They can be as long as everyone has good security practices

https://meshtastic.org/blog/that-one-time-at-defcon/

Meshtastic might start to be useful in a use case like

• the Internet is demolished in an area
• power is not out, or at least everybody has enough batteries to last for a while
• a large actor is not driving around looking for LoRa device broadcasters (this one basically rules out avoiding surveillance)
• All you need is SMS tier texting

It's also got so many limitations, I really don't know what an optimal use case would be.

• Devices can't be too far apart or the connection won't work.
• Devices can't be too close together or the network will get overcongested*
• Devices can't be too many hops away, or the message won't make it.
• Data transfer speeds range between slow and extremely slow
• You need either a specialized piece of hardware - which currently isn't very good - or a separate phone to message people.

* I don't know what a network that's too congested looks like, but if a surveillance state feels like cracking down on communications to the point of shutting down the internet, they could probably rove around finding people with these stations.

The data rates it can work at are very low compared to what most people are used to in terms of data transmission. It's not really a general replacement for wireless data networks for most people.

https://www.rfwireless-world.com/terminology/lorawan-spreading-factor-range-data-rate

For the US:

For comparison, a plain old telephone system (POTS) analog modem might do 56 kilobits per second, more than double the highest data rate there.

It might be possible to create some sort of zero-maintenance public-access mesh wireless network that could start to approach something like an alternative for what people do with smartphones today, but if so, my guess is that it's going to be done using hardware that uses something like self-aligning point-to-point laser links to tie together the nodes.

EDIT:

https://meshmap.net/

Those links, like.

A major remaining issue with Meshtastic is the NodeID being tied to the device MAC. This means that even if you can't decrypt comms, it is trivial to track a device and thereby a user across geographical areas even with factory resets. This is solvable at a software level and iirc there's a PR to address this vulnerability, but it has not been merged.

LoRA networks as a general technology are only as private as they are designed to be. I have the option of both Meshtastic and Meshcore in my city, and as far as I'm aware, they both use E2EE.

Nodes and relays don't store data for any period longer than it takes to relay a message, and even if they did, it would be encrypted. On top of that, they're separate from other WAN/radio networks operated by capital interests, so they're resistant (not impervious) to the influence of money and government.

As a solution for activism, I think they are a great choice, but they are limited by the fact that you need a device compatible with LoRA and the particular network standard you're using, as would everyone else.

For better bandwidth Ive been looking at 802.11ah (Long range wireless) but i haven't seen any darknet implentations yet like what you are talking about.

Hey everyone thank you for the really great and informative comments and links. I'm still new to meshnets and such, and have only recently taken a more active interest in privacy protection, so I very much appreciate the input

I'd stop short of saying "solution" but they can be of some help. There are still surveillance methods that work against them, maybe not to decrypt the actual messages, but to monitor who is talking to who and maybe jam the communications. When you say "protest" etc., do you mean you're part of some big mob in the streets and you want portable gizmos to communicate with other people who are also protesting? Or do you mean you're all sitting at home coordinating something and the wired internet works?

Almost anything you do that's scalable across lots of users and likely to be replicated, will also be targeted by surveillance. So the trick is to do something one-off that nobody else is doing and that isn't figured into systematic monitoring. So that means concocting something unique or obscure, that only you and a few of your friends know about.

Generally maintaining security in something like this is difficult and paranoia-inducing and you end up feeling like you're in Spy vs Spy cartoon if you remember those. The only real solution is to get rid of the surveillance regime.

The surveilance state will continue to grow as long as it's left to its own devices. Pushing against it is the most guaranteed way to avoid it taking over whatever aspects of your life.

I have been dipping my toes into meshtastic for the past few months, now having a T-Deck as a home repeater and a small node I carry in my pocket.

Channels can be E2EE if you set it up, but public channels are usually not.

In terms of being trackable, I would venture to say it does not protect you from being tracked. Most devices use a GPS signal to report location (though you can run them without this iirc). Most devices also require a phone in order for you to configure, and read/send messages.

Your best option would be a T-Deck without a GPS module, though as someone has stated in this thread there is a vulnerability allowing tracking of the MAC.

Lots of good comments here. Just wanted to say: Privacy often depends on the threat scenario. What really helps is encryption.

And if you need anonymity within the network, that needs to be baked into the protocol. Like I2P or TOR do on the internet. They bounce traffic through random nodes so nobody knows both sender and receiver at the same time. That of course makes it expensive for the network, and slow.

Other protocols just send packets from a sender to a receiver. That's fast. But people en-route know who's communicating with each other. Packets might be encrypted, though. So third parties can't look inside what kind of information is exchanged.

And there's a million different threat scenarios with the surveillance state. They might be far away and not catch the radio you're sending through the air. They might come and triangulate your position once you transmit any stuff over radio.

And the internet is just complicated. Most traffic there is encrypted these days. But the easy stuff they'll do is just ask Google what's on your account. Or have a side-channel to the data that's generated for the advertising industry. Or bug your phone or unlock it. Or subpoena the internet service provider, or mobile phone provider. So they can see what DNS queries you do. Or your phone location 24/7. Or they'll get access to your modern car electronics...

So depending on what you're trying to do, you might want to get rid of your smartphone, modern car etc. Credit card, NFC train ticket... Accounts with big corporations... That's all data the surveillance state is more interested in than random chat messages... Though, those have an impact as well. So it really depends on what we're trying to protect here, because there's so many different attacks on privacy from all kinds of directions. It is a chore.

Not LoRa related, but you might be interested in graphene os on a pixel phone if you're concerned about privacy

Well, my experience with Meshtastic is: Make the shittiest least finished chat app you can think of, and then give it a range most efficiently measured in inches.

Instead of using Meshtastic, just raise your voice a little, then you don't have to spend money on shitty little Chinese-made circuit boards.