Do you use Signal for chatting securely with friends and loved ones? Us too! We endorse it wholeheartedly, and rely on it for nearly all our communication.

But the vibes are deteriorating here in the US, and we should have a communications contingency plan for if Signal goes down.

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[–] 13 points 9 months ago

The reticulum project with the Sideband client is probably a lot more censorship resistant than DeltaChat or Meshtastic.

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  • [–] 9 points 9 months ago (1 child)

    If Signal gets blocked, why not use a Signal Proxy?

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  • [–] 13 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    OpenPGP for encryption through autocrypt is a BIG NO for me. OpenPGP is inherently flawed, read any reasonable cryptographer's opinions on it. DeltaChat is a significant security downgrade from Signal. I would much rather use SimpleX or Briar.

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  • [–] 1 point 9 months ago (2 children)

    I couldn't find any criticiques of OpenPGP aside from LibrePGP's. Do you have sources I could look into?

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  • [–] 2 points 9 months ago (1 child)
  • [–] 2 points 8 months ago

    This article was more constructive (suggesting alternatives) than destructive (leveraging critiques), but it did link to several critiques/vulnerabilities with OpenPGP.

    Unfortunately, half are about implementation issues (granted, it's made more difficult to implement something correctly when it's as convoluted and all-encompassing as PGP)—which are hopefully not applicable to Delta due to their 3rd party, applied cryptography audit—and the rest are obsolesced by the 2024 updates to the standard—RFC 9580, the so-called "crypto-refresh."

    Do you have any critiques that address the current state of the PGP protocol's security?

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  • [–] 11 points 9 months ago

    https://eylenburg.github.io/im_comparison.htm

    Falling back to email isn't a most preferred backup, I'd rather do simplex

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  • [–] 13 points 9 months ago

    If you're in a country that is shutting down servers, then your contingency plan should involve serverless p2p apps like Quiet or Keet.

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  • [+] 19 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago) (11 children)
  • [–] 5 points 9 months ago (4 children)

    deltachat will leak metadata everywhere

    Got a citation for that? Genuinely curious

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  • [–] 3 points 9 months ago* (last edited 9 months ago)

    You can move to any other service, but once it becomes popular enough to draw attention they might also get blocked as well. If it's centralized, then the central servers can be blocked and it's not longer working. If it's decentralized and peer to peer, then the bootstrap nodes can be blocked and it's no longer working.

    Even if it's self hosted and not advertised, the adversary can run active probes to detect banned services and block it if it detects any.

    The only thing that can work reliably is something that can be concealed and can't easily be detected.

    A simple HTTPS website that runs a small blog, forum or an image board, can have a lot of bot traffic, and human traffic that makes the traffic analysis hard, it also provides plausible deniability if someone asks why you visit that site often, you can say that you are playing games or browse images there. Such website can have a secret interface that can be used as an interaction point for secure chatting (in a store and forward manner), which responds only if the requests are cryptographically signed by the participants, otherwise the server can play dumb and show a 404 error. Therefore an active prober can't easily detect that the website hosts that interface the first place, because they cannot produce a signed request unless they manage to compromise one of the participants.

    Threat analysis:

    • Obviously if the endpoints are compromised, all bets are off.
    • The certificate authority (CA) that issued the certificate for the website can be compelled to issue certificates for man-in-the-middle (MITM) observation and then the MITM-er can detect the secret interface. But nowadays this is difficult to pull off due to certificate transparency (CT), TLS clients can be configured to not accept the cert if it's not logged by a CT provider, and domain owners can get an immediate alert if someone else issues a fraudulent and logged cert for their domains.

    Someone should make an app that works this way. Only one tech savvy person of the given group need to set this up (preferably someone who alredy have a website), then others in the group can be invited into it and can use it without much friction.

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  • [–] 5 points 9 months ago

    matrix.org is my new favorite

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  • [–] 1 point 8 months ago*

    Good idea. (Also "server not found" on your link.) Here for the info. Please mention if these methods allow for video and voice calls.

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  • [–] 0 points 9 months ago

    take a look at Jami.

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  • [+] -7 points 9 months ago (4 children)

    Does Signal host its user's data?

    Not sure why privacy-conscious people would be recommending it over something like Matrix. Unless they're paid off or stupid.

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  • [–] 4 points 9 months ago (3 children)

    it does not. and the reason is, matrix clients and servers are fucking unstable, and spam is still an unsolved thing.

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