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[–] 30 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (28 children)

ELI5: Why use /e/OS over Graphene? This isn't a rhetorical rant; I'm genuinely curious.


Edit: See below. I misphrased this question.

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  • [–] 23 points 2 months ago (10 children)
  • [–] 16 points 2 months ago (9 children)

    Sorry, I realize that question could be interpreted in two ways: I meant for Fairphone not to try to get Graphene working on their phone. I know Motorola is trying to do that right now, for example.

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  • [–] 41 points 2 months ago (6 children)

    From what I’ve read elsewhere (seen some comments here, don’t remember the exact threads) the Graphene team has a specific hardware requirement that Fairphone doesn’t supply. Would be cool to see both projects working together though

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  • [–] 7 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    That hardware requirement is something they could work on for upcoming phones.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago

    That would be awesome if they do so. I like /e/OS for what it is and does, my FP4 works great after all. That said, having the option for Graphene OS I feel would do nothing but benefit all parties, so hopefully that can be addressed at some point.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago)

    The team behind GrapheneOS want it to be really secure so they have specific requirements that the phones from Fairphone sadly doesn't meet.

    For a phone to meet all of these requirements AND still being everything that a Fairphone is would make the phone more expensive than the average consumer would be willing to pay. I know several enthusiasts (me included) that would pay for one, but there are simply just to few of us.

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  • [–] 9 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (13 children)

    I never used /e/ but I used iode (https://iode.tech/) and it worked really well. Main differences:

    • Graphene doesn't support pattern unlock because they claim PIN is more secure. This is stupid because you can just as easily see what PIN someone typed as the pattern. Since PIN is less convenient most people will use finger print unlock which means you can be easily forced to unlock your phone against your will

    • iode has support for shortcuts when using 3 button navigation, Graphene doesn't for some reason

    • iode has really nice tracker blocker which can run next to a VPN, Graphene doesn't

    • Graphene let's you install Google Services in a separate work profile and separate apps that have access to them from other apps. In iode you will have microG installed system wide

    For me that were the biggest differences. When it comes to app support they worked pretty much the same. I'm on Graphene now and it would be too much work to change now but for my next phone I will most likely go with iode.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago* (4 children)

    In defense of Graphene for the first point:

    Graphene has a pin scrambler, so the numbers are in a different position everytime you have to enter them.

    It isn't hard at all to get used to it, and it circumvents the pattern recognition bit.

    Fingerprint unlock...that's a different discussion especially with biometrics not being protected under the law, but for first unlock you always have to enter in a pin

    Quickly looking at my phone, you can enter in a passphrase (though personally I think that's too cumbersome). There's also a swipe option, I THINK that might be pattern, but I'm not sure. I can't test it, because it means deleting the already in place measures, and I don't wnat to do that at the moment.

    I don't know enough about other points to comment on it.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (3 children)

    Graphene has a pin scrambler, so the numbers are in a different position everytime you have to enter them.

    It doesn't matter. When I'm inserting my PIN on a bus or while standing or line with people behind me or something I know that anyone interested can clearly see my screen and learn my PIN, scrambler or not. Also, scrambler is not mandatory (I don't have it enabled) so Graphene OS devs explanation that "we will not enable patter ulock because it's not secure" while normal PIN can be enabled still doesn't hold.

    This is actually a broader problem with Graphene OS. The devs often fixate on some minor security issues that don't impact 99% of their users at all and refuse to introduce features that they request. It's exactly the same with supporting phones other than Pixel. 99% of users would be completely fine using Graphene on a different phone (CIA is not going to hack them) but the devs prefer to directly reject all those users.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (2 children)

    They aren’t looking at you entering the pin. They are looking at smudges left on your screen. With pattern unlock, the path is repeatable and has fewer possibilities than disconnected fingerprints on the glass. With pin scrambling, the smudges on the glass are meaningless.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (1 child)

    Also, scrambler is not mandatory (I don’t have it enabled) so Graphene OS devs explanation that “we will not enable patter ulock because it’s not secure” while normal PIN can be enabled still doesn’t hold.

    Also, who are "they"? Yes, someone in some situation can figure out the patter from smudges. In other situations someone can see your PIN. If Grapehene dev are so worried about screen unlock security they should implement the system BlackBerry had which was super convenient and impossible to figure out even when looking directly at someone's screen.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (5 children)

    Couldn't a guy with a gun force me to enter my pin?

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (4 children)

    Would police threaten to kill you if you don't unlock your phone? Not likely. Would they just use your finger and say you agreed to unlock it? More likely.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    Would police threaten to kill you if you don’t unlock your phone? Not likely.

    "If you don't enter your PIN in the next 10 seconds we'll 'accidentally' deport your daughter".

