[–] 8 points 1 week ago (2 children)

It's a strange anti-human attitude. We should just go extinct as a species to own the bourgeoisie. I mean, the bourgeoisie needs workers like us, so by that logic, why not just all kill ourselves now to own the bourgeoisie, who will then have no workers left? It's just such a freaking weird mindset I don't get how there are 10 people who agree with you.

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  • [–] 1 point 1 week ago*

    Yes. Physicists have only proved two fundamentally different features of quantum mechanics and Einsteinian mechanics such that the latter cannot reproduce the former: quantum non-locality and quantum advantage. Clearly, we do not see quantum effects all around us on macroscopic scales, and Einstein's GR is not even mathematically compatible with QM, so QM must somehow converge to the classical picture on larger scales. We have tested quantum non-locality over large, macroscopic distances, so the only thing left that could possibly break down on macroscopic scales is quantum advantage.

    This fact people all gloss over seems to call quantum computing into question, and has led to the proposal of several models, like Tim Palmer's recent rational quantum mechanics, post-quantum gravity, and historically some other models like Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory, where quantum advantage is fundamentally not scalable, because this creates a natural convergence between quantum theory on microscopic scales and classical theories on macroscopic scales.

    These models are inspired by decoherence, which shows that environmental noise, if you cannot track the environment, leads the system to appear like it acquires classical dynamics. Decoherence fails to actually explain the emergence of the macroscopic world, however, because macroscopic phenomenon, like gravity, do not attach to subjective "appearances" but attach themselves to real physical properties of the system, given by the stress-energy tensor.

    However, if you presuppose that there exists some noise fundamental to the dynamics itself, not simply in the environment, then it causes a quantum to classical convergence naturally. The consequence, however, is that quantum advantage is not scalable. As you try to entangle more and more qubits, you'd predict it'd also introduce more noise, and so you'd need more error-correcting qubits. This may be manageable for some time, but eventually there'd be so much noise that adding an additional qubit would require so many noise-correcting qubits that it would outweigh any possible quantum advantage.

    Tim Palmer's model for example makes a very explicit quantitative prediction that 1000 noiseless qubits will entirely saturate any advantage you could get from a quantum computer. The "noise" in his model is not fundamental but an emergent feature of an assumption that the Bloch sphere of a qubit is discretized, and since it is discrete, it is finite and can be saturated.

    There is good reason to not see quantum advantage as an actual proven technology, because it is based upon a theory which we already know should break down on large scales, and the only way that hasn't been tested that it could break down is in terms of quantum advantage. The only other possibility is that our understanding of gravity is totally wrong and so QM never actually breaks down, but the only consistent mathematical formulation of that approach is String Theory, but String Theory has been empirically ruled out, because it needs an anti-de Sitter space to work, but cosmologists have empirically measured our universe to be a de Sitter space, so String Theory is no longer a possibility.

    These claims of thousands of qubits in quantum computers are never thousands of effectively noiseless qubits that could be used for universal quantum computation. There is always some huge caveat and so in practice they never actually show a real advantage.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago (1 child)

    You declared the expression meaningless, then dissected its constituent words to argue that its literal interpretation makes no sense.

    Yes, so I analyzed both its social use, and its literal word meaning, and found no meaning in either... so I concluded it has no meaning.

    That doesn't establish your claim that I conclude it has no meaning only because the literal definitions of the words have no meaning. You just hallucinated something that never happened and was never said.

    I identified the inconsistency between your appeal to social usage and your literal dissection of an established expression. You haven’t explained that inconsistency, let alone resolved it.

    Again, a complete hallucination of something I objectively did not say. You are just inventing idiotic straw men argument and doubling and tripling-down on them.

    You laughably say I claim X, then quote me literally saying ¬X, and then claim I'm "contradicting" myself, when your delusional ass invented that I said X to begin with!

    Instead, after being presented with direct quotations, you’ve resorted to categorical denials and personal insults.

