Oh wow ... stating this is just regular fingerprinting is out of touch.
Its like my electric energy supplier analyzing current data and knowing brand, model and type of dishwasher and fridge. Which they can.
Oh wow ... stating this is just regular fingerprinting is out of touch.
Its like my electric energy supplier analyzing current data and knowing brand, model and type of dishwasher and fridge. Which they can.
The researchers responsibly disclosed FROST to Google, Apple, and Mozilla before publishing. The responses are worth reading carefully:
Google said it does not consider browser fingerprinting to be a security vulnerability.
Apple described the attack as “currently out of scope,” with possible mitigations in the future.
Mozilla acknowledged the findings but has not implemented any fix.
In other words, the three companies that ship some of the world’s most-used browsers have collectively said “ok, not my concern”.
Fingerprinting is treated as a known cost of doing business on the modern web, and a side channel that leaks tab and application data through a storage API is, apparently, not a fire worth putting out.

I read about this a while ago and people then concluded that FROST is harder to exploit in real-world scenarios than in the lab. Still worth addressing and a fix shouldn't be too difficult, e.g. by adding small amounts of random latency to OPFS accesses. Firefox already does this with other APIs to make fingerprinting harder. Chromium doesn't because they love fingerprinting.
Honestly, I'm not thrilled with the OPFS model in general. Each page can randomly occupy part of your storage with you having no control over the process. You don't get asked. You can't even inspect the data. Even if it turns out to be useless for fingerprinting, the ability to use your storage invisibly with zero effort is not a power I want to hand out like candy in an environment that supposedly is assumed to be adversarial by default.
The only upside is that browsers do have a quota which is apparently shared between all instances of IndexedDB and OPFS. So the threat model of "use OPFS to fill up the user's entire storage" isn't plausible per se even if you have multiple tabs to attack with. Filling up the storage to evict other sites' stored data might actually work, though, and while it sounds like more of an annoyance, it might also become a step in some other attack.
Besides, quota size is entirely up to the browser; while Firefox uses 10% of total storage or 10 GB, whichever is lower, Chromium can in principle take up to 60% of total storage. When I tried, both a Firefox-based browser and a Chromium-based one had quotas of exactly 10 GB; I suspect that my distro's packagers configured the latter when the built the browser package.
people then concluded that FROST is harder to exploit in real-world scenarios than in the lab
What happens if there's an extra 4GB of stuff laying around?
From what I remember, the measurements taken by the researchers were under rather controlled conditions with little other storage access to muddy the waters.
As for the 4 GB LLM Chrome now ships with: If those 4 GB create significant storage issues on your system you probably have other issues to worry about already. I'm not a huge fan of LLMs being crammed into everything but it shouldn't make much of a difference in this case.
Important to note that this has not been seen in the wild yet. From the article this article directly quoted (without attribution):
"The technique was published by security researchers at Graz University of Technology. There are currently no indications of it being actively used by ad networks or malicious actors." [emphasis mine]
So at this point it seems like when you read, "Company X unveils new fusion reactor" and it means a new design for one. You probably aren't being surveilled with this yet.
We now return you to your regularly scheduled dystopian panic mode.
So ifI run a hardened Firefox inside a docker container and spoof any identifying information and run no other tabs or programs, will that limit exposure?
Probably not. AFAIK docker isn't a virtual machine in the traditional sense that it has its reserved storage other apps on the machine can't access. And even if it were, it's the same physical drive.
Now I'm not too versed myself in SSD firmware so maybe the large file size really is like a wide net, or maybe the file size isn't important - only the fact you're doing read operations on a small space on the SSD may give enough volatility in the read speed to infer the exact app that decided to spin up at that moment.
The simplest fix that comes to mind is to have multiple drives (e.g. install and data) and put the browser on the data one. Maybe this added complexity can throw off some naive attacks. Also, a HDD "naturally" has some variability in the access time (since it needs to physically locate the sector with its read heads).
So in essence, laptops with a single SSD are by far the most vulnerable.
However, adding sane limits on the vulnerable API mentioned and throttling read/write speeds (ideally with randomization) seems like a fix good even for single-drive laptops.
What'd probably work with Docker is a similar read speed throttling setup.
Spoofing identifying information won't help much since read time variability is what matters here. It may make it take more info to infer performance rather than having the transparent information, but a good model is bound to infer pretty well after some initial data.
Well, probably. Do you?
Thinking about it. I have docker running for other local homeland services.
Look into podman / docker as user (may as well go podman, you get SELinux for free)
I used dockge to manage images and instances.
As long as it's not basic root docker, the gaping hole in self-hosted security. I don't know that, why is it good?
It’s a lightweight open source web based manager.
You can manage images and edit docker compose files and see terminal output from one place.
Makes it easy to see everything and is very functional.
Sounds like portainer with extra steps, but if it works for you, cool. As said I prefer podman, but I'm on an immutable fedora derivative, so it's natural.
I didn’t like portainer. I think it works with podman.
A bit overstated. I'd be very skeptical about this being useful in a real world situation.
Something worth noting, but not to get too worked up over. Firefox will probably address it at some point.
Google said it does not consider browser fingerprinting to be a security vulnerability.
Apple described the attack as “currently out of scope,” with possible mitigations in the future.
Mozilla acknowledged the findings but has not implemented any fix.
Well Firefox should get a fix because the other two don’t give a shit. Hopefully DDG does too.
I think it's more likely Firefox forks will than Chromium forks, we already have some mitigation on Waterfox and Librewolf, despite Mozilla being a complete joke now they do still have some good projects fixing everythng they screw up.
Ddg is chromium though, so...
So, it needs time to fill a large chunk of my SSD then use AI to guess what my specific machine is doing after that... when I've probably closed the FROST web page...
Ok, if I'm a "person of interest" that they're going to spend a lot of time looking at then I'd bear this in mind... for me, you & joe public... it's not a thing.
Wire, such trash! So, using multiple browsers like Firefox and any fork, technically separate programs, aren't even safe. So a hardened browser isn't sage from an untrustworthy one.
Like the article says:
So we just need a disk scheduler that inserts small randomness into response times? 🤔
Great. Just what we need.
https://hannesweissteiner.com/pdfs/frost.pdf
While it surely can detect whether you're doing something on your SSD, I'm highly doubtful that it could be used to accurately predict what that is. The training model was highly specialized to the target machine and with only certain application genres (e.g. iMac music, videos app store, etc), and only lists two websites (google.com, youtube.com) as identification. In addition, many websites and applications simply don't access the disk.
Chrome and Safari will let a single origin claim up to 60% of your disk space without raising a flag
Is it not possible to disable this?
The researchers responsibly disclosed FROST to Google, Apple, and Mozilla before publishing. The responses are worth reading carefully:
Google said it does not consider browser fingerprinting to be a security vulnerability.
Apple described the attack as “currently out of scope,” with possible mitigations in the future.
Mozilla acknowledged the findings but has not implemented any fix.
In other words, the three companies that ship some of the world’s most-used browsers have collectively said “ok, not my concern”.
This isn't entirely true. Apple and Google said "piss off", but Firefox acknowledged the issue, but don't yet have a solution, which doesn't mean they aren't working on one. It is bad, though, that they haven't come up with something during the responsible disclosure timeline.
My perspective is this. It's being framed with the same level of boogedy boogedy a previous headlines like "Hackers capture passwords by listening to individual keypress sounds".
No practical fingerprinting could be accomplished with this technique, but it is very distressing that individual tabs seem to have unmitigated control over drive read write.
Hopefully as a result of this Firefox or their forks provide the capability to set RAM / disk permission or even script persistence permission as a per-site setting.
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