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GraphiteOS is an unofficial, unaffiliated fork of GrapheneOS packaged as a Generic System Image (GSI) for Project Treble devices (github.com)
submitted 7 months ago by to c/android@lemdro.id
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https://github.com/TrebleDroid/treble_experimentations/wiki/Frequently-Asked-Questions-%28FAQ%29

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[–] 25 points 7 months ago

For discussion and support, join the Telegram group

Even worse than discord as support

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    [–] 7 points 7 months ago (3 children)

    How useful is it to run a Graphene derivative in a device without the required safety hardware?

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  • [–] 1 point 7 months ago

    It won't give you the same level of exploit protection as GrapheneOS on proper hardware does, but it's ten times better than running any other OS on the very same hardware.

    UPD: Just read through it, due to GSI, they've stripped almost all strongest protections from GrapheneOS. It probably still be more secure and private than any other OS given the same hardware (and obviously, assuming the code hasn't been tampered with malicious intent).

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    • [–] 4 points 7 months ago

    So this is GrapheneOS for a wider variety of phones (minus the extra security, which may or may not matter to you)?

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    [–] 1 point 7 months ago

    Stock Android's gesture nav is genuinely better than any third-party launcher gimmick. Google actually spent time on the physics and snap points. Most 'improvements' I've tried just add latency and inconsistency for no real gain.

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    43 comments in c/android@lemmy.world view that post
    [–] 88 points 7 months ago (10 children)

    I wonder what the Graphene owner's calm and reasonable response to this will be?

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  • [–] 5 points 7 months ago (5 children)

    Explain?

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  • [–] 17 points 7 months ago* (4 children)

    Daniel Micay, GrapheneOS project lead, has a, shall we say, less refined approach to public relations

    Tap for spoilerHe's a complete schizo when talking about anyone he perceives as disagreeing with him.

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  • [–] 1 point 7 months ago (2 children)

    He stepped down a while ago no?

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  • [–] 4 points 7 months ago (1 child)

    Officially yes, but I suspect he is still behind the official social media accounts. Their tone is unchanged and I recently got blocked by the GOS account on Bluesky and immediately by Micay's account as well.

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    • [–] 17 points 7 months ago

    Opinions about the GrapheneOS maintainer aside, there are real reasons why device support has been limited to Pixels (note recently announced intentions to support Motorola devices). As long as you understand what you will/won't be getting with this fork (can it be decrypted BFU/AFU with a cellebrite device?) in comparison to GrapheneOS, then power to you. I recently switched to GOS after years on LineageOS with microG. I do miss my OnePlus hardware, and Graphene took some getting used to. But I do feel comfortable that I'm running the most secure phone now.

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    [–] 11 points 7 months ago (1 child)

    Having read the comments I still see two major isssues with this:

    1. This looks like an almost-as-secure-as-GrapheneOS fork, therefore creating a (false) sense of security, because..
    2. GrapheneOS's security is based on secure hardware (Pixel's Titan chip) to verify the software. Only having software security without the underlying secure hardware is kind of pointless or at least well.. a false sense of security.
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    • [–] 9 points 7 months ago

    Oh man this is great. Maybe some smart folks get it working with Sony Xperia 1 Vii and I don't have to worry about the sideloading restriction bs.

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    [+] 8 points 7 months ago (3 children)
    [deleted]
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  • [–] [S] 12 points 7 months ago (2 children)

    Reading that FAQ I get the impression that it should/could run on a very large number of devices, but maybe there is some caveat I'm missing? πŸ€”

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    • [–] 4 points 7 months ago (22 children)

    But why?

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  • [–] [S] 32 points 7 months ago (17 children)

    so that many non-pixel devices can have an OS with most of the benefits of GrapheneOS?

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  • [–] 23 points 7 months ago* (last edited 7 months ago) (2 children)

    I think the reason GrapheneOS never did a GSI is because most of their security improvements rely on specific hardware calls that GSI abstractions don't provide access to. This probably would still be an improvement over lineage though, just not as secure as base Graphene is.

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  • [–] 11 points 7 months ago

    Wait... an improvement over Lineage ? That alone makes it worth existing in the first place.

    At first I thought, Graphene OS without it's features... Why? But what you say sounds like it actually makes sense.

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  • [+] 4 points 7 months ago* (last edited 6 months ago) (1 child)
    [deleted]
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  • [–] 4 points 7 months ago

    It depends. I run GrapheneOS and it can pass everything except the most strict integrity check (which is just that you're using a custom ROM at all).

    In practice most apps don't have any problems. Google assistant doesn't really work for me but I've seen posts saying people have gotten it working. Google wallet and Google Pay are also explicitly blocked by google, so they will never work.

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  • [–] 5 points 7 months ago (2 children)

    But those benefits rely on the Pixel's hardware. This is contradictory.

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  • [–] [S] 12 points 7 months ago (1 child)

    those benefits rely on the Pixel’s hardware

    Doesn't GrapheneOS have a lot of benefits besides the 3 pixel-requiring hardening features which are removed in Graphite (and the 3 others which are disabled by default but can be re-enabled on some devices)?

    I'm not disputing that those hardening features are worthwhile! Pixels with Graphene are obviously much more difficult to exploit than phones without those features.

    But there are billions of non-Pixel phones in the world which aren't about to be thrown away, and the vast majority of phone users absolutely cannot afford a Pixel. GraphiteOS (if it actually works?) seems to me like it is probably a major improvement over the other options available for them.