    Because you're a subhuman bug who cannot have a meaningful conversation and just wants to deflect to idiotic hallucinations.

    Repeating that an interpretation was “hallucinated” doesn’t demonstrate that it’s false. You need to show where the inference fails. You’ve done nothing of the sort.

    Now, you want to say I need to prove I didn't say X! What a laughable shift of the burden of proof! How on earth do I prove I never wrote something? Just copy/paste everything I have ever typed in my entire life into one giant document? How does that even work?

    If you want to claim I said something, you need to show evidence that I said it.

    If you can’t distinguish between quoting someone’s words and critically examining their implications, you have no business lecturing anyone about language or reasoning.

    Ah yes, you cannot quote me saying X, but you can "critically examine" my words to derive that I must've been secretly thinking X despite never having written it... right.

    I’ve provided the evidence twice. I’m not wasting a third explanation on someone whose entire rebuttal amounts to “I never said that” and “you’re delusional.” Get your shit together.

    You have never provided a shred of evidence.

    Your claim is X: that I claimed that the phrase has no meaning only because its literal definition has no meaning.

    You quote me saying two things:

    • Y: The literal definition has no meaning, so its meaning must be in an abstract social definition, but Chalmerites cannot even tell me what that is, either.
    • ¬X: Words can also have meaning from how they are used in a social context.

    You then, after quoting me saying Y and ¬X, claim I'm "contradicting" myself because your "critical examination" allows you to read my mind and conclude I intended to write X!

    You're just a fucking idiot, and I cannot believe I have allowed such a monkey to waste this much of time to begin with.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago (3 children)

    You are just delusional, literally hallucinating things I never wrote. Nowhere in anything I wrote did I claim that I am rejecting it as meaningless "because its individual words don’t yield the intended meaning under their preferred literal interpretation.". I never said that, I never implied that, I never gave the impression of implying that, and I never had the air of the impression of implying that.

    You are literally just hallucinating things never written.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago (5 children)

    You insist that words derive their meaning from social usage, then declare “what it’s like” meaningless by dissecting its individual words into “similar being.” That’s not a serious linguistic argument. You’re contradicting your own account of how language works.

    That is literally not what I said at all.

    Likewise, a rock “experiencing erosion” and a person experiencing pain involve two different meanings of “experience.”

    Maybe for you it is, but then you'd need to explain why it is different, other than the subjects and objects being different.

    One means undergoing a physical change; the other involves feeling something. You’re equivocating between them. And a camera has a vantage point, too. That doesn’t mean it has subjective experience. Nothing I’ve argued requires consciousness to be nonphysical or inexplicable.

    So... this "consciousness" is not monphysical... but feelings aren't physical changes... right.

    A physical explanation of pain doesn’t negate the existence of felt pain.

    Why would a physical explanation negate the existence of a physical event?

    The question is what produces that experience and how we can reliably identify it in other systems.

    Reality is not something "produced." It just is what it is.

    But here’s the fundamental issue: Do you actually deny there’s a distinction between a nervous system detecting harmful stimuli and someone consciously feeling pain?

    If the nervous system in question is a person, and the harmful stimuli is pain, it is one and the same.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) (7 children)

    Experience is not subjective. It is contextual, but contextuality is a property of physical reality, not of subjectivity.

    I’m referring specifically to subjective experience: what it’s like to feel pain, perceive color, experience emotions, dream, etc.

    Yes, Chalmerites like to prepend "what it is like" to things, as if it somehow proves anything. You can tell when a phrase means literally nothing when everyone just repeats it verbatim without ever rewording it in different ways, because the phrase carries no meaning, and only has the appearance of meaning by being repeated a lot.

    Pain, color, emotions, and dreams are all real occurrences in the real world that really happen and all have real physical explanations for them. Prepending "what it is like" to them doesn't mean anything. "Like" means "akin to" or "similar to," and "what it is" regards being. And so the phrase, if taken literally, is about "similar being," which I don't see how that even makes linguistic sense in this context.

