The clearest example involves a Chinese AI lab. This lab’s systems fetched the secret URLs from more than half of the prompts that we sent to its models between July and October, including roughly two-thirds of the requests marked as “no data collection” or Zero Data Retention. The scraper typically showed up two or three days after the request.
This wasn’t limited to requests sent to the lab directly. Several U.S. hosting providers resell this lab’s models, and prompts sent to those providers triggered the exact same scraper – the prompts were flowing back to the lab. A customer who picked a U.S. provider specifically to keep their data in the U.S. didn’t get what they paid for. Later on, a git client on a different cloud started trying to clone the private repositories referenced in our prompts, but only for prompts that used this lab’s models.
The large U.S. providers have their own issues. One continued to crawl a secret URL more than two months after we used it in a single inference call to their search endpoint. Another runs a scraper that comes back for our URLs days after each request, regardless of which router we used to reach it.
The strangest incident involved a company chat. Twenty-four days after we sent a prompt to one Chinese provider, the secret link from that prompt was posted into a Feishu chat channel (Feishu is known as Lark outside of China). Within two minutes, the link was opened from three desktops and three phones in Beijing and Shanghai. Our disclosure to this provider only included the first eight characters of that link, so whoever shared it was reading from a stored copy of the full prompt, more than three weeks after the request was sent to a U.S.-based provider with the ZDR flag.
I wish they had named these providers. I know they aren't supposed to, but still.

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