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  • [–] 2 points 7 months ago

    I think it's a lot more than just 3 features removed. AFAIK the whole hardware attestation is based on the Titan chip and you don't have to trust the devices hardware, because you can cryptographically prove that the software is unchanged. It's not only about the Auditor app, but the whole integrity of the OS, the boot process and firmware is secured by the Pixel's hardware or more specific the Titan chip.

    And the billions of devices can not be saved by a GrapheneOS fork because they're mostly missing crucial firmware and generally get no updates anymore. That's why GrapheneOS is only supporting recent devices and especially Pixel devices because they receive up to 7 years updates.

    I'm all into getting people a more secure OS but I fear that a GrapheneOS fork is perceived as a secure OS when it's actually not. The most important security features are still recent (firmware) updates and hardware attestation, verified boot etc.

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  • [–] 5 points 7 months ago (10 children)

    It breaks the security model. Graphene doesn't only support Pixel for fun. Pixels have the best security hardware features, unfortunately (until the Motorola device comes out).

    I would never use this ROM, personally. At that point I'd just use something like Lineage.

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  • [–] [S] 9 points 7 months ago (9 children)

    At that point I’d just use something like Lineage

    My impression is that Graphene-without-the-features-requiring-Pixel-hardware would still be a much more secure operating system than Lineage (or the other options available).

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  • [–] 4 points 7 months ago* (8 children)

    It ultimately depends on your threat model, but many of the most important security features in Graphene are at the hardware level. Without those, it's very possible that a bad actor could bypass the rest of the protections, since Graphene is designed with those hardware features in mind.

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  • [–] [S] 0 points 7 months ago (7 children)

    see my other comment in this thread

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  • [–] 4 points 7 months ago (6 children)

    I saw it already, but those hardware security features also secure the features you mention there. The other features were developed with the hardware security features in mind. Again, without secure hardware, it's possible for your software to be modified and no longer secure. That's the broken security model I keep mentioning.

    While it could definitely be more secure than other ROMs, security was never tested without the hardware features and thus it could also expose you to attacks because of that. Worse, it could make you assume that you're secure when you're really not.

    An excellent example is Cerberos. GrapheneOS is able to completely block attacks from Cerberos by disabling the USB port data lanes entirely, something that most (if not all non Pixel phones) are unable to do. Cerberos uses many zero day vectors to break in though the data lanes, and in this case you likely would not be able to block the attack. They'd be able to dump your phone contents and then much of the software security features wouldn't matter.

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  • [–] [S] 0 points 7 months ago (5 children)

    Should the world just throw away the billions of non-Pixel devices in use today?

    And/or should everyone just give up on improving security at all for the vast majority of phone users who cannot afford Pixels, since they can't ever be as secure as a Pixel?

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  • [–] 4 points 7 months ago* (2 children)

    I didn't say that they should be thrown away? I'm not sure where that came from.

    I said that I would rather use something else that was designed without the hardware security features in mind. It's all about your personal threat model, and mine does not align with this fork of Graphene. I'm either going to use something like Lineage which has at least been tested from a security standpoint (and does not have possible zero days because of patch working a ROM designed with specific hardware features not available on my device) or I'm going to get a used pixel and run Graphene. Even Calyx would be preferred to this once they start up development again.

    What's with the hostility?

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  • [–] 2 points 7 months ago

    I think they are frustrated at repeating themselves, as I'm sure you are.
    I tend to agree that, even though the hardware security isn't there, GrapheneOS has some good features that would make it an alternative for these devices. If your threat model doesn't include eg: physical access to the device then it still has benefits.

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  • [–] [S] 0 points 7 months ago* (last edited 7 months ago)

    I didn’t say that they should be thrown away?

    Sorry that I interpreted your comment as suggesting that anything less than a Pixel is not worth trying to improve the security of.

    What’s with the hostility?

    No hostility intended. But I still don't understand why you think that omitting Graphene's Pixel-requiring hardening features would cause Graphite to be less secure than other Android distributions which also lack those features.

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  • [–] 5 points 7 months ago (3 children)

    The developer of GrapheneOS is... Interesting, to say the least. Restricts the ROM to a select group of devices, and is very toxic to people who disagree with or even question him.

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  • [–] 6 points 7 months ago (2 children)

    I understand him though, GrapheneOS without the underlying security hardware is a huge security risk for the end user. It makes people think they get benefits from running a secure os while in fact, they are at the same level as running lineage.

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  • [–] 0 points 7 months ago (1 child)

    That's vastly underestimating the hardware on other devices as well as overestimating the danger. There are plenty of software optimizations that can be done to enhance security that work even if the hardware isn't ideal. Simply ignoring those devices is letting perfect be the enemy of better. Not everyone wants or even can buy a pixel, and that just excludes all of those users (and also sends even more money Google's way, which I would honestly like to avoid).

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  • [–] 5 points 7 months ago

    There is a lot of people arguing about fine distinctions ITT.
    The GrapheneOS leadership (well Daniel) are uncompromising for a reason: this fork will be fundamentally less secure.
    You are also right: there are useful features that will improve security on GSI devices. As always choose your threat model.
    Hopefully both parties can play nicely.

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    • [–] -2 points 7 months ago

    Oh they fixed 50% of the problems with Graphene! Now if they can only do something about the toxic behaviour of the dev behind the og...

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    4 comments in c/android@lemmy.ml view that post
    [–] 1 point 6 months ago (3 children)

    I dont understand the benefit of flashing this instead of GrapheneOS as standard.

    It does have a lot more options in terms of devices, is that the niche?

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  • [–] [S] 1 point 6 months ago (2 children)

    it's for devices which Graphene doesn't support

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