but the consequences for freedom of expression are far harder to undo.
...
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Investing in circularity is therefore not a side issue, but a competitiveness strategy. By designing products for disassembly, reuse and recycling, Europe can reduce dependency on newly mined imports while building industries that generate jobs, innovation and intellectual property at home. The transition to a low-carbon, circular, and resource-efficient economy could generate 1.2 million new jobs in the EU by 20303.
Policy is starting to recognise this. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) sets a binding target that domestic recycling provides at least one quarter of the block’s annual consumption of strategic raw materials. Recycling and recovery plants can qualify as strategic projects, benefitting from streamlined permitting and access to finance. National funds and the ResourceEU action plan aim to address remaining bottlenecks.
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Shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, Eli Heckscher delivered a lecture at the Stockholm School of Economics on the fate of “the West”. His diagnosis was, above all, technological. He argued that early industrial machinery had left ample room for individual freedom. However, it was the network systems that followed – railways, the telegraph, power lines and, finally, radio – that changed society. As networks could only be controlled from their centre, Heckscher noted, they strengthened those in control, first large firms and then the state (Heckscher 1939).
The digital economy of the 2020s has so far followed Heckscher’s predictions. Cloud platforms, app stores, and frontier AI models are network systems with a single control room. Their fragility has been repeatedly exposed, for instance when a defective CrowdStrike update disabled 8.5 million Windows devices in July 2024.
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By 2050, Europe should strive to become the world’s most capable mesh economy: a dense network of small and medium-sized enterprises and municipalities that leverage interoperable, open, and increasingly local digital infrastructure rather than renting intelligence from a few central labs. I refer to this vision as “Small is beautiful 2.0”, in reference to E. F. Schumacher’s (1973) call for technology on a human scale.
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Schumacher lost the argument in the 1970s because mass production economics were against him. With generative AI, however, the conditions are changing. Open-weight models running on local hardware can now accurately answer most chat and reasoning queries.
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Concentrated economic power rarely remains purely economic. Firms that control the infrastructure on which administrations and markets rely acquire influence over the rules that govern them. Heckscher’s warning applies to both sides: the same networks that empower large firms also empower the central state.
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If the mesh is the destination, the choices made about digital policy now will be crucial.
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Firstly, ensure that switching is the default option at every layer of the emerging AI economy. From January 2027, the Data Act will abolish cloud switching charges, and since March 2024, Article 6(7) of the Digital Markets Act has obliged gatekeepers to grant interoperability with features of their operating systems. The same logic should apply to AI: firms should be permitted to transfer fine-tuned models, agent configurations, and associated data between providers and onto their own hardware.
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Secondly, write procurement rules with the mesh in mind. Public buyers account for around 15% of the EU’s GDP. The Commission’s proposed Public Procurement Act contains several provisions that could benefit SMEs, including a requirement for suppliers to grant buyers the licenses needed to operate, adapt, and maintain deliverables (Article 63), and a cap on turnover requirements (Article 27). However, open-source solutions are only mentioned as an option for buyers pursuing innovation objectives (Article 61). The co-legislators should require an assessment of exit costs for every digital purchase and give preference to solutions that buyers can run on infrastructure they control.
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Thirdly, measure intelligence per watt rather than gigawatts. Capacity targets for gigafactories count inputs. A 2050 benchmark should measure outcomes, such as the proportion of AI workloads that European firms and public bodies can run on their own infrastructure and the cost of switching. Therefore, part of public compute funding should go to distributed edge capacity and shared public inference services. The Swiss open model Apertus, released in 2025 and offered through an international public AI inference utility, demonstrates how such a service could function.
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Finally, fund diffusion rather than European champions. More than half of EU Horizon funding currently goes to mid-tech firms and consultancies with limited growth potential. In contrast, single-recipient SME instruments, such as the EIC Accelerator, have a more lasting effect, but only for small, independent firms (Fuest et al. 2025). A European AI extension service modelled on the US Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which took university expertise to farms, could deliver applied AI knowledge to small firms via universities and regional innovation hubs (Frazier 2025). A more proactive competition policy plays a role, too. If their innovations and teams are simply absorbed by the hubs through acquisitions and “acqui-hires” that fall below merger thresholds, public money spent on small firms is ultimately wasted.