    Of course, as Chalermites always do, you will probably get frustrated with me for taking the words literally, because I'm supposed to interpret them abstractly or something, but then there is zero clarity on what this abstract interpretation is supposed to be.

    But notice what you’ve actually demonstrated: we can recognize instances of a phenomenon without fully understanding what constitutes it… You can describe the observable characteristics of a banana and use them to identify other bananas. But what happens when you encounter something that shares those characteristics without being a banana, or a banana that doesn’t exhibit the characteristics you’ve chosen? You need to investigate further, potentially refining your classification criteria.

    It's literally physically impossible for something to share all observable characteristics of a banana without being a banana.

    Of course, if we have a very loose definition of a "banana" that is so broad it would even include an apple, then either the word itself "banana" really does just refer to banana+apple, or we would add on to the definition to separate the two. Words are ultimately a social construct, what is real is what they refer to when used in practice, and not the specific definition in the dictionary. I'm sure you know what a "dog" is, but few people have ever intentionally looked up the word "dog" in a dictionary. You can just know what it means by its social use.

    Now consider consciousness. Unlike a banana, subjective experience isn’t directly observable by third parties. I can recognize my own experiences, but determining whether another entity has comparable experiences is a different problem entirely. That’s why establishing reliable criteria matters.

    You are being so absurdly vague that I have no choice but to just try and guess at what you even mean by this, so I may get my guessing wrong, but that's on you for being so extremely abstract. It seems that there are two halves to what you are trying to say, so I am going to attempt to parse them.

    First, again, there is nothing "subjective" about experience. Experience is just when X happens to Y, i.e. a rock experiences erosion in the rain. It seems to me that one half of how you are you are using "subjective" here to refer to "my own experiences," i.e. "X happens to myself," which is a strange way to use the word "subjective," because it would be like saying, if I eat a sandwich, I'm engaging in "subjective eating," or that my house is a "subjective house" because it's owned by a subject. But, whatever, words are words, but I would refer to it more meaningfully as "experience of a subject." Second, you say that it "isn't directly observable by third parties." Of course, the experiences of a subject are obviously observable by third-parties, so you must be introducing some second criterion here, likely you are trying to say, it is the experience of a subject, as it is realized from the subject's own vantage point. That is what I presume you mean by "isn't directly observable by third parties."

    Actually, the first half seems irrelevant, because any experience, whether it happens to a subject or not, as it is realized from a subject's vantage point specifically, is not realized by the vantage points of other subjects. If I see a rock experience erosion in the rain, no one else on earth can perceive it exactly the way I did. (The term "accessible" does not really make much sense, because what is realized is not something to be "accessed.")

    But, there is no mystery about this at all. Obviously, if they were to perceive what I perceived exactly as how I perceived it, they would have to be standing in the same place as I am, they would have to be of the same height as me, they would have to have the same nose in front of their face as I do, they would have to have the same memories such that they contemplate upon it the same way, so on and so forth.

    That is to say, they would have to be me.

    Indeed, talking about accessing another person's vantage point does not even make linguistic sense. You could imagine getting closer and closer to my vantage point, by gradually taking atoms from my body and replacing them with your own, until you become identical to I, but the moment that identity occurs, then you would just be me, and you would cease to exist, so you would have failed to achieve my vantage point, you would have just stopped existing. Indeed, this is because how we define objects in the first place inherently entails that object's vantage point, and so they are basically two ways of describing the same thing.

    If you think the "mystery" is that we cannot access each other vantage points... that is not mysterious at all. So what is the mystery? Even after this whole aside, I am not sure what you think is so mysterious.

    Your Florgleblorp analogy would apply if I were referring to something for which we had no identifiable phenomenon whatsoever. But that’s not what I’m doing. I’m referring to subjective experience, and asking what constitutes it and how we can determine whether it exists in other systems.

    You have not identified any phenomenon at all. You are acting as if X experiencing Y suddenly evolves into some new phenomenon if X is a subject, but there is no explanation as to why this is the case. It would be like saying that houses are banal, but houses owned by people, those are "subjective houses," and require a special explanation... why? You kind of skipped that step.

