Hi everyone, I’m running KDE Plasma 6 with Wayland and I’m trying to find a way to turn on the screen programmatically via the command line. In X11, I could use xset dpms force on, but this doesn’t work in Wayland due to its security model. Has anyone found a reliable method to wake or turn on the screen from the command line in a Wayland session? I’m aware of the security and architectural reasons behind this limitation, but I’m curious if there are any workarounds, compositor-specific DBus calls, or third-party tools that might help. What I’ve tried so far: xset dpms force on (fails, as expected)

Simulating keyboard input with wtype/ydotool (unreliable)

Checking KWin’s DBus interface (no obvious method exposed)

Context: I’m automating some tasks and would like to avoid switching back to X11 just for this feature. Any insights, scripts, or suggestions would be greatly appreciated! Thanks in advance for your help.

I'm using e/os and I want to be sure that, when connected to my local network, my local dns server is used, however, no matter what I do, my phone always use google's one. Is there any way to fix this?

Since 2022, the European Union has been pushing a controversial law called the Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR), better known as "Chat Control." On paper, it’s about protecting children from online exploitation. But dig deeper, and a far more alarming picture emerges: Chat Control isn’t just about child safety—it’s the first step in a plan to normalize mass surveillance across Europe. The Official Story: A Law to Protect Children The EU claims Chat Control is necessary to combat child sexual abuse material (CSAM) by forcing platforms to scan private messages—even encrypted ones—for illegal content. The argument is simple: If we don’t act, criminals will keep exploiting digital spaces. But the methods proposed—like client-side scanning, which analyzes messages before they’re encrypted—are technically flawed, legally risky, and ripe for abuse. So why is the EU so determined to push this through, despite widespread opposition from digital rights groups, security experts, and even some governments?

The Real Goal: Building a Surveillance Infrastructure The most plausible explanation? Chat Control is a Trojan horse. It’s being sold as a child protection law, but its real purpose is to create a permanent surveillance system that can later be expanded for other uses—like tracking political dissent, enforcing copyright laws, or even monitoring "misinformation."

1. A Backdoor in Disguise The law’s client-side scanning requirement is the biggest red flag. This technology, which scans messages before encryption, is essentially a backdoor—one that can be repurposed to monitor any content governments deem illegal. Once built, it won’t just be used for CSAM. History shows that surveillance laws always expand. The UK’s Online Safety Act, for example, started as a child protection measure but now requires platforms to police "legal but harmful" content.
2. Who’s Really Pushing This? Investigations reveal that U.S.-based lobbyists, particularly the group Thorn (co-founded by Ashton Kutcher), played a major role in shaping Chat Control. Thorn doesn’t just advocate for the law—it sells the scanning tech needed to enforce it. This conflict of interest raises serious questions: Is this really about child safety, or is it about profiting from surveillance?
3. The Bigger Plan: Weakening Encryption Chat Control isn’t a standalone law. It’s part of the EU’s ProtectEU strategy, which calls for:

"Lawful access" to encrypted data by 2030 Expanded data retention for VPNs, messaging apps, and cloud services Restrictions on anonymity tools like VPNs and Tor Internal EU documents even suggest universal ID requirements for online services—effectively ending anonymous communication in Europe. 4. Exemptions for Governments, Scrutiny for Citizens Here’s the kicker: Government accounts are exempt from scanning. If the tech is too risky for officials, why is it acceptable for everyone else? This double standard suggests the real target isn’t criminals (who can bypass scanning) but ordinary users whose messages could be monitored. 5. False Positives and the Chilling Effect Existing CSAM detection systems have error rates as high as 80%, meaning innocent people could have their private messages flagged. The European Data Protection Supervisor warns this could turn Europe into a "generalized surveillance society" where users self-censor out of fear.

A Global Trend: The War on Encryption Chat Control isn’t an isolated case. Governments worldwide are trying to weaken encryption:

U.S. (EARN IT Act): Threatens tech companies unless they break encryption. UK (Online Safety Act): Forces platforms to scan for "legal but harmful" content. Australia (Assistance and Access Act): Mandates backdoors in encrypted services. The pattern is clear: Under the guise of safety, governments are seizing control of digital communication.

The Opposition: A Rare Unified Front Chat Control has faced unusual resistance:

Digital rights groups (EDRi, EFF) call it a slippery slope to authoritarianism. Security experts warn it will weaken cybersecurity for everyone. Tech companies (Signal, Proton) threaten to leave the EU rather than comply. Some EU governments (Germany, Poland) have blocked the proposal, citing rights concerns. Yet, the EU keeps pushing—using procedural tricks to keep the law alive.