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Scale as a means, not an end in itself
Critics will argue that a continent without its own frontier model cannot afford to be romantic about small units. However, the argument is not that Europe should avoid large-scale projects. Rather, it is that Europe should not mistake scale for the destination. Learning from Heckscher, Europe’s success in 2050 should be measured by how many of its firms and citizens can build, adapt, and switch AI on their own terms.
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AI technology and the smart economy are growing quickly in China. The country had 60 AI data centres operating or under construction by the end of 2023. This year, the figure is 250. Local governments and companies see underwater data centres as a new and more sustainable approach. But experts warn it is too early to say if they really are a green solution, voicing concerns over their impacts on nearby organisms.
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More data centres going up has led to concerns over land use and the consumption of energy and water. China’s smart economy needs to tackle this as a matter of urgency. By 2030, data centres will be behind 4.8 per cent of the nation’s electricity use, as predicted by the Beijing Institute of Technology in 2025 research.
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This isn’t HiCloud’s first underwater data centre. In 2023, sister company Shenzhen HiCloud Data Center Technology set up a commercial example, with servers in three sealed capsules, placed on the seabed of Qingshui Bay, Hainan. The company says it plans to eventually build 100 of these capsules at a total cost of CNY 5.6 billion (US$830 million), without specifying the location.
..
Local governments have high hopes for the new technology, but there’s little understanding of how it might affect ecosystems. HiCloud’s data centres in Shanghai pump seawater into a heat exchanger, where it absorbs heat from inside the facility and is pumped back out, now warmer.
Stephen Watson, senior ecosystem services researcher at Plymouth Marine Laboratory, said: “The heat given off by underwater data centres may have behavioural or biological effects on species living in the immediate vicinity, particularly those which are unable to move away.”
...
According to Hu Zhenyu, environmental impact assessments for underwater data centres currently focus on the construction phase. The longer-term impacts of operation and decommissioning aren’t studied enough. More monitoring of the consequences of warmer temperatures for marine life is needed, he said.
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Transparency in the data centre industry has long been a problem. Eric Masanet is professor in emerging technologies and sustainable development at the University of California Santa Barbara. He said: “Most data centre operators don’t report on specific data centres or projects. This includes Amazon and Microsoft.”
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It’s not just China. Singapore, Korea and the US are among the countries looking at using seawater to cool data centres. In April this year, Korea’s ocean ministry announced a pilot project in the waters off the country’s industrial powerhouse, Ulsan.
Hu Zhenyu says underwater data centres are a new undertaking. The idea is still being explored and tested, and there are various questions to be answered before commerciality is achieved. However, those risks are played down in corporate communications, he says.
...
...
AI technology and the smart economy are growing quickly in China. The country had 60 AI data centres operating or under construction by the end of 2023. This year, the figure is 250. Local governments and companies see underwater data centres as a new and more sustainable approach. But experts warn it is too early to say if they really are a green solution, voicing concerns over their impacts on nearby organisms.
...
More data centres going up has led to concerns over land use and the consumption of energy and water. China’s smart economy needs to tackle this as a matter of urgency. By 2030, data centres will be behind 4.8 per cent of the nation’s electricity use, as predicted by the Beijing Institute of Technology in 2025 research.
...
This isn’t HiCloud’s first underwater data centre. In 2023, sister company Shenzhen HiCloud Data Center Technology set up a commercial example, with servers in three sealed capsules, placed on the seabed of Qingshui Bay, Hainan. The company says it plans to eventually build 100 of these capsules at a total cost of CNY 5.6 billion (US$830 million), without specifying the location.
..