    Here’s my own example for you: we could define consciousness as the ability to verbally report internal states. That’s a perfectly testable definition.

    Notice how your definition, then, suddenly entails nothing about so-called "subjective experience."

    The moment you start to talk about anything real, you suddenly have to move away from the meaningless, Chalermite language.

    But whether it actually identifies subjective experience, rather than merely the ability to produce convincing reports, remains a question. There’s nothing there to differentiate between correlation and causation.

    Yeah, you can see the essence of Chalmers in here as well. On one hand, you want to make it look like you are being reasonable by giving a definition that has some concrete meaning, but then you immediately backpedal to Chalmerland and start talking about how we could never actually connect that concrete definition to the abstract thing you were supposed to be defining in the first place... and so you would've just wasted our time.

    If you want to prove consciousness, I stand my ground on the argument that you first need to qualify consciousness as a thing. What is it?

    Why would I want to prove something that isn't even defined in the first place?

    You may find that consciousness is actually something which was deeply misunderstood and unexpected.

    Well, I can't misunderstand anything because I have no understanding of what this "consciousness" supposedly is to begin with, so if someone did discover something unexpected and labeled it as "consciousness," it would just be a new understanding.

    Such a discovery would allow you to draw genuinely meaningful conclusions about whether or not LLMs can ever truly be conscious. That’s how you form a theory.

    That's more akin to taxonomy than theory building, just looking for ways to categorize things into this or that group.

    You suggested, earlier, that someone may be able to detect consciousness by measuring whether the agent’s observation can collapse a waveform...By the same logic, an LLM could pass your hypothesized test.

    the fuck

    I literally said the opposite

    I wrote a giant rant about how that is insanely batshit idiotic and that quantum mechanics has nothing to do with consciousness at all.

    No, there is no "hypothesized test," what on earth are you talking about

    Simply deciding that LLMs shouldn’t count as conscious, without even truly understanding what qualifies consciousness, is just moving the goalpost. Or bikeshedding, perhaps.

    I don't decide that LLMs shouldn't count as "conscious," because I don't have a reason to even take the concept of "consciousness" seriously to begin with!

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago (9 children)

    I started with the disclosure that we all believe consciousness exists in some form.

    Do we?

    That alone separates my argument from your example: consciousness exists, Florgleblorp doesn’t.

    How can we even assign properties to something which has no meaning?

    That’s how scientific investigation frequently works. We recognize phenomena before we fully understand their mechanisms or develop reliable criteria for identifying them.

    No, that's not how scientific investigation works. Even if we do not fully understand something, we can still fully define what it is we're talking about. We can concretely define what a banana is, such that you and I can both agree upon what is and isn't a banana, long before we have any detailed physical analysis of the underlying chemical properties of a banana. Not understanding something in perfect detail doesn't prevent you from giving a high-level definition which defines it in terms of its surface-level qualities.

    I don't even see how we can investigate something to begin with if we cannot even identify what it is that we're talking about. That's why I think you missed the point of my Florgleblorp example... if I told you to go investigate Florgleblorp, how would you even do that, if you have no idea what I'm even talking about, because I've not even given you a definition loose enough to identify it?

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  • [–] 3 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) (1 child)

    I don't blame you because half of PhD physicists are obsessed with quantum woo themselves and believe silly things like this, so there's no shame in a Laymen making such a mistake.

    But there is no scientific reason to believe that there is any physical wave that exists when you're not looking and suddenly "collapses" when you look to begin with.

    The reality is much simpler. Bell's theorem proves that quantum mechanics is non-local, but the no-communication theorem proves that this non-locality never bubbles up to the level of something directly measurable, so you cannot communicate with it. You can only notice the non-locality by bringing measurements together and then making inferences about things that you did not directly measure.

