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MeshMarauder: someone finally published a tool to demonstrate how trivial it is to defeat meshtastic's DM encryption (by replacing public keys in profile broadcasts) (partyon.xyz)
submitted 1 year ago by to c/meshtastic@mander.xyz
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[–] 5 points 1 year ago (1 child)

I may be thinking of signing. The idea is that you would have a message that's only proven to be authentic if you get the corresponding key. I probably just have the wrong terminology or something.

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  • [–] [S] 6 points 1 year ago

    Yes, you can make a signature using the private key and anyone can verify it using the corresponding public key.

    But, if the attacker can replace the public key they can also replace the signature with one made using their own key - so this doesn't solve the problem of keys being unverified.

    If public keys were actually verified, signatures could protect the other fields in the profile packet from being modified. You could also theoretically use signatures to authenticate key rotation, by signing a packet containing your new public key using your old private key. But this doesn't really work in the unreliable radio setting where some messages are likely to be missed.

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