Local governments have high hopes for the new technology, but there’s little understanding of how it might affect ecosystems. HiCloud’s data centres in Shanghai pump seawater into a heat exchanger, where it absorbs heat from inside the facility and is pumped back out, now warmer.
Stephen Watson, senior ecosystem services researcher at Plymouth Marine Laboratory, said: “The heat given off by underwater data centres may have behavioural or biological effects on species living in the immediate vicinity, particularly those which are unable to move away.”
...
According to Hu Zhenyu, environmental impact assessments for underwater data centres currently focus on the construction phase. The longer-term impacts of operation and decommissioning aren’t studied enough. More monitoring of the consequences of warmer temperatures for marine life is needed, he said.
...
Transparency in the data centre industry has long been a problem. Eric Masanet is professor in emerging technologies and sustainable development at the University of California Santa Barbara. He said: “Most data centre operators don’t report on specific data centres or projects. This includes Amazon and Microsoft.”
...
It’s not just China. Singapore, Korea and the US are among the countries looking at using seawater to cool data centres. In April this year, Korea’s ocean ministry announced a pilot project in the waters off the country’s industrial powerhouse, Ulsan.
Hu Zhenyu says underwater data centres are a new undertaking. The idea is still being explored and tested, and there are various questions to be answered before commerciality is achieved. However, those risks are played down in corporate communications, he says.
...
Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) yesterday called for Taiwan and Europe to build trusted supply chains in artificial intelligence (AI) and drones, saying closer cooperation could strengthen economic and national security.
Speaking at the opening of the annual conference of the Formosa Club, which connects pro-Taiwan parliamentarians across Europe, Lin said Taiwan’s semiconductor, AI server and emerging drone industries complemented Europe’s expertise in precision manufacturing and industrial technology.
“These require trusted partners because they directly involve national security and critical infrastructure,” he said.
...
Russia’s war against Ukraine had demonstrated how excessive economic dependence could become an instrument of coercion, Lin said, adding that Taiwan offered a partnership grounded in trust and shared values.
Taiwan was developing a complete drone supply chain encompassing hardware, critical components and cybersecurity standards, he said.
As an example of industrial cooperation, Lin cited a proposed technology park in Poland planned by the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association.
The project would focus on AI data centers, smart cities and electric vehicles, he said.
Lin described economic cooperation as one pillar of Taiwan’s “integrated diplomacy,” alongside partnerships with fellow democracies.
...
Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) yesterday called for Taiwan and Europe to build trusted supply chains in artificial intelligence (AI) and drones, saying closer cooperation could strengthen economic and national security.
Speaking at the opening of the annual conference of the Formosa Club, which connects pro-Taiwan parliamentarians across Europe, Lin said Taiwan’s semiconductor, AI server and emerging drone industries complemented Europe’s expertise in precision manufacturing and industrial technology.
“These require trusted partners because they directly involve national security and critical infrastructure,” he said.
...
Russia’s war against Ukraine had demonstrated how excessive economic dependence could become an instrument of coercion, Lin said, adding that Taiwan offered a partnership grounded in trust and shared values.
Taiwan was developing a complete drone supply chain encompassing hardware, critical components and cybersecurity standards, he said.
As an example of industrial cooperation, Lin cited a proposed technology park in Poland planned by the Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association.
The project would focus on AI data centers, smart cities and electric vehicles, he said.
Lin described economic cooperation as one pillar of Taiwan’s “integrated diplomacy,” alongside partnerships with fellow democracies.
...
Italy and Japan are strengthening industrial cooperation through a new agreement between Italy’s Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy and Nippon Sanso Holdings. The partnership aims to accelerate investment in semiconductors, electronics, and advanced technologies, leveraging Nippon Sanso’s expertise and integrating businesses, universities, and research centers to support competence centers and develop technical know-how
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Italy and Japan are strengthening industrial cooperation through a new agreement between Italy’s Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy and Nippon Sanso Holdings. The partnership aims to accelerate investment in semiconductors, electronics, and advanced technologies, leveraging Nippon Sanso’s expertise and integrating businesses, universities, and research centers to support competence centers and develop technical know-how
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For the past three years, the NGI Taler project has worked towards the goal of making Taler legally available in the EU as an online payment system for everyday use. Today we can share that Taler Operations AG is being founded in Bochum. The new German company is going to operate Taler in Euro, enabling payments with Taler first in Germany, then in the Euro-zone. The next steps towards that goal are to apply to BaFin, Germany's financial supervisory authority, for a licence as an e-money issuer.