    This is significant because special relativity is both logically and mathematically incompatible with anything non-local. However, if what you directly measure never exhibits anything non-local, then you can construct a theory which only talks about what happens at measurement and nothing else, and then that theory would remain mathematically consistent with special relativity.

    That is how textbook quantum mechanics is formulated: it is purely a theory of measurements. It is simply not a theory of physical reality. It makes no claim as to there being, in physical reality, some infinite-dimensional waveform that floats around in Hilbert space with no address in physical that "collapses" down when you look at it. It makes no claims at all to what physical reality is doing when you are not looking.

    The wavefunction is just taken to be a book keeping tool to make a prediction as to what will happen if you make a measurement, and you have to update it in response to the measurement, and so "measurements" are taken to be fundamental in the theory, as a fundamental axiom. There is no derivation of what the measuring device is actually even measuring at all, because it is not a theory of reality. There is no claim that "consciousness" is involved, or anything at all, because it is not a theory of reality.

    It is a theory of measurement outcomes and nothing more is said. Injecting things about the wavefunction collapsing because a cat looking at it is going beyond the textbook axioms. The textbook axioms of quantum mechanics really are entirely operational: they just provide a book keeping method for the physicist to make predictions as to what they will measure. The dependence upon the measuring device as fundamental is not a claim that measurements are actually fundamental to reality, but it is just a consequence of the operational nature of the theory. Treating it as a theory of physical reality will always lead to nonsense.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 weeks ago* (11 children)

    To me, that is backwards. No one applies the same logic anywhere else. Can you think of any other situation whereby we insist some word, let's call it Florgleblorp, has true meaning, even though none of us can define Florgleblorp, and that we need to do further scientific research and discovery in order to learn how to properly define Florgleblorp?

    It's just strange to me. We invent terms to describe things that we already know exist, we don't start with terms that contain no meaning and then go out in search for meaning. That is bizarre.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago (1 child)

    You can rant all you want about how I’m arguing from authority (I’m not) or how you’re disagreeing rather than not understanding, but you keep literally saying you do not understand.

    I am challenging you to actually justify your position, which you have not done so.

    Your perception of the squares in the image is “subjective” because you are seeing the same light from both grey squares but perceiving it differently based on context. You are literally percieving the same objective physical phenomenon in two different subjective ways.

    Why does something differing based upon context make it subjective? That would make it contextual. It's not the same physical phenomenon: one is a gray square in the context of a shadow, and the other is not. Those are not the same things.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago) (3 children)

    Still, Chalmerite bug person cannot admit that someone who disagrees with them might disagree for reasons other than misunderstanding. Not a single bone in your body will ever allow you to admit that other people may disagree for reasons other than being ignorant of the holy scriptures, because then you'd actually have to have neurons fire in your brain to justify why you believe what you do. Every post you make must be layered with long rants about how I do not understand anything because it is necessary to avoid actually having to justify why you believe what you do, which requires independent thought.

    Color is a subjective experience

    Why is color a subjective experience? I mean, the image you sent me is something you sent to me because you knew I would look at it and see the same colors you are seeing... that seems pretty objective to me.

    (which, for the third time, does NOT mean a physical experience happening to a subject (like you), it means your perception of that physical experience).

    I'm not sure I see the distinction. My perception is just a physical experience happening to me.

    Do you understand what I’m trying to communicate about the difference between a physical phenomena, and your perception of said physical phenomena?

    No, you keep just describing the same thing twice but saying one is different by fiat without ever actually giving any explanation as to why.

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    (Audio version of this post for those who can't be bothered to read it all.)

    If you watch any pop-sci YouTube channel, you have probably heard the old story: physicists used to believe in this silly thing called the aether, but then the Michelson-Morley experiment disproved it in 1887, and Einstein replaced it with his theory of special relativity in 1905, which is "the most tested theory of all time."

    But this is historical revisionism and does not accurately reflect the reality of what actually happened.

    The 1887 experiment was only intended to test aether models where the aether is directly detectable. Its negative result could imply the aether doesn't exist, or it could imply it is only indirectly detectable.

