(I apologize in advance for the mountain of text. My main point is about how I don't think you can cleanly separate the philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness, and how the line between humans and simpler processes is a lot blurrier than your list of differences makes it seem.)

Hmm. I see what you're saying, although I will admit this threw me for quite the loop:

I’m not interested in philosophical discussions of consciousness when it comes to the question of whether an LLM is conscious

Because, IMO, consciousness is almost entirely within the realm of philosophy. I'm not sure how much you can do with a scientific approach to it; I cannot think of many hypotheses to test that could give useful (ie. unambiguous and certain) results about the nature of consciousness. But perhaps you're right that that's giving up too easily; we can (and often must) make assumptions and reason by analogy to figure out what the most likely state of reality is, even if technically we cannot be entirely sure.

To avoid the pitfalls of unknowability, you could assume that all humans are conscious (reasonable imo, obviously) and that having certain humanlike properties is a good indicator that something might be conscious (which properties these are is of course a subject of great debate). I do think it's a mistake to say that lacking these properties means it's "not possible" for something to be conscious-- just that if we want to have any reasonable chance of accurately guessing what's conscious, these properties (along with an understanding of said something's inner workings) can be a useful guide. So, let's evaluate the similarities and differences.

Humans share some of these properties with LLMs. Humans are only conscious for a period of time (while we are awake (or while dreaming?)) where we are processing information. We too lack full continuity of consciousness. The parallel of this for a neural network of any kind might be during the time they are generating output or training-- in that period of time, they are also processing information. So I think you have narrowed the window in which it is reasonably possible for an LLM to be conscious ("awake") to just the period of time in which it is running. (Also worth noting is that human brains don't fully shut down while we are unconscious, not sure how to fit that in here though).

You also mention randomness-- true, maybe randomness plays a part in consciousness (true randomness, not pseudorandomness), and LLMs are deterministic. I think you could relatively easily construct a neural network that does use true randomness, but 1. true randomness is "expensive" to use in terms of computers, usually only being used to seed PRNGs, so it would take FOREVER to run, and 2. it would probably require new training techniques, and at that point maybe you could just skip to the experiment after the end of the next paragraph.

The last difference is that they don't take input, produce output, and update themselves (train) all at the same time like we do. We also do this continuously, rather than in discrete steps. Therefore you can say that LLMs (or any current neural networks) lack an integrated and locally continuous experience. This is probably the biggest blocker to LLM consciousness that I see being taken seriously, and I'm inclined to agree, because it is the biggest difference between humans and neural networks.

So, what if we construct a machine using an LLM as its core that has these properties? One that could:

• Operate continuously
• Parse input, train, and generate output all at once
• Use true random number generation to avoid determinism What would you expect about the capability of such a machine to be conscious? What if the core of this machine was an LLM, and the other functionality was not integrated like it is for us, but "bolted on", and then you consider whether the entire system as a whole is conscious? Note that I don't believe that you can point to the fact that the core LLM and all other parts of the system would not individually be conscious to prove that the whole system could not be conscious, since in humans it appears that consciousness either arises spontaneously from non-conscious sub-processes or that each individual part of you contributes some small amount of consciousness to the whole, while not crossing the threshold for consciousness individually.

Anyways, sorry for getting sidetracked in hypothetical scenario land. I agree that there are enough differences that it is unlikely for an LLM to be conscious in the same way that a human is. But I am curious what makes you so confident that those particular properties are necessary for consciousness to exist at all on some level-- could consciousness not simply be a phenomenon that arises whenever something is being computed, and human brains are just a continuous and very complicated computer with the ability to learn and act simultaneously?

I suppose that line of thinking could quickly be expanded to the "basically everything has a tiny bit of consciousness" philosophy, and then you would have to come up with a more specific term for human-like consciousness; but that only delays the moral dilemmas until we create machines that have more human properties (like the one I proposed above)-- or humans that have more machine ones (brain organoids or whatever they're called are fucking terrifying philosophically).

If you don't understand what I'm trying to explain about qualia or that there is a philosophical distinction between the physical world and your perception, just read the wikipedia article on qualia or any similar introductory material to the philosophy of the mind. It answers like 90% of your questions.

Some specific answers though:

RGB is measuring/defining proportions of different wavelengths of light, even if its goal is to describe that light in a way that is supposed to elicit a particular subjective experience in the viewer. Color spaces are a MASSIVE rabbit hole so I would suggest using the simpler example of how an individual photon has a wavelength that makes us percieve the subjective experience of red, rather than being red itself. Although actually, bringing up RGB gives me an idea for something to point out: qualia and the physical world can "desync", which is evidence they are different. If you see light with a wavelength of ~600nm, such as that produced by a sodium lamp or banana, you will percieve it as yellow. But that subjective experience of yellow is also triggered by seeing both ~700nm and ~500nm wavelengths of light simultaneously, which you would individually percieve as red and green respectively. This is how your computer screen does it. ||I guess technically you could argue the cone activations in your eye end up the same, so this may be a bad example... regardless, the point is that something like a taste or smell or color has no physical meaning, they are experiences which are caused by physical phenomena rather than being the physical phenomena themselves.||

I am using "internal experience" to mean the subjective way that you percieve the world. If I just used "experience" you could use it more broadly in your sense of "X is happening to you", which is not what I mean. I guess you could call those things happening in the physical world an "external experience" but I agree, that is a bit confusing and is not my intention. I am using "internal" to make a more specific compound term, not really to contrast it with "external". But if you are using the word "experience" to mean "C is happening to you" then yes, the external experience is the thing that is physically happening and the internal experience is your perception of it happening to you.