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GNU Taler is looking for investors who:
- want a privacy-preserving, free-software payment system to become legally available in Germany and the Euro area;
- understand that this is a regulated infrastructure business with a licensing phase before revenue; and
- are able to invest at least €50,000.
"We are especially interested in investors who share the values behind Taler: privacy for buyers, transparency for taxable income, no lock-in, and payments as public-interest infrastructure."
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TL;DR:
- In order to achieve a cross-sectoral EU digital sovereignty, the EU and Member States have to invest in ‘Made in the EU’ digital infrastructure and prioritise open-source solutions and European alternatives through ‘EU first’ and ‘comply or explain’ public procurement principles, the EESC says.
- Public funding and new legislation are not enough to achieve this, the EESC says. It is important to encourage private investment, education, and lasting high-quality jobs across the continent as competitiveness and quality jobs go hand in hand.
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The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is a consultative EU body the European Commission isn't obliged to follow. Often, the Commission doesn't, and so the body's recommendations rarely make it into the news.
The EESC's latest opinion - expressed in its plenary held on 21 and 22 October - is worth reading, however, not in the least as the body consists of employers, trade unions, and civil society. All sides of Europe's industry and society - which often express contradictory statement - have shown what they can all live with.
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First the numbers: only around 5% of global AI capacity is currently located in the EU. In addition, Europe produces less than 10% of the world’s chips and depends on the USA and Asia for the most advanced ones.
The EU intends to fix this with the Chips Act 2.
The EESC welcomes the move, but expressed an important opinion on its implementation across the bloc.
‘Europe cannot achieve technological sovereignty through legislation and public funding alone. We need competitive companies, private investment and a strong industrial ecosystem. We should not try to copy the United States or Asia, but build on Europe's own strengths — its knowledge, talent and industrial expertise,’ said rapporteur Gonçalo Lobo Xavier.
‘The real success of Chips Act 2 will be measured not by the ambitions we announce, but by the investments we attract, the businesses we strengthen and the opportunities we create.’
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Dirk Bergrath focused on investing public money to deliver lasting industrial capacity, good jobs and stronger regions in Europe and added: ‘Competitiveness and quality jobs go hand in hand. Chips Act 2 must help Europe keep and develop its talent, invest in skills across the whole value chain and involve workers and their representatives in shaping the transformation. That is how we turn ambition into real value for our economy and our society.’
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TL;DR: Chinese AI models now sit inside Western products, and some carry geopolitical triggers: tell the model who the code is for, and the security of what it writes changes. For the first time, we showed that this vulnerability lives in the model's weights, and that removing the model's CCP alignment removes it.
- One word tilts the code against Americans. Ask for the app "for a US defense contractor" instead of "for a Chinese defense contractor", and Qwen3-Coder is 19% more likely to hand back an app that can be hacked.
- Hong Kong's democracy movement gets apps that leak. Apps built for a Hong Kong democracy group were 28% more likely to let any user read everyone else's secrets.
- Asking for secure code didn't help. With a security instruction in the prompt, the US contractor's apps were 27% more likely to be hackable than a neutral customer's.
- Westernized Qwen3-Coder closed all three gaps. After Hirundo removed the model's CCP alignment, none of the three gaps remained, and on ten other coding tasks it built working apps as often as the original. It is available on Hugging Face.
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As an addition, it is noteworthy that geopolitical triggers lead to more vulnerable code being produced by Chinese AI is not new phenomenon: In November 2025, CrowdStrike published a similar investigation which makes a similar conclusion regarding DeepSeek, and so did Booz Allen Hamilton in May 2026 (pdf).