    Indeed, in 1904, the physicist Hendrik Lorentz put forward an aether model whereby the aether is not directly detectable, and thus was consistent with the Michelson-Morley result.

    This model is mathematically equivalent to special relativity, and in fact Einstein's 1905 paper was explicitly in response to Lorentz's paper.

    Since they are mathematically equivalent, the claim that "special relativity is the most tested theory of all time" makes no sense because no experiment can directly distinguish between Lorentz's 1904 model and Einstein's 1905. If you were to experimentally confirm time dilation, for example, well, both Lorentz's and Einstein's models predict that, so you didn't distinguish them.

    Einstein's theory thus won out on philosophical grounds, not empirical grounds. Einstein had, at the time, the stronger philosophical argument: if the aether is not directly detectable, then maybe it doesn't exist, so maybe we should try constructing a model which makes the same empirical predictions as Lorentz's theory but without the aether.

    And that is precisely what Einstein's 1905 paper achieves. This convinced basically every physicist to abandon Lorentz's ideas and adopt Einstein's ideas.

    So, if Einstein's 1905 paper showed that the undetectable aether is not necessary to make the right predictions, what's the issue? Why do I even bring it up? Seems like all of this is completely reasonable.

    I bring it up because of a caveat Einstein was well aware of himself: Lorentz's theory only renders the aether directly undetectable. It does offer a path under which its existence can be indirectly verified, and this bothered Einstein significantly, since he knew it would rule out his special relativity.

    What is this indirect verification? The existence of Lorentz's aether can be indirectly verified if we can provide any experimental evidence, at all, that nature contains, anywhere, in any empirical observation, non-local effects.

    Why?

    Well, if two events occur so far apart and in such quick succession that not even light can traverse the gap, then special relativity predicts that different observers can disagree as to the temporal ordering of the events, measured on their clocks.

    If no effect can travel faster than light, then these disagreements about the temporal ordering of events are always causally disconnected, and so it has no real implications.

    If an effect can travel faster than light, then the causal sequence can become out-of-order in some perspectives, leading to causal paradoxes and logical inconsistencies in the theory.

    This is only true for special relativity, however, because Einstein's theory treats the time-readings on clocks as equivalent to true, ontological time. Lorentz's theory treats the time-readings on clocks as an emergent feature and not fundamental, and so it is perfectly consistent for two observers to disagree about what event happened first without there being a paradox, because one of them can just be wrong and the other correct.

    Why is all this relevant?

    Newton's theory of gravity is unambiguously a non-local action-at-a-distance theory. Einstein knew that if he wanted his theory of special relativity to make sense, he needed to replace Newton's theory with a local theory of gravity, and so he did precisely that: developing the theory of general relativity.

    However, Einstein also realized quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and tried for the rest of his career to replace it with a local field theory, but never succeeded.

    In fact, in 1964, the physicist John Bell proved it is impossible to replace it with a local theory without contradicting its empirical predictions. As Bell concludes at the end of his 1964 paper, either quantum mechanics is wrong, or the states of particles cannot be Lorentz invariant.

    If they cannot be Lorentz invariant, they must be Galilean invariant, which then returns us to Lorentz's theory, as there is no absolute reference point in Einstein's theory, so Einstein's theory is incompatible with the requirement of Galilean invariance.

    In 2022, the Nobel Prize was awarded for experimentally testing quantum mechanics and verifying that quantum mechanics is indeed not wrong, and, by extension, Lorentz's theory must necessarily be the correct theory, as the existence of the rest frame of the universe has been confirmed indirectly through proving the existence of non-local effects.

    Did physicists respond to this by revisiting Lorentz's ideas? No! Because to do so would contradict the last century of ideology centered around the "revolution" that is special relativity.

    So, instead, physicists took a different approach. Rather than agreeing with Bell's own conclusion that his 1964 theorem shows that nature is non-local and therefore rules out "locality," they instead claim that Bell's theorem rules out "local realism."

    The implication here is that you could deny locality, but you could also deny realism.

