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Google Has Removed Manifest V2 Extensions From the Chrome Web Store, Including uBlock Origin (webiterate.dev)
submitted 2 months ago by to c/technology@lemmy.world
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[+] -114 points 2 months ago (15 children)

Not really. UBlock Origin Lite works really well. They even added content scripts recently. From a technical perspective MV3 offers more security by default.

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  • [–] 67 points 2 months ago (4 children)

    The following filter options can't be translated into DNR rules:

    strict1p, strict3p: whether a network request is same-origin as its initiator
Entity-based values for domain= filter option (webextensions #394)
redirect-rule=: the DNR API does not support redirect-if-blocked concept (webextensions #493)
Click-to-load embedded contexts through redirect=click2load.html filter option
Regex-based removeparam= modifier filter options
Exceptions for all modifier filter options are not possible
    Workarounds exist for removeparam= and csp= by carefully tuning the priority property.
Many very useful regex-based filters used in uBO are not allowed, or are rejected by the DNR API (webextensions #344)
replace=, can't modify the response body (full support is only possible with Firefox MV2)
ipaddress=, can't use IP address as a condition to block/unblock (full support is only possible with Firefox MV2)
urlskip=, this requires programmatic steps to extract a URL from another URL (partial support, for strict-blocked pages only)

    aside from that it is somewhat better than default ublock but that's a pretty big list of issues.

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  • [–] 12 points 2 months ago* (1 child)

    There's also pretty restrictive length limits on filter lists iirc, so ubo lite would have to select top filters at some point. This getting worse as websites add more ads or obfuscate more requiring more rules.

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  • [–] -2 points 2 months ago (1 child)

    Some of those limitations were never supported in Chrome to begin with. MV3 still supports webRequestBlocking at the engine level but it is gated behind enterprise policy (ExtensionInstallForcelist in the Windows Registry, macOS MDM, or Linux managed policy JSON). If an extension with webRequestBlocking is installed via policy, it restores programmatic interception.

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  • [–] 12 points 2 months ago*

    In practice, I found it breaks sites more, lets some things through, triggers more adblock detectors, and doesn't work as well with the annoyance list.

    It doesn't work on YouTube. And the maximum number of entries to block is limited.

    Its not catastrophic though.

    So UBO Lite is not wholly ineffective, no. It works great, mostly. Buts its definitely more of a nuisance to use, which is exactly what Google wants.

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  • [–] 4 points 2 months ago (4 children)

    No, they're intrinsically less secure.

    They generate memory issues (use-after-free, dangling pointers, double free(), zombie processes, uncomplete teardown, GC failures or abrupt stops, race conditions, etc.) because of their shitty isolation, and their poor service-workers and IPC architecture.

    What's worse, they greatly limit the network APIs needed to active defense (DNR instead of webRequest).

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  • [–] -3 points 2 months ago (3 children)

    No, they’re intrinsically less secure.

    GrapheneOS disagrees with you:

    https://grapheneos.org/usage#web-browsing

    I agree however that Chromium has some issues still. I have personally managed to crash my browser when calling the Mojo APIs via JavaScript. However, it wasn't related to security. As GrapheneOS notes, no other browser engine provides the same levels of sandboxing. Recognizing the effectiveness of Chrome's sandbox, Microsoft began evolving Windows kernel access control to formalize and harden these techniques at the OS level. The upcoming Windows Updates implements this in its new ProcessContainer support.

    Blaming process isolation and IPC for memory bugs like Use-After-Free and dangling pointers fundamentally confuses language-level C++ problems with OS containment architecture. Memory corruption exists across all C++ engines (Gecko, WebKit, Blink); isolation is what prevents those bugs from compromising the host OS.

    Handing third-party extensions blanket permissions to inspect and modify live plaintext traffic across all tabs creates a massive MITM exfiltration surface. Moving rule matching to declarativeNetRequest enforces least privilege by executing filters in the native engine without exposing sensitive network payloads to extension code.

    webRequestBlocking is not deleted in MV3. The synchronous blocking engine still exists in Chromium. If an extension is installed via local policy or the Windows Registry (ExtensionInstallForcelist), full programmatic webRequestBlocking executes in Manifest V3 just as it did in MV2.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (2 children)

    Blaming process isolation and IPC for memory bugs like Use-After-Free and dangling pointers fundamentally confuses language-level C++ problems with OS containment architecture. Memory corruption exists across all C++ engines (Gecko, WebKit, Blink); isolation is what prevents those bugs from compromising the host OS.

    Yeah, but they instead greatly compromise the browser, and the problem is that these are not as likely to happen in MV2 (i.e., Firefox).

    Why? Simple:

    1. You have a long operation running inside an extension.
    2. Your system (or the browser itselfs) suspends or even kills the associated Service Worker.
    3. A new one has to be created.
    4. If the previous memory chunk goes unreferenced, then you have a double free and/or an UAF.
    5. If the previous memory chunk doesn't get unreferenced, then you get a dangling pointer.
    6. Either way you get a race condition if it's something concurrent.

    The problem is, if an attacker and/or a malicious process do compromise that unreferenced or unallocated memory, then any and all sandboxing will be esentially irrelevant and thus vulnerated, vulnerating not only the browser (something that itself can compromise sensible information), but even the OS.

    Then you have the zombie processes because the current memory model in V8 causes SWs to forcedly stop before they can do any cleanup.

    MV3 is not about security at all, is about more control over your own computer and about more control over the network (that way they can let more trackers, zero-days, ads, malvertisers and even malware to pass because browser-level blockers and firewalls won't be able to block them).

    Edit: MV3 is a perfect example of inverse tivoization.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 months ago

    Handing third-party extensions blanket permissions to inspect and modify live plaintext traffic across all tabs creates a massive MITM exfiltration surface. Moving rule matching to declarativeNetRequest enforces least privilege by executing filters in the native engine without exposing sensitive network payloads to extension code.

    You're doing a false equivalence here.

    It's not about blanket permission vs. almost no permissions.

    You can have granular ACLs (which are being hindered by MV3), or OCap/CapSec, or even other security and permissions approaches.

    They're or incompetent or malevolous, these are the only two options left when you think a bit about it.

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  • [–] 0 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago)

    webRequestBlocking is not deleted in MV3. The synchronous blocking engine still exists in Chromium. If an extension is installed via local policy or the Windows Registry (ExtensionInstallForcelist), full programmatic webRequestBlocking executes in Manifest V3 just as it did in MV2.

    It is in practice.

    Not all users are able to do that (local policy install), as not all users are (or have to be) that tech savvy. That's an exclusionary barrier towards inclusion and accesibility of security and sovereignity features.

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  • [–] 0 points 2 months ago (2 children)

    That's a whole truckload of copium you're consuming there, fella. Watch out for the side effects.

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