The "Atomic Arch" campaign compromised over 1,500 AUR packages between June 10-12, targeting SSH keys and API tokens. If you updated via yay or paru during that window, you need to audit your local system.

I’ve built a client-side tool to help with this.

Local Processing: Your package list never leaves your browser. All comparisons are done client-side.

Live Data: It fetches the verified malicious list directly from the official Arch servers (md.archlinux.org) to ensure it's always current. Zero Bloat: No trackers, no ads, no cookies. How to use:

  1. Run pacman -Qm
  2. Paste the output into the tool

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[–] 22 points 5 months ago* (last edited 5 months ago) (2 children)

The script in the top post of this thread does a better job, since it actually checks when you have upgraded the affected packages: https://discuss.cachyos.org/t/aur-compromised-1500-packages-affected-20260611/31040

There's also an even more thorough https://github.com/lenucksi/aur-malware-check

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  • [–] [S] 7 points 5 months ago

    Those are solid resources but I built mine specifically for the folks who don't want to pipe a remote bash script into their shell during a malware outbreak. My goal was simple, a private way to audit the list without needing to clone a repo or install Python dependencies.

    Use the forensics scripts if you’re a power user, but if you just want a quick, client-side check that doesn't touch your filesystem, that's what the tool is there for.

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  • [–] 4 points 5 months ago

    Nice. That helped me quickly test my systems, thanks

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  • [+] -7 points 5 months ago (13 children)

    I'd nuke and pave if I were an Arch btw user. Then rotate keys and passwords everywhere impartant.

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  • [–] 7 points 5 months ago (6 children)
  • [+] 5 points 5 months ago (5 children)
  • [–] -1 points 5 months ago* (3 children)

    This dipshit (me) hasn't reinstalled their OS since 2014. Not Arch btw.

    But if my OS was affected by a supply attack like this, I wouldn't trust the analysis on which packages were affected and which weren't so I'd likely nuke and pave as all my and my family data is here.

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  • [–] 4 points 5 months ago

    I wouldn't trust the analysis either; luckily most PKGBUILD scripts are quite short and simple. It would take significantly less effort to hand-audit every single file I've gotten from the AUR than it would to reinstall Arch.

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  • [–] 1 point 5 months ago

    As long as you're using a slower release cycle, ie something like Debian, then you shouldn't need to be concerned.

    I think anyone riding the crest of the wave with Arch (& esp. the AUR) would likely be aware that things break, so, supply chain attacks are likely to be seen here quicker.

    I honestly wouldn't be surprised if PPAs had similar issues, but might take longer to be noticed.

    Personally, I have a lot of Ansible building my stuff, so actually rebuilding things wouldn't be an issue, but, would I then be installing everything with all the current latest malware...?

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  • [–] 6 points 5 months ago*

    I would recommend to firstly check the update window for the package. It seems that these packages only contained the malware PKGBUILD for a certain time period, before the commit was reverted back by the arch/air devs.

    Then if you find youself infected, try

    1. Rotating the stored passwords on chromium/electron based browsers/apps.
    2. Rotate keys, (SSH, Cloud, Github etc).
    3. Backup your files, this is not a virus, so the file are safe.
    4. Reinstall the system from a live USB.
    5. FINALLY Nuke your house with a Hydrogen bomb.
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  • [–] 5 points 5 months ago (3 children)

    Even if you are not affected?

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  • [–] 0 points 5 months ago (2 children)

    How do I know I'm not affected? I have to be fairly certain the packages identified are the only ones that were affected. That assesment could be wrong. If I 100% trust it, then yeah, I can trace if any of those packages/versions touched my machine. I would trust the package manager.

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  • [–] 5 points 5 months ago

    Here is an example with searxng-git: https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/log/?h=searxng-git

    Look at the recent changes, inclusive the dates. The last change is from February. Let's open it: https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/commit/?h=searxng-git&id=24cc08c8aad50f5114db2d85251bde918b017cb8 with a description of "new ver":

    diff --git a/.SRCINFO b/.SRCINFO
    index 3d2546ff3229..7ff006da7650 100644
    ***
    a/.SRCINFO
    +++ b/.SRCINFO
    @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
     pkgbase = searxng-git
     	pkgdesc = A privacy-respecting, hackable metasearch engine
    -	pkgver = r9110.3f91ac4
    +	pkgver = r9201.ad42b55
     	pkgrel = 1
     	url = https://searxng.github.io/searxng/
     	arch = any
    @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ pkgbase = searxng-git
     	makedepends = python-wheel
     	makedepends = python-setuptools
     	makedepends = python-msgspec
    +	makedepends = python-yaml
     	depends = valkey
     	provides = searxng
     	conflicts = searx
    diff --git a/PKGBUILD b/PKGBUILD
    index 6f8aa8e7938a..ab4f903ea4c9 100644
    ***
    a/PKGBUILD
    +++ b/PKGBUILD
    @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
     
     pkgname=searxng-git
     _pkgname=searxng
    -pkgver=r9110.3f91ac4
    +pkgver=r9201.ad42b55
     pkgrel=1
     pkgdesc="A privacy-respecting, hackable metasearch engine"
     arch=('any')
    

    Nothing has anything to do with the attack we experience right now. That is how you know that you are not affected by the current attack. Use scripts to check if you are attacked, and then lookup every single AUR package and verify yourself. If you can't be sure that you are under attack, then sure, reinstall and do not trust it. But if you can be sure, like I am, then you have nothing to worry. At least speaking of this specific attack.

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  • [–] 4 points 5 months ago

    In example if you don't use the AUR at all, or the packages you installed are not affected. In example the packages from the AUR I have installed have no such changes that could affect me from this malicious attack. Also if the packages you have are not updated in the last couple of days (or weeks) and are not even orphaned packages, then it is unlikely that you are affected by this attack. I am not talking of specific packages only, but a systematic logic you can follow.

    The script https://github.com/lenucksi/aur-malware-check does a good job and not just check for known infected packages.

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  • 1 comment in c/linux@programming.dev view that post
    [–] 4 points 5 months ago