    "Reality doesn't exist, but thank God it is local!"

    Despite a weird common misconception I've seen thrown about, "realism" has nothing to do at all with determinism or randomness. It is about object permanence, the idea that observable objects with observable properties continue to possess observable properties even when they are not being observed in the instantaneous moment of observation.

    Bell's theorem does not assume determinism; it assumes merely that at least one of the particle's observable properties still contains definite values even when not being observed, regardless of whether or not those values evolve randomly or deterministically.

    The denial of realism leads directly to the "measurement problem," because it creates a disconnect between the fact that you are claiming particles possess no observable (measurable) properties when not being observed (measured), but then this fails to explain why, when we try to observe (measure) them, they always empirically possess those properties.

    This has led to a deluge of incoherent, incomprehensible papers on "interpretations" of quantum mechanics which all start with the premise that particles do not possess any observable properties at all when you are not looking at them and then work backwards from this conclusion to try and desperately make it coherent.

    None of them succeed in this, and they readily admit they do not succeed in this. The popularization of statements like, "no one understands quantum mechanics" are all just passive admissions that these attempts to make sense of it in a non-realist framework are simply incomprehensible and nobody even knows what is being talked about anymore.

    People use these kinds of phrases in an incredibly dishonest fashion. It gives the implication that quantum mechanics is objectively incomprehensible, and that is just a fact of life. But it's not true at all.

    As Bell pointed out in 1982...

    [T]he subjectivity of the orthodox version, the necessary reference to the 'observer,' could be eliminated...that vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice

    That is to say, the supposed "incomprehensibility" of quantum mechanics, the insistence that it is impossible to understand, the hyper-focus on the observer, measuring apparatus, stemming from its non-realist premises, are not fundamental features of the theory, but are explicit theoretical choices made by physicists.

    These explicit theoretical choices all arise from a desperate attempt to preserve locality. The 2022 Nobel Prize shows empirically that, if the particles possess observable properties when not being observed (realism), the experimental results are impossible to explain unless those properties influence each other in a non-local fashion.

    That directly renders special relativity non-viable. But, physicists use a loophole where they just argue the particles possess no properties when you're not looking at them.

    You see, if you deny that anything exists when you're not looking at it, then the only possible way to prove non-locality is to prove non-locality precisely in what you are directly observing, which requires you to send a direct signal, i.e., superluminal communication.

    Under a non-realist framework, you can't prove non-locality indirectly by showing merely that the results are impossible to explain without non-local influences if you did not directly observe those non-local influences. A non-realist framework only allows for the proof of non-locality if you can directly signal with it.

    Of course, it has been proven for decades that quantum mechanics does not allow for signaling, so this loophole allows you to continue to claim quantum mechanics is local, but at the cost of denying that particles have real properties in the real physical world independently of you looking at them.

    This denial of object permanence, the very basis of realism, then leads to all the absurd interpretations around the theory, interpretations which its own authors admit are entirely incomprehensible by continually repeating that "quantum mechanics is impossible to understand" over and over again.

    Indeed, the complete incomprehensibility of these interpretations was proved in a paper by Frauchiger and Renner in the journal Nature titled "Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself." They proved in a simple four-qubit circuit that every major interpretation of quantum mechanics is logically inconsistent.

    The only one which they analyzed that wasn't inconsistent was a realist interpretation, but when they applied this interpretation, they point out in the paper that the time-ordering of events matters, meaning you have to introduce an absolute time-ordering of events to resolve the inconsistency... meaning you need Lorentz's model.

    All of this nonsense is just a desperate attempt to preserve the dominant philosophical paradigm for the last 100 years. As pointed out by Bell in his paper "How to Teach Special Relativity," Lorentz's and Einstein's views are mathematically equivalent, so changing from Einstein's to Lorentz's view does not require actually even changing any of the mathematics or the empirical predictions.

