The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.

Devices running only local accounts are not affected.

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[–] 7 points 6 hours ago* (3 children)

As I don't really understand the Windows and BitLocker architecture, could someone please clear my confusion? I thought that BitLocker was a full disk encryption feature with the decryption keys derived from the BitLocker password, or a potential cloud-based recovery that would require re-authentication with Microsoft. How could such a encryption be bypassed by just escaping the recovery flow?

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  • [–] 1 point 2 hours ago (1 child)

    The attack also starts from a lock screen, which means it targets drives BitLocker has already unlocked at boot, as the default TPM-only setup does. A startup PIN would likely stop an attacker before the lock screen ever loads, though that has not been tested.

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  • [–] 1 point 1 hour ago*

    Ah, so BitLocker just decrypts the drive using keys from TPM without a password required? That's quite far on the convenience over security scale.

    I would argue that this isn't a BitLocker bypass so much as a classic login screen bypass, then.

    In any case, thanks for the explanation

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