One could say that the reason the Soviets could not get the same western investment is because of the differences between the soviet system and the Chinese system.

Specifically for our conversation, I would like to briefly introduce you—in outline form—to the contents of Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov’s book, The Flip Side of NEP (Обратная Сторона НЭПа):

Crisis Phenomena: According to the researcher, the partial return to market mechanisms did not lead to the long-awaited economic boom; instead, it triggered a protracted economic crisis.

Political Struggle: The transition to the NEP (New Economic Policy) exacerbated latent conflicts within the USSR’s party elite (during the 1923–1925 period), resulting in a fierce struggle for power.

Social Stratification: Economic liberalization led to the rapid enrichment of a narrow social stratum—the "NEPmen"—a situation that stood in stark contrast to the dire plight of the majority of workers and peasants.

As you can see, there exists a radically different perspective on the events of that era. Zhukov is an archivist; his work relies primarily on archival documents. In his books, every claim is substantiated by the figures and statistical indicators of those years, which form the core of the economic analysis within his work. The political struggle is evidenced in the minutes of party meetings, while social stratification is clearly visible in criminal police reports. One such report, for instance, describes the formation of a student gang in Moscow that specialized in robbing NEPmen. A great number of such motley gangs sprang up, triggering a rampant surge in crime.

Indeed, we know that between 1919 and 1921, "War Communism" was implemented at the behest of Trotsky. Both Trotsky and Lenin indulged in fantasies of a global revolution; they fully expected that a wave of socialist revolutions would erupt across Europe at any moment, and that the Red Army would immediately rush to their aid. Consequently, the army was effectively transformed into a "labor army."

It was a truly terrible time for the workers and peasants. Soldiers were not demobilized from the army; instead, they remained under barracks conditions, working in factories and receiving no wages—only food and clothing. Yet, even these basic necessities the state was unable to provide in sufficient quantities. As the situation deteriorated, unrest and strikes began to erupt in the factories; workers refused to work. Measures had to be taken. To breathe some fresh life into the economy, War Communism was abolished and the NEP was introduced; however, as it turned out, this dawn was short-lived. As for the notion that the NEP was actually effective in the USSR—that was a myth later inflated by Gorbachev in order to push through his own hare-brained ideas.

Let's set everything else aside for a moment and focus solely on the construction of socialism via the "Stalinist path." We will take into account all the errors, miscalculations, and successes involved.

How did Stalin attract investment? Stalin sold priceless paintings from the state-owned Hermitage Museum, thereby effectively bribing American officials and tycoons. Capitalizing on the Weimar Republic's diplomatic isolation, he established trade relations with them. Raw materials were shipped to the Weimar Republic, while technology, equipment, machinery, and machine tools flowed back in return. At that time, Germany was a technologically advanced nation. However, problems arose in the 1930s; Hitler rose to power, and relations between the USSR and Germany were severed. Simultaneously, an unprecedented economic crisis struck. Trade relations with Europe and the USA were all but reduced to zero. As always, the peasants ended up bearing the brunt of the consequences. The 1930s were an incredibly difficult period for the peasantry. There were also miscalculations regarding collectivization—specifically, those that followed the failure of the communes. In case you weren't aware, prior to collectivization, there had been communes established in the villages. That particular approach failed miserably, sparking intense resentment among the peasants. Yet Mao—for some inexplicable reason—chose to emphasize communes rather than kolkhozes (collective farms) during his "Great Leap Forward," completely disregarding Stalin's prior experience.

And do not forget that, running parallel to the processes of collectivization and industrialization, a "Cultural Revolution" was taking place within the USSR. And believe me, Comrade: had Mao orchestrated something similar, China would not have suffered from such a dire shortage of agricultural specialists.

After Mao botched the industrialization, collectivization, and "Cultural Revolution"—and subsequently fell out with the USSR—China was forced to go to the West with cap in hand, begging for aid. Had it not been for American assistance back then, China would have simply collapsed!