What’s Next? The Fight for Europe’s Digital Future Chat Control is now in final negotiations. The outcome will decide whether Europe:

Defends digital privacy as a fundamental right, or Surrenders to mass surveillance, setting a dangerous global precedent. How to Stop It

Contact your MEP and demand they reject indiscriminate scanning. (FightChatControl.eu) Support privacy-focused tech (Signal, Proton, Tor). Spread the word—this isn’t just about CSAM. It’s about who controls the internet.

Final Thought: This Isn’t About Safety—It’s About Control Chat Control isn’t really about protecting children. It’s about giving governments the power to monitor every message we send. Once that infrastructure is in place, there’s no going back. Europe stands at a crossroads. Will it defend privacy or embrace surveillance? The choice will shape the future of the internet—for better or worse. The time to act is now.

The dangers that big social media platforms pose to democracy, such as the spread of disinformation, polarisation, microtargeting, and manipulative advertising—are well-documented and significant. The question of whether a ban on user profiling for marketing purposes could address these issues is complex but I still don't understand why a real debate was never started.

What are the potential Benefits of Banning User Profiling for Marketing?

User profiling enables highly targeted advertising, which, as we know, can be exploited to amplify divisive content, spread misinformation, or influence voter behaviour. A ban could reduce the precision and effectiveness of such campaigns, thereby mitigating their impact on public opinion and democratic processes.

Profiling also allows malicious actors to identify and exploit vulnerable groups with tailored disinformation. Restricting profiling could make it harder to deliver customised false narratives, thereby slowing the spread of misleading or harmful content.

Enhanced User Privacy. Banning profiling for marketing would align with stronger data protection principles, such as those enshrined in the GDPR. This could restore user trust in digital platforms and reduce the commodification of personal data.

We could have a massive reduction in polarisation. Algorithmic amplification, driven by profiling, often prioritises engaging but polarising content. Limiting profiling could reduce the echo chamber effect, where users are repeatedly exposed to extreme or one-sided viewpoints.

A ban could reduce the advantage that well-funded actors (e.g., political campaigns, corporations) gain from microtargeting, thereby promoting fairer public discourse.

Seem quite clear what the challenges and Limitations of a ban are. Sure there are enforcement difficulties: Profiling is deeply embedded in the business models of social media platforms. Enforcing a ban would require robust regulatory frameworks, cross-border cooperation, and technical oversight, all of which are challenging to implement consistently.

Obviusly there could be Impact on Legitimate uses, I mean, not all profiling is harmful. For example, personalisation can enhance user experience by delivering relevant content. A blanket ban might disrupt benign or beneficial applications, such as local business advertising or public service announcements.

This would have massive economic Implications for platforms. Social media companies rely heavily on targeted advertising for revenue. This would help the fediverse a lot.

There are some alternative and complementary measures.We could ask stronger transparency and accountability. Mandate platforms to disclose how algorithms and profiling are used, including the criteria for content recommendation and ad targeting. Require independent audits of algorithms to assess their impact on democracy and user rights. for sure a big area of intervation should be the regulation of political Advertising. Implement stricter rules for political ads, such as mandatory disclosure of funding sources, targeting criteria, and the use of profiling. Ban microtargeting for political advertising, as proposed in the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and other regulatory frameworks. We could require platforms to design algorithms that prioritise democratic values, such as pluralism, accuracy, and fairness, over engagement metrics. Introduce "circuit breakers" to limit the viral spread of harmful content, as suggested by some policymakers and researchers.

Important could be empowering users.Provide users with meaningful controls over their data, including the ability to opt out of profiling and access clear explanations of how their data is used. Promote digital literacy initiatives to help users recognise and resist manipulative content.

Also, support independent journalism and public interest media to counterbalance the influence of algorithmically amplified contentaEncourage the development of decentralised social media platforms (e.g., Mastodon, PeerTube) that prioritise user control and reduce reliance on centralised profiling.

Bans on certain forms of targeted advertising (e.g., based on sensitive data like political opinions or sexual orientation). Risk assessments for systemic risks, including impacts on democratic processes. The AI Act further restricts harmful uses of AI-driven profiling, reinforcing the EU’s commitment to mitigating the risks posed by big social media.

So, yes, a ban on user profiling for marketing could be a valuable component of a broader strategy to protect democracy. Why there is basically no conversation about this?