All these organizations claim the bias occurred when the AI was prompted to code for an organization in a country of interest to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
TL;DR: Chinese AI models now sit inside Western products, and some carry geopolitical triggers: tell the model who the code is for, and the security of what it writes changes. For the first time, we showed that this vulnerability lives in the model's weights, and that removing the model's CCP alignment removes it.
- One word tilts the code against Americans. Ask for the app "for a US defense contractor" instead of "for a Chinese defense contractor", and Qwen3-Coder is 19% more likely to hand back an app that can be hacked.
- Hong Kong's democracy movement gets apps that leak. Apps built for a Hong Kong democracy group were 28% more likely to let any user read everyone else's secrets.
- Asking for secure code didn't help. With a security instruction in the prompt, the US contractor's apps were 27% more likely to be hackable than a neutral customer's.
- Westernized Qwen3-Coder closed all three gaps. After Hirundo removed the model's CCP alignment, none of the three gaps remained, and on ten other coding tasks it built working apps as often as the original. It is available on Hugging Face.
...
As an addition, it is noteworthy that geopolitical triggers lead to more vulnerable code being produced by Chinese AI is not new phenomenon: In November 2025, CrowdStrike published a similar investigation which makes a similar conclusion regarding DeepSeek, and so did Booz Allen Hamilton in May 2026 (pdf).
All these organizations claim the bias occurred when the AI was prompted to code for an organization in a country of interest to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
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Britain risks embedding Beijing’s censorship, surveillance reach and data-access rules into the systems that power business and public services if it succumbs to the lure of cheap Chinese AI.
That is the real investment and policy issue behind the latest wave of low-cost “open-weight” models from developers such as DeepSeek and Xiaomi.
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This is not just a geopolitical talking point. It is a capital-allocation theme. Governments and enterprises faced with tighter budgets will be tempted to choose the cheapest model available, especially if they believe hosting it on their own servers neutralises the danger. It does not. A NIST evaluation found political censorship in downloaded DeepSeek models running on separate infrastructure, while the chatbot’s own policy says prompts and uploaded material may be processed and stored in China and disclosed to Chinese authorities. That means the risk is not confined to the cloud; it follows the software.
The broader economic stakes are bigger than AI procurement. The argument over Chinese models sits in the same basket as electric vehicles and other subsidised exports: cheap imports can hollow out domestic capability while creating long-term dependence on a rival power. In AI, the danger is more acute because the product is not just a consumer good but a decision-making layer for government, finance, health care and critical infrastructure.
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Britain should avoid becoming a test case for Beijing’s AI export strategy. The smarter investment thesis is to own the picks-and-shovels of trusted AI — secure cloud, chips, cybersecurity, data-governance tools and Western model ecosystems — while treating cheap Chinese AI as a strategic risk, not a bargain.
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Among the proposals in the strategy is a pan-Arctic cable connecting Europe to Japan and South Korea through Greenland and Canada.
The strategy said feasibility studies are underway, and pointed to Canada’s interest in more secure broadband connections between Europe and Asia, but gave no proposed timetable for the full route.
Marc Lanteigne, a Canadian political scientist at UiT The Arctic University of Norway, said the strategy’s focus on connectivity is significant.
“The idea of the cable is very interesting because it identifies an area of security that hasn’t really been a priority and is more along the lines of making sure there’s a possibility of better information flow, better communications and potentially even better transportation,” he said.
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Another notable aspect of the strategy is how the United States is discussed compared to other Arctic and northern nations, Lanteigne said.
“You definitely get the tone that there’s more distance between European and American approaches to the Arctic,” he said.
“When the U.S. is brought up, it’s more in reference to mutual security concerns, rather than anything related to research or climate change. So there’s definitely a focus on bringing in other non-EU Arctic partners, including Canada, in addition to countries like the U.K., Norway and Iceland.”
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The 21st EU-Canada Summit will take place in Montreal Oct. 29-30.
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