    It is purely a philosophical reinterpretation of the same empirical results and the same mathematics, yet the reinterpretation allows you to avoid having to deny reality to make sense of violations of Bell inequalities, and to make sense of quantum mechanics in a trivially intuitive framework.

    But, of course, if the distinction is only philosophical in nature and non-empirical, a lot of physicists just don't care, since many aren't particularly interested in philosophy and don't really care to know anything about the natural world. They are more pragmatic engineers and just want to build stuff, so they just want to know what the math says and can't care much about the ontological implications of said math.

    If a person is a pure pragmatist, they wouldn't care about this debate anyway, one way or the other. So this rant is largely on the side of people who do care.

     

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ud6LNtX014

    https://www.stochasticnetwork.com//

    It is often claimed that the bits in a quantum computer have no values until you look at them, then they "collapse" into a definite state. However, such a belief is not required by the mathematics but is a personal choice, as it is possible to represent any arbitrary quantum circuit as a Markov chain.

    In classical probabilistic computing, you represent the bits using a probability vector we can call p⃗, which holds the current probability distribution for the bits, and we represent logic gates in terms of stochastic perbutations given by the Markov matrix Γ.

    The evolution rule then just becomes:

    • p⃗'=Γp⃗

    The mathematical description does not track the definite values of the bits, but those are indeed believed to exist, because you can create a simulation whereby you start with well-defined values for the bits and stochastically perturb them to new definite values based on the probabilities given by Γ, and the statistics on such a system will reproduce p⃗ at every time step.

    Quantum computers use a different evolution rule:

    • ψ'=Uψ

    Where U is a unitary matrix and ψ is the wavefunction. The main difference is that U and ψ are complex-valued, so it is not obvious what they physically represent or how this could relate to a Markov chain in any way.

    Complex numbers aren't magic. They just represent a system with two degrees of freedom. That means we can get rid of the complex numbers by decomposing them into two separate real-valued vectors. Specifically, we can perform a polar decomposition on ψ.

    • p⃗=|ψ|²
    • φ⃗=arg(ψ)

    Notice that, if we perform a polar decomposition on ψ, then one of the two degrees of freedom is quite literally a probability vector. Something interesting happens if we write an update rule for this p⃗ directly so we can evolve p⃗ directly without having to constantly convert back and forth between p⃗ and ψ.

    We get this evolution rule:

    • p⃗'=Γp⃗+q⃗ where Γ=|U|²

    We get what looks like a classical Markov process but with a non-linear correction term called q⃗, which accounts for interference effects. The equation for computing q⃗ has a dependence upon φ⃗, and so φ⃗ acts like a memory effect which can cause the same logic gate to give different behavior if the value of φ⃗ is different at that time.

    A prime example is the Hadamard gate. Apply it once then p⃗=[0.5; 0.5]. Apply it twice then the bit deterministically goes back to where it came from. That means it needs a way to "remember" where it came from, and that "memory" is stored in φ⃗. If you apply the Hadamard gate when the bit value begins with a value of 0, then φ⃗=[0; 0]. If you apply it when the bit value begins with 1, then φ⃗=[0; π].

    Rather than using φ⃗ to compute q⃗, which is a correction term for Γp⃗, we can instead use φ⃗ to correct Γ, such that the same logic gate can give us a different Γ if the state of φ⃗ is different at a given time. If we do that, then we can represent each logic gate in terms of these corrected Γ, and thus fit the entire system to the evolution rule given by: p⃗'=Γp⃗.

    There would be no need to correct Γp⃗ with q⃗ because we already built that correction into our corrected Γ. The method to correct Γ also turns out to be trivially simple, you just apply an algorithm called iterative proportional fitting which comes from optimal transport, which will adjust the initial Γ=|U|² as little as possible such that Γp⃗ maps you to the correct p⃗'.

    That means we can fit the entire circuit to a Markov chain where the qubits have definite bit values at all times and each logic gate represents a stochastic pertubation upon the bits that merely permutes them randomly to a new definite configuration, and if you collect statistics on that stochastic process at every step, it will always match the Born rule distribution at that step.

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