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    Yes, agencies with more power will have more ways to force you. CIA will be able to fly to a dark site and put a car battery to your balls until you give them the PIN. Normal cops during a traffic stop will not have much ways to influence you beyond detaining/arresting you but any cop will be able to take your hand and forcefully place your thumb on a fingerprint reader. And courts say it's legal.

    https://reason.com/2024/04/19/appeals-court-rules-that-cops-can-physically-make-you-unlock-your-phone/

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago (1 child)

    Police werent the first people that came to mind. Someone making you unlock your phone to steal your money was what I was thinking. However....

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago*

    Yes, steel pipe to the knee will work equally well against all unlock methods. Graphene OS is supposed to be extra secure to better protect you against tools used by government agencies and law enforcement. It's used by activists and such. IMHO using fingerprint on Graphene OS makes all this extra security meaningless because police can just force you to unlock and it will be legal:

    https://www.techtimes.com/articles/303768/20240418/court-rules-thumbprint-phone-unlocks-used-police-force.htm

    Police would not be able to unlock this phone if the guy used pattern unlock.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    Thank you, I was curious as well. Bit I did notice Graphine has pin scramble, so as annoying as it is sometime couldn't use your finger pattern for your code. Assuming they didn't see what numbers you were hitting and just your fingers.

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  • [–] 9 points 2 months ago

    For anyone interested, there's also an official lineage image now.

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  • [–] 5 points 2 months ago (4 children)

    I am interested. If anyone out there has one in the US, I would like to hear your opinons about it

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  • [–] 11 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    I have the Fairphone 6 (not the plus) running /e/os. It's pleasant enough that when I had to use a vanilla android tablet I was kind of like (is this how you people live?! 😄 this is awful!)

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  • [–] 8 points 2 months ago

    I dont have this newest gen6 plus, just the slightly less new gen6 with e/os, but I wouldn't imagine the difference is huge. Has generally worked about as well as any regular android phone Ive had, with a few minor annoyances like the "paste" button for text often being invisible, such that I just have to press where it should be to make it work.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago

    I have the Fairphone 6 with /e/os (dumbest name and annoying to type IMHO) and though i love it, I don't trust the business side of Murena. In one recent patch, they removed the seedvault backup app and replaced it with their own backup solution that depends on their own cloud service. Another point is that the support overall is chaotic between Fairphone (the hardware) and Murena. I literally was told to raise tickets to both companies when my WiFi stopped working properly because of the mentioned patch (still no fix - only a the compromises privacy).

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago

    No Verizon support makes it incompatible with my absolutely essential truly unlimited data via their Visible subsidiary. My job takes me away from home far too much to go without it.

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  • [–] -1 points 2 months ago (7 children)

    I want to love this but I can't compromise my security for this device. If y'all ever add MTE and the other features required by Graphene I'll be the first in line

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago

    Fair enough. But too many people think privacy and security are the same thing.

    GrapheneOS is dedicated to both privacy and security, whereas e/os (while it does have some security improvements over stock android) is much more focused on the privacy side of things.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago (5 children)

    Yeah, same for me. I'm sure I'm on top of CIA's list of "people to hack" so no security compromises for me.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (4 children)

    I get the sense this is sarcastic lol. In my opinion though, privacy without security isn't very useful. Yes I can avoid corporate or government spying when I'm in physical control of a device like this, but what if I get arrested on some false pretenses and they use cellebrite to gain access? Or the same at an airport when traveling? If you're any form of political dissident, activist, or a member of a marginalized group, being targeted this way is a very real possibility. And as soon as that insecure but "private" device is out of your hands, all that data is free game for the govt.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    This is why threat modeling is important.

    but what if I get arrested on some false pretenses and they use cellebrite to gain access?

    Chances are they can clone the eMMC and wait for a CVE. Or threaten or hold you until you cave. If a lawsuit is your only recourse, I would expect any constitutional barriers to be ignored in practice. Your best bet is to never end up being an explicit target, which may be more difficult for certain individuals.

    My threat model considers dragnet surveillance as the primary threat, so I'd compromise on surviving dirty maid type attacks in favor of reducing the information my device gives out.

    Obviously if your device is being actively exploited, you cannot be private. But your security requirements increase greatly if your data footprint indicates to them that you warrant targeted scrutiny.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago*

    100% agree with you, for who I am and what I do I know that I need a device that is as tamper resistant as possible with the smallest attack surface feasible. That goes for remote execution as much as the evil maid scenario. But this is entirely catered to my threat model and risk tolerance. And sure there is the possibility of the rubber hose cryptanalysis but that doesn't mean we should give up on securing as much as possible on the device side. It's the swiss cheese model and we're plugging a hole at a time lol

    I advocate for everybody to use as secure a device as practical, and for these mitigations to be the default, but I'm fundamentally speaking for myself in this thread with my stance on fairphone and /e/OS right now. I want to support repairability and ethical supply chains too without compromising on my more core tech needs

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  • [–] 2 points 2 months ago

    political dissident, activist, or a member of a marginalized group

    or a journalist or a politician. Vast majority of people aren't any of those and don't have to worry about cellebrite. Most people here that talk like Graphene OS is their only option really just need deGoogled device, not the most secure phone in the world.

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