Throw in Xi and Bibi and you're looking at worldwide peace.
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If it happens closer enough, they'll be thinking twice, like they're a death note or something.
For Kim Jong-Un, I doubt that much would change. The dynasty has been stable for three generations now.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Ju_Ae
She made her first public appearance alongside her father at a missile launch in 2022. State media initially referred to her as Kim Jong Un's "beloved" and "precious" daughter before adopting the adjective "respected", which is typically reserved for the most honoured members of North Korean society, such as Kim Jong Un himself. After her public debut, analysts of North Korea speculated about the reason for her prominence in state media, with some hypothesising that she was being trained as the heir apparent to lead North Korea. In 2026, the NIS reported to South Korea's National Assembly that she had finished her training and had become the designated successor of her father.
For Putin, my suspicion is that whoever replaced him would likely be authoritarian. That is, they've effectively got a functionally one-party system with a group of people at the top who are invested in that system continuing. It might be the case that some people feel differently about invading Ukraine, say.
Trump would be succeeded by Vance. I would guess that stuff like the "rename various bodies of water" or whatnot things would stop, but Vance is an isolationist, not an internationalist, and I understand has, if anything, been the source of stuff like not wanting to be involved with Ukraine. I don't know about some of the stuff that I'd call breaking conventions around use of executive power; my guess is that Vance would be better.
EDIT: On Putin, here's someone writing their analysis; they also say that they think that the most-likely outcome of Putin's death will be a post-Putin environment that looks similar to the Putin environment:
https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/04/russia-after-putin/
As either president or prime minister, Putin’s 27 years in power are the second-longest period of post-Tsarist rule in Russian history after Joseph Stalin’s. Should Putin remain in office, he will surpass Stalin’s record of being in power for 30 years and 11 months in July 2030. There are no indications that, as long as he lives, Putin will give up power voluntarily.
Exact scenarios are difficult to predict due to the uncertainty of the when and how of Putin’s demise. However, based on patterns of Russian history, the realities of its political system, the correlation of international and economic forces, and social norms including a general consensus of Russia’s national identity, a broad outline can be drawn to suggest which future is more likely than others. This article proposes that there is little hope of change in a post-Putin Russia absent revolutionary change from within the Kremlin or forced on it from without. Those scenarios are unlikely barring a major geopolitical event that transforms both how Russia is governed and how its elites and society identify themselves.
Putin’s successor will have to operate, at least initially, within Russia’s present political system. He will also be influenced by international factors, economic realities, and social norms of Russia’s ruling class and society, which have been heavily affected by almost three decades of Putin’s rule including at least four years of war in Ukraine. This article will examine these factors, analyze the limits they impose on Russia’s next ruler, and describe why they are likely to result in continuity or, at best, change only around the margins in a post-Putin Russia.
Russia’s constitution states that in the event of a president’s death, resignation, or incapacitation, he will be replaced by the prime minister until elections are held in ninety days. In reality, Putin has no designated successor because it is too dangerous for any dictator to name a successor and allow opposition forces to accumulate around him. Instead, Putin balances between the leaders of various elite groups who operate the levers of coercion and oversee the sources of wealth within Russia. This balancing keeps possible successors under control by not allowing them to gain too much power. A culture of corruption adds to this internal balance of power because corruption makes all political players controllable by being compromisable.
Described as a “vertical of power,” this system is maximized to maintain Putin’s control over Russia but not transfer that control. Russia’s constitution gives this system just three months to hold elections after a president’s sudden departure. Since Russia’s electoral system is controlled by the Kremlin and will only produce results predetermined by the Kremlin, there will be little time for Kremlin elites to decide upon a new leader and arrange for the façade of an election intended to signify national approval and legitimacy.
The first challenge for any future leader after Putin will be to control a system that is both centrifugal and fragmented with reins of power emanating from the Kremlin but not touching each other. While all lines of authority center on the Kremlin, none are connected, and each are designed to balance, if not challenge, the other. The strength of each major political figure has been purposefully constrained so they cannot gain power with their resources (military or financial) alone and cannot trust those with whom they would have to coordinate to do so.
Kremlin elites live under a surveillance system maintained by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Federal Protective Service (FSO). The FSB, FSO, and other internal security organs such as the National Guard (Rosgvardia) are the primary guarantors of Putin’s system. They can also serve as a springboard for whoever wishes to gain power after Putin, and will be the new guarantors of power for whoever achieves it. Russia’s political structure is unlikely to evolve differently from the system Putin has created while these forces remain or remain unchanged.
Under these conditions, it will be difficult for a reformist leader to emerge. Since the system is not designed for shared power, the next leader will likely be someone who can move quickly to consolidate power and protect himself from competitors. This will limit his freedom of action since he cannot alienate too many Kremlin factions. As Otto von Bismarck once observed, “politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best.” While facing this internal political reality, Putin’s eventual successor will face other limiting factors.
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To dream the impossible dream...
what sucks with the us is we have a large line of aholes in the succession list. Don't get me wrong it would be great but I kinda feel thiel pushed vance with the idea trump would die and they did not expect him to last this long.
As opposed to wtf was going on this week.
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Keep talking that way and I’m gonna have to change my pants
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