▲ 509 ▼ Google's plan to restrict sideloading on Android has a potential escape hatch for users (www.androidauthority.com) submitted 1 year ago by ardi60@reddthat.com to c/technology@lemmy.world 118 comments fedilink hide all child comments
[–] Zak@lemmy.world 5 points 1 year ago (10 children) It need only check at install time. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 10 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 4 points 1 year ago (9 children) Correction: SSL certificates can expire before someone would want to continue being able to install any given app. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 9 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 5 points 1 year ago (7 children) Sure, the developer needs to keep the certificate up to date and re-sign the APK on occasion. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 7 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 3 points 1 year ago (6 children) So any APK I download will just expire at some point in time that's probably really annoying to know, and then I have to dig through the internet again so I can install the app again? permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 6 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (4 children) Another option is to allow otherwise-valid signatures after expiration. It's generally still possible to check them. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (3 children) That completely nullifies the entire point of signature validations. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 3 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent [–] pycorax@sh.itjust.works 1 point 1 year ago If it's anything like how Windows does it, you would still be able to override it. It just gives you a scary warning and hides the option unless you click "more info" or something. permalink fedilink source parent [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago These two are identical for software. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 4 points 1 year ago (9 children) Correction: SSL certificates can expire before someone would want to continue being able to install any given app. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 9 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 5 points 1 year ago (7 children) Sure, the developer needs to keep the certificate up to date and re-sign the APK on occasion. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 7 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 3 points 1 year ago (6 children) So any APK I download will just expire at some point in time that's probably really annoying to know, and then I have to dig through the internet again so I can install the app again? permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 6 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (4 children) Another option is to allow otherwise-valid signatures after expiration. It's generally still possible to check them. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (3 children) That completely nullifies the entire point of signature validations. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 3 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent [–] pycorax@sh.itjust.works 1 point 1 year ago If it's anything like how Windows does it, you would still be able to override it. It just gives you a scary warning and hides the option unless you click "more info" or something. permalink fedilink source parent [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago These two are identical for software. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Zak@lemmy.world 5 points 1 year ago (7 children) Sure, the developer needs to keep the certificate up to date and re-sign the APK on occasion. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 7 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 3 points 1 year ago (6 children) So any APK I download will just expire at some point in time that's probably really annoying to know, and then I have to dig through the internet again so I can install the app again? permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 6 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (4 children) Another option is to allow otherwise-valid signatures after expiration. It's generally still possible to check them. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (3 children) That completely nullifies the entire point of signature validations. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 3 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent [–] pycorax@sh.itjust.works 1 point 1 year ago If it's anything like how Windows does it, you would still be able to override it. It just gives you a scary warning and hides the option unless you click "more info" or something. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 3 points 1 year ago (6 children) So any APK I download will just expire at some point in time that's probably really annoying to know, and then I have to dig through the internet again so I can install the app again? permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 6 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (4 children) Another option is to allow otherwise-valid signatures after expiration. It's generally still possible to check them. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (3 children) That completely nullifies the entire point of signature validations. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 3 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent [–] pycorax@sh.itjust.works 1 point 1 year ago If it's anything like how Windows does it, you would still be able to override it. It just gives you a scary warning and hides the option unless you click "more info" or something. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (4 children) Another option is to allow otherwise-valid signatures after expiration. It's generally still possible to check them. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (3 children) That completely nullifies the entire point of signature validations. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 3 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent
[–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (3 children) That completely nullifies the entire point of signature validations. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 3 child comments replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago (2 children) How? Expiration doesn't grant an unauthorized party access to the private key. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent
[–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago (1 child) There's zero cryptographic reason to have a signed date at that point. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment replies: [–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Zak@lemmy.world 1 point 1 year ago Which nullifies the point of certificates having an expiration date (limited window for exploiting a compromised certificate, possibility of domains changing hands), not the point of validating the signature (tie responsibility for apps to who owned a domain on a specific date, allow third parties to create blacklists of bad developers). permalink fedilink source parent
[–] pycorax@sh.itjust.works 1 point 1 year ago If it's anything like how Windows does it, you would still be able to override it. It just gives you a scary warning and hides the option unless you click "more info" or something. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] LodeMike@lemmy.today 1 point 1 year ago These two are identical for software. permalink fedilink source parent