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How would you expose Jellyfin securely without a vpn? (discuss.online)
submitted 5 months ago by to c/selfhosted@lemmy.world
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Assuming the user will not be connecting over vpn, but is both remote and non-technical, how would you expose Jellyfin to them securely?

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[–] 4 points 5 months ago (4 children)

Yeah not only would a lot of people have the same media name, because of docker mounts, probably a lot of people have the same path to the media inside of the docker container even if the external location is different. I bet you could make a rainbow table of sorts of the most popular movie/TV torrents combined with the most common place in the container for media to be mounted, then use shodan to get a list of hundreds of instances that you could scan for the common hashes.

I'm just seeing the issue for the first time and noticed it was raised 5 years ago - surely that was enough time to at least put forward a changeover date and give clients time to update.

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  • [–] 3 points 5 months ago (3 children)

    Jokes on them, my paths are a shitshow and I can't be bothered to organize them properly

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  • [–] 2 points 5 months ago* (last edited 5 months ago) (2 children)

    Do you not do any renaming? That probably would make it even easier as you can just brute force with a database of filenames scraped from torrents. I already have a proof of concept that generates valid jellyfin IDs from any given file path, it only takes a few more steps before you can plug in a shodan scan of jellyfin instances and just shotgun a bunch of IDs generated from torrents.csv at them and find stuff you can stream without authentication.

    People not bothering to rename, using the default radarr naming scheme, or everyone using the same naming pattern from trash guides just makes it easier.

    Probably the only way to guarantee nobody can probe your media and stream it without authentication is to make sure to rename everything using a format that only you use or mount all your media under a path inside docker that contains a long randomly generated folder prefix.

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  • [–] 1 point 5 months ago (1 child)

    I was mostly making the comment in jest. I do rename, but my folder structures, as someone who downloads everything manually based on what I want to watch rather than doing the automated *arr stuff leaves it in directories only I consider sensible.

    I have Jellyfin behind a reverse proxy that lives in a DMZ and a WAF to go with it. I'm sure there's still room for watching an unauthenticated stream because I forgot to rename a folder somewhere, but it's not exactly an attack vector I care about. I'm more concerned about DDoS or impersonation attacks, which I also attempt to mitigate via an LDAP implementation behind the scenes.

    It's not perfect, but it's the best effort I can make at the moment.

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  • [–] 1 point 5 months ago

    Yeah that's fair and I think that's a good move, my point is just that people are acting like this is not feasible to exploit. I'm at the point in my exploit testing excursion where I have a script that can generate a stream of potential IDs based on real torrent names being parsed and reformatted using radarr's default naming pattern as well as the commonly used trash guides ones permuted with some common library paths used in the default docker compose examples, and it's turning up actual ID matches with my jellyfin instance. All I have left to do is make it create API requests to test the IDs against the unauthenticated API instead of checking an exported list and there's a proof of concept. 5 years is a long time for someone to figure that out.

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