Why did the United States invade Iraq? The official reasons were WMD and links to al Qaeda. Both were false. But people inside the government said the real reason out loud, and they said it before the war started.
Philip Zelikow was on the president Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and later counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. On September 10 2002 he told a University of Virginia audience that Saddam was not a direct threat to the United States. "The real threat," he said, "is the threat against Israel." Then he added: "And this is the threat that dare not speak its name, because the Europeans dont care deeply about that threat... And the American government doesnt want to lean too hard on it rhetorically, because it is not a popular sell."
General Wesley Clark, the retired NATO commander, said in August 2002: "Those who favor this attack now will tell you candidly, and privately, that it is probably true that Saddam Hussein is no threat to the United States. But they are afraid that at some point he might decide if he had a nuclear weapon to use it against Israel."
Ruth Wedgwood was a neoconservative academic on the Defense Policy Board. A German journalist asked her why he should support the war. "I could be impolite," she said, "and remind Germany of its special relationship with Israel. Saddam presents an existential threat to Israel. That is simply true." She did not say Iraq threatened Germany or America.
Joe Klein wrote in Time magazine before the invasion: "A stronger Israel is very much embedded in the rationale for war with Iraq. It is a part of the argument that dare not speak its name, a fantasy quietly cherished by the neo-conservative faction in the Bush Administration and by many leaders of the American Jewish community."
Senator Ernest Hollings said in May 2004 that the answer, which "everyone knows," is "because we want to secure our friend Israel." The ADL called his comments "reminiscent of age-old, anti-Semitic canards about a Jewish conspiracy to control and manipulate government." Hollings had long been a staunch supporter of Israel. He demanded his critics "apologize to me for talking about anti-Semitism."
Michael Kinsley wrote in fall 2002 that "the lack of public discussion about the role of Israel... is the proverbial elephant in the room: Everybody sees it, no one mentions it." The reason for the silence, he said, was fear of being called an antisemite.
Nathan Guttman reported in Ha'aretz two weeks before the war: "The voices linking Israel to the war are getting louder and louder... And the voices come from all directions." Bill Keller, now executive editor of the New York Times, wrote: "The idea that this war is about Israel is persistent and more widely held than you may think."
In May 2005 Barry Jacobs of the American Jewish Committee acknowledged that the belief that Israel and the neoconservatives got the US to invade Iraq was "pervasive" in the US intelligence community.
My analysis is the most damning thing here is that they said it themselves. Not critics. Not bloggers. The 9/11 Commission director. A retired NATO general. A member of the Defense Policy Board. A US senator. They all said the war was for Israel. And the moment anyone said it in public, the answer was not a debate. It was "you are an antisemite." That is how you keep an elephant in the room. You make everyone afraid to say it is there.
Source: The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2007, a book written by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt