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cross-posted from: https://hexbear.net/post/9750154

The international reputation of the Nobel Peace Prize, which has suffered in progressive and human rights circles over recent years, may be on the path to improvement after Friday's announcement that this year's award has been given to Navi Pillay, a person of "exceptional courage" who has been at the forefront of accountability efforts for apartheid, prosecuting war crimes, and upholding international law for decades.

In its statement, The Norwegian Nobel Committee said Pillay—who during her career served as a judge on the High Court in South Africa, her native country, and later the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court (ICC)—"has been instrumental in ensuring that war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are prosecuted."

Pillay also served for six years as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, from 2008 to 2014, and more recently chaired the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which generated a 2025 report concluding that the Israeli government had committed genocide in Gaza.

"The last thing I did is the report on Gaza naming what is happening there as genocide. One of the main reactions to that report [was] paying tribute to me for my courage.. why would you need courage to speak the truth?" Navi Pillay upon winning the 2026 Nobel peace prize https://t.co/hYPA94eFLe
— Saul Staniforth (@SaulStaniforth) October 9, 2026

"The last thing I did is the report on Gaza naming what is happening there as genocide," Pillay said Friday. "One of the main reactions to that report is paying tribute to me for my 'courage.' And you can imagine our surprise—why would you need courage to speak the truth?"

"Is it true?" asked Pillay when first notified of the award, fittingly while at the Nuremburg Court where Nazi's were tried for their atrocities of last century.

In a moment of levity, surrounded by colleagues applauding her achievement, Pillay said, "Thank you so much. If you clap a little bit more, I may share this prize with [US President Donald] Trump."

Trump, accused of war crimes himself, has notoriously said he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize despite his record of violating international laws, kidnapping or assassinating foreign heads of state, initiating wars of aggression, and carrying out a lawless campaign of lethal attacks in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean which human rights experts have denounced as "murder spree."

Agnes Callamard, secretary general of Amnesty International, called Pillay's selection an "amazing moment" for human rights.

"We are at the Nuremberg Court; I cannot think of a stronger symbol for her Nobel prize," said Callamard. "We are all so thrilled!"

Amazing moment. Navi Pillay has received the Nobel Peace Prize ! https://t.co/HL3r1PJzLOWe are at the Nuremberg Court; I cannot think of a stronger symbol for her Nobel prize. We are all so thrilled! This is her first reactions upon hearing the news: https://t.co/Crbj6XdiyQ
— Agnes Callamard (@AgnesCallamard) October 9, 2026

"At a time of existential challenges—including more wars and conflicts than the world has seen in a long time—international law is no longer just a supplement to peace and security. It is an absolute necessity," the Nobel Committee said in its announcement.

Warning that "the system of international law is under tremendous pressure, and its institutions are under attack," the committee said "a shift towards power politics at the expense of legal frameworks and global respect for law and justice" threatens peace and stability worldwide, a veiled but clear reference to the antagonism the US government under Trump has shown to the ICC, the United Nations, and other legal institutions and frameworks.

"Whenever might overtakes right, it undermines stability, trust and peaceful co-existence," the statement said. And continued:

History has shown that a world operating without the rule of law is unjust, unwise and inhumane. The judges – those who guard the thin red line between order and chaos—are therefore highly deserving of our praise. But today, as these same judges are sanctioned, and their institutions are attacked, we need people of courage, vision and determination—qualities that Navi Pillay demonstrates in her work on the bench.

Pillay, it concluded, "is one of the great defenders of international legal principles in our time. Her distinguished career reminds us of the need to support, fortify and expand the global rule of law. Navi Pillay’s commitment to justice and human dignity is a source of hope and inspiration to all who seek to bring about a more peaceful world."


From Common Dreams via This RSS Feed.

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cross-posted from: https://hexbear.net/post/9213703

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/69385

Women’s groups took to the streets this Sunday across several cities of Brazil to demand that the National Congress vote on and immediately approve Bill 896/2023, scheduled for August, which equates misogyny with the crime of racism.

The demonstrations were spearheaded by the Ascent for Living Women (Levante das Mulheres Vivas) movement and took place on August 2 ahead of the resumption of legislative activities. The main objective was to pressure the speaker of the Federal Chamber, Representative Hugo Motta, to bring the bill to a vote within the next 15 days, specifically between August 11 and 12.

The protests were organized in 10 states across the country, including the capital cities of São Paulo (Avenida Paulista), Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, João Pessoa, Boa Vista, Curitiba, and Campo Grande and the cities of Medianeira, Ponta Grossa, and São José.

Irina Cezar, a member of Levante das Mulheres Vivas, stated in an interview with the program Es de Mañana on Radio Brasil de Fato that support for the bill is widespread. The movement engaged in dialogue with legislators from the left, right, and center, securing support from parliamentarians across various ideological sectors, including members of parliament and activists.

The legislative text was unanimously approved by the Senate in March and sent to the Chamber of Deputies, where it remained stalled without a scheduled vote. It includes a report prepared by federal deputy Tabata Amaral and awaits debate in plenary session following its approval as an urgent matter in early July.

The passage of this law seeks to establish a legal framework for violence against women that protects collective rights, an area not covered by current legislation. Cezar emphasized the urgency of the law given the discourse disseminated by digital content creators that promotes the subordination or harassment of women, behaviors that lack adequate legal definition in current criminal law regarding collective violence.

From the movement’s perspective, collective protection has a direct influence on reducing individual attacks.

Criminalizing hate speech reduces violence against women as a collective, thus decreasing the intervention of the judicial system, police action, and the burden of prosecution in Brazil.

Lula Rejects US Terrorist Designation of Brazilian Criminal Gangs

(Telesur)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/CB/SL


From Orinoco Tribune via This RSS Feed.

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Pakistan’s Indigenous Torwali people are fighting to save the Swat River · Global Voices

Save River Swat. Image by the author. Used with permission.

Image by the author. Used with permission.

This post is part of Global Voices’ May 2026 Spotlight series, “Global crisis, local solutions.” This series will offer stories of resistance and successful climate action, insight into how communities in the Global South are fighting back against the crisis, analysis of what this might mean for future generations, and more. You can support this coverage by donating here.

For the Indigenous Torwali community living in the Swat valley, in northern Pakistan, rivers are not a “resource.” They are not just “water.” They are the heartbeat of their nation, a sacred presence, the manifestation of the goddess Dara connecting them to their ancestors. But under the justification of the “electricity crisis,” in the past few years, the Pakistani government has been pushing a new wave of hydroelectric projects that are threatening this river system, along with the ecosystems and cultural systems tied to it.

For the Torwalis, losing a river means losing history, livelihoods, identity, and imagination. This is why, since 2023, they have been leading a fierce resistance to save the Swat River and halt the construction of the 207 MW Madyan hydroelectric project, one of at least 18 schemes planned between Madyan and Kalam in the Swat District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The project is part of the World Bank-funded Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Hydropower and Renewable Energy Development project, approved in 2021 for a total of USD 450 million.

On April 4, 2026, the movement celebrated a victory: The provincial cabinet approved its withdrawal from this project. However, it is not yet clear whether the project proponents will challenge this decision or seek equally devastating alternatives, and there have been no comments from the World Bank so far. For the Torwalis living in the valley, the struggle is not over yet.

The Torwalis know well what happens when large-scale dams interrupt the free flow of their rivers. For them, the Daral Khwar Hydropower project is a lesson written in water. The project was initially funded by the Asian Development Bank, which withdrew after public pressure. The authorities, however, sought other funding sources to advance the project, making false promises and dividing communities to silence dissent.

In the town of Bahrain in the Swat district of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, where the Daral merges with the Swat River, the local community used to describe their land as a paradise. In the summer, children were playing in the river’s cold pools, women were collecting fresh water from its springs, and orchards were thriving along its banks. Today, though, the powerhouse controls the river’s flow like a tap, leaving long stretches of riverbed dry. Mosquitoes breed along its banks well into autumn. Sudden water releases from the tunnel with little warning, causing a drowning hazard for children. This loss has taught the Torwali a painful truth: once a river becomes a machine, everything connected to it — culture, ecology, economy, identity — unravels.

With this memory still fresh, the Torwalis have formed the Save River Swat Movement (Darya-e Swat Bachau Tehreek) to mobilize against the Madyan project. In August 2024, they submitted a formal complaint to the World Bank, demanding a review under its environmental and social safeguard policies. They have exchanged hundreds of letters with the Bank; held meetings in Peshawar, Islamabad, and online. They also informed international bodies, including UN institutions, and engaged local authorities. Meanwhile, jirgas (a gathering of elders) were held from Madyan to Kalam. A massive demonstration took place on August 23, 2024, in the town of Bahrain; youth marched again a month later. Press conferences in Swat and Islamabad generated national attention, and even children have written petitions to the prime minister.

According to international law and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, no project can proceed without Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). Yet, the Torwalis have complained about rushed hearings, inaccessible documents, procedural shortcuts, and bureaucratic coercion — none of which constitute real consent.

And their opposition was clear from the start. Already in July 2023, when the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organization (PEDO) and the provincial environmental authorities held the first “public hearing,” people attended in large numbers. Yet, a “No Objection Certificate” was issued, despite attendees’ protests.

There have also been a series of threats and intimidation against community members opposing the project. Local authorities and government staff have threatened activists and local village officials with possible imprisonment and surveillance of their family members. Some activists were framed and accused of working against national interests. As a result, in the affected villages, there is a climate of fear, and some are choosing to avoid voicing their concerns out of fear of being targeted.

Additionally, the World Bank has failed to recognize the indigeneity of the Torwali peoples, leading to flawed impact assessments and a lack of information disclosure in the local Torwali language. As a result of the movement’s sustained efforts, in June 2025, the World Bank commissioned a new screening to determine whether the Torwali qualify as Indigenous people under its policy, an unprecedented step in this region. Almost a year later, however, it has not shared the findings with the community.

But for the Torwalis, there can be no doubts about their indigeneity. Their identity is inseparable from the mountains they inhabit, the rivers they honor, the pastures they graze, and the ancestral systems they still practice. Their language — Indo-Aryan with some pre-Aryan and Gandharan elements — is shaped by their interaction with the landscape: there is a word for every cliff, rock, ravine, stream, meadow, and pass. Even today, Torwalis living in the cities of Karachi, Hyderabad, or Rawalpindi continue to call their region watan, a word deeper than “homeland.” A proverb expresses this bond: “tu watan ge ke bedu, watan ma wad.” It means “your body may reside elsewhere, but your heart belongs to the homeland.”

Whether or not the movement to save the Swat River will ultimately prevail, this movement has already achieved something profound: it has reaffirmed that Indigenous rights and environmental justice are inseparable; that rivers have rights because communities have relationships; and that development must be accountable to those who bear its consequences.

As the Pakistani poet Allama Iqbal reminds us, “A drop of dew is enough to make this soil fertile again.” The resistance of the Torwali people is that drop of dew: an act of dignity, unity, and courage in the face of imposed development. And as long as the Swat River flows, they will continue to defend it.

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Archived

China’s desperation for raw materials to make plastics has driven US ethane exports to record levels, even as the two countries are locked in disputes over everything from Iran to semiconductors.

The Iran war has disrupted oil supplies around the world, leading to a shortage of the petrochemical feedstock naphtha, made from crude and produced in the Middle East.

The shortage has pushed refineries in China, the largest plastics manufacturer in the world, to import more ethane, a cheaper alternative and an abundant byproduct of US natural gas production, to help make everything from water bottles to car parts.

[...]

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Last week, Italian authorities issued expulsion orders for eight Chinese nationals from Schengen territory on national security grounds. According to news reports, three have been deported immediately, while four others had already left the Italian territory. One individual reportedly remains in custody on grounds of a pending asylum application.

Archived

The decision comes after years of investigations into relentless surveillance, harassment and threats against prominent Chinese dissident and influencer Teacher Li.

Safeguard Defenders previously published a partial account of the ongoing transnational repression campaign against him. From online smears, doxxing, surveillance and threats against his parents, to mass questioning of his followers across China: much of the campaign is conducted (from) within China’s borders. But not all...

For over three years, physical efforts to locate, intimidate and pressure Teacher Li into giving up his activities and return to China also took place across the Italian territory.

[...]

In response to the decision, Teacher Li states:

Over the past three years, my team and I have steadfastly upheld press freedom, documenting and disseminating social events within China that are censored domestically.

Simultaneously, we have endured prolonged transnational repression by the Chinese government. Myself, my team, and our families have faced persistent and comprehensive harassment, threats, and violations.

We are heartened to see the Italian government take action against China's overseas repression. This represents not only protection for us, but also the defense of fundamental democratic principles and the rule of law.

We sincerely thank the Italian government for all its efforts, and we also thank Safeguard Defenders for their sustained attention, documentation, and support throughout these incidents."

[...]

The expulsion decision marks the first decisive action against the CCP’s ongoing transnational repression operations on Italian soil. In Fall 2022, our global reports on “Chinese overseas police service centers” showed how Italy was a prime target for the CCP’s [Chinese Communist Party's] transnational repression and foreign interference operations – at least in part due to its cooperation with China’s Ministry of Public Security through joint police patrols, readily execution of INTERPOL warrants requested by China and extraditions.

[...]

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Op-ed by Barbara Magalhães Teixeira and Jiayi Zhou. Both are researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Archived

[...]

The USA, China and Russia—today’s great powers—have all developed ambitions to access, secure and even capture overseas resources and the associated markets in the name of strategic interests. They have deployed a series of instruments that include well-established channels of economic diplomacy through legitimate investments that provide local development benefits. But, increasingly, violent resource appropriation and territorial control have also become features of the wider great power resource scramble that can be characterized as new mercantilism-driven geopolitics.

The risks associated with this increasingly mercantilist approach are particularly pronounced for resource-rich lower-income countries, which have less leverage and institutional capacity in financial, technological and even military terms to set the conditions of their own resource exploitation. At a time of reduced multilateral safeguards, such countries must balance opportunities to capitalize on this race for raw materials while avoiding the fate of those that have already become its casualties. This essay explores the growing trend towards resource mercantilism among the great powers and lays out some of the resulting perils that face the global rest.

[...]

China has pursued a long-term state-led strategy to secure overseas energy and mineral supplies to fuel its economic growth and industrial development. Chinese overseas investments in and imports from resource-rich lower-income countries have been concentrated in extractive sectors. Concerns have been raised by the potentially military-capable infrastructure and ports that China has constructed in several countries through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which serve China’s combined geostrategic and natural resource interests.

[...]

Russia has been using its oil and gas exports as instruments of political coercion for several years, as well as a way to finance its military aggression abroad. It continues to project power through its commodity exports—not only oil and gas but also agricultural products—while pursuing economic fortification through an import substitution policy in place since at least 2015.

[...]

Russia has attempted to realize this aim [of becoming a major exporter in mineral markets] not only through domestic extraction but also through violent resource appropriation. It has already started integrating Ukrainian territories it has occupied or illegally annexed into its industrial strategies for energy, mineral and food production and export. State actors have engaged in systematic destruction, disruption and even theft in sectors where Ukraine is a competitor for global markets.

[...]

The USA’s stated intention of appropriating Venezuelan oil and gas and its posturing on Greenland’s resources are any indication [of a similar approach of resource mercantilism as Russia's]. There are also concerns about resource-securing motives in China’s activities in disputed territories in the East and South China Seas.

Overseas resource extraction is transactional by nature, but as coercive forms of resource diplomacy are increasingly utilized, this could very plausibly lead to a race to the bottom, as great powers leverage power asymmetries—economic, political and military—to secure resources, potentially at the partner country’s expense.

[...]

The case of Ukraine clearly illustrates today’s great power resource mercantilism, with Russia’s violent resource appropriation on the one hand, and the highly unbalanced 2025 Ukrainian–US minerals deal on the other. The latter was publicly portrayed as an opportunity for Ukraine to secure more foreign investment. However, the implicit threat of losing US security assistance ultimately shaped the deal’s terms, and the few mining concessions that have since been negotiated have privileged the interests of US oligarchs.

[...]

At the same time, resource-rich low-income countries are not entirely without agency. Although the earlier ‘race to the top’ provided more favourable bargaining conditions, competition among external powers can still, in certain cases, create opportunities to renegotiate contracts, diversify partnerships or extract greater fiscal benefits. For example, Ghana, Indonesia, Namibia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have all used export restrictions to promote domestic processing of minerals, to retain more value within their own economies. Other major mineral exporters in the developing world—including Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Peru and Zambia—have also significantly increased mineral export taxes, mining taxes, royalties, deposits and other fees. In 2024 the DRC also successfully renegotiated elements of the 2008 Sicomines agreement with China.

[...]

Rivalry among external actors [over resources in low-income countries] can still expand the bargaining space available for producer countries. However, such agency depends heavily on institutional capacity—the technical and administrative ability to negotiate contracts, enforce regulations and manage revenues. In addition, while domestic processing does help to retain value within producer states, it does not resolve and can even exacerbate many of the related environmental and social challenges of extractive activities. Meanwhile, official development assistance (ODA), which supported institutional capacity-building, the promotion of inclusive development and the strengthening of ESG-related safeguards, is seeing dramatic cuts.

[...]

In this context, what precautions might be realistic for resource-rich low-income countries? Maintaining diversified geopolitical partnerships can help to preserve bargaining space and strategic flexibility, but in a more heavily securitized and resource mercantilist world, the options to do so may be increasingly limited. Producer states can strengthen their hand through actions at the domestic level. Reinforcing domestic institutional capacity—particularly in contract negotiation, revenue management and regulatory oversight—can reduce vulnerability to external pressure. Greater transparency in resource governance can limit elite capture, improve accountability and increase local development gains.

In addition, actors such as the EU are still formulating their own strategies in the face of great power resource mercantilism. If they are interested in safeguarding a more inclusive, equitable global order, they should continue to support multilateral, rules-based and sustainable development-centred approaches to the governance of natural resources.

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Archived

Here is the report: Unseen and unaccountable: The growing threat of China’s squid fleet in the South Pacific - (pdf)

  • A new report from U.K.-based NGO the Environmental Justice Foundation draws on interviews with 81 fishers, mainly Indonesian sailors who worked between 2021 and 2025 on 60 Chinese vessels targeting jumbo flying squid (Dosidicus gigas) in the Southeast Pacific Ocean.
  • It documents frequent labor abuses affecting crew members, including several indicators of forced labor as described by the International Labour Organization.
  • The report also documents regular shark finning, targeted hunting of marine mammals, and involvement in suspected illegal fishing incidents, often inside Ecuador, Peru or Chile’s exclusive economic zones.
  • The report was launched days before the annual meeting of the commission of the South Pacific Regional Fishery Management Organisation, the intergovernmental body that manages the fishery. Officials with fishing organizations mentioned in the report and members of China’s delegation to the meeting did not respond to Mongabay’s request for comment on the report.

[...]

Labor abuses including violence, debt bondage and withheld wages and medical care, overfishing, shark finning, marine mammal killings: A new report exposes bad practices and a weak regulatory framework governing the jumbo flying squid fishery in the Southeast Pacific Ocean. The report was launched on Feb. 19, just days before the annual meeting of the commission of the South Pacific Regional Fishery Management Organisation (SPRFMO), the intergovernmental body that manages the fishery.

[...]

In some cases the capture of sharks and marine mammals was accidental, according to the testimonies; in others it was intentional. Some videos show fishers finning sharks — cutting fins off living sharks, then throwing them into the sea to die. Shark fins are an expensive delicacy in some Asian countries.

[...]

“He complained that he was sick, but he wasn’t allowed to leave,” an Indonesian fisher EJF interviewed in September 2025 said, recounting the two months of illness that preceded the death of one of his colleagues at sea in April. “He was forced to work,” the fisher said, “became severe in February” and “wasn’t allowed to leave.”

[...]

Dismal labor conditions and illegal fishing by China’s fleet have been documented in several news reports from recent years, including by Mongabay and The New Yorker, as well as in reports by EJF and other organizations.

[...]

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  • In complete secrecy, Iranian authorities bought FindFace, a Russian facial recognition software, in 2019, as confirmed by contracts obtained by Forbidden Stories and its partners.
  • FindFace can identify faces in public spaces in a matter of seconds and run them through databases maintained by the regime's security services.
  • The Iranian security apparatus is attempting to conceal this acquisition with shell companies.
  • Several security agencies are involved, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence.

...

[An investigation] reveals the Iranian regime’s widespread use of a particularly powerful Russian facial recognition software ... This software has potentially devastating consequences for people who want to take to the streets again.

During the recent protests, Iranians suspected that the authorities had such a repressive tool at their disposal, as evidenced by several similar videos from Iran. In one of them, a hooded man dressed in black climbs a pole and strikes a surveillance camera perched several metres above the ground. It falls to pieces. Below, a crowd of demonstrators cheers the climber on [you'll see video about it in the linked article].

The women and men behind these brave acts of sabotage conceal their faces with surgical masks, scarves, or hoods — for good reason. In the summer of 2022, the Iranian authorities announced the use of facial recognition in public spaces, particularly to monitor women’s attire.

...

In December 2023, a journalist from Khorasan, a media outlet with close ties to the government, posted a photo on Instagram of a control screen from the subway’s surveillance camera network in Mashhad, the second most populous city in Iran, with more than 3 million inhabitants, and a holy site for Shia Muslims.

“Photos of everyone passing in front of these cameras are displayed on large screens along with their age and gender. Can the municipality explain the purpose of this?” he wrote, not providing any other information.

On March 14, 2025, the UN Independent International Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran published a report condemning the “far-reaching use of technology to restrict freedom of expression.” The report also cited “new facial recognition software [that] was reportedly installed in April 2024 at the entrance gate of the Amirkabir University of Technology in Tehran.”

...

Using an image of a face captured on the subway platform in Tehran or Mashhad, authorities equipped with the Iranian version of FindFace can compile lists of each targeted individual’s dozens of relatives. Called “interaction tracking” by the Russian company, Iranian officials kept the function.

“This system not only detects their faces and movements, but also creates a ‘social map’ of their friends and relationships, along with other information such as license plates,” said Nima Fatemi, founder of Kandoo, an NGO working on cybersecurity for vulnerable populations, after consulting the confidential documents. “It allows you to track the targeted person’s movements and monitor everyone, everywhere. It is a centralized tool for learning who is who and how individuals are connected.”

...

FindFace was developed by the Russian company Ntechlab, founded in 2015. Through the holding company Rostec, Ntechlab sits at the heart of Russia’s military-industrial and technological apparatus. Rostec “reports to the Ministry of Defense and is headed by Mr. Chemesov, a close associate of Vladimir Putin,” according to Julien Nocetti, a researcher at the Center for Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategy at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and specialist in Russia and digital technology. NtechLab has become a veritable “national technology laboratory” since the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, according to Nocetti. After the large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Rostec became directly attached to the presidential administration. Ntechlab was sanctioned by the EU in July 2023 for “serious human rights violations in Russia” and blacklisted by the US in December 2024 for actions “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” But the company continues to promote its products, such as FindFace, which is notably used to track independent journalists and supporters of Alexei Navalny, Putin's former main opponent. In July 2022, Business Insider revealed that NtechLab had more than 1,100 clients in more than 60 countries, including major Western companies and “government agencies.” Today, the company reports it has sold FindFace and other products to “400 major customers” in 34 different countries. But the Islamic Republic of Iran is missing from the company’s website.

Web archived link

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Archived

Download full report: China's Financial and Fiscal Decay (pdf)

[...]

There is a widening gap between Beijing’s targets (and data measuring economic performance) and the actual capacity of China’s policymakers to support domestic demand with the tools at their disposal. The best description for the weakness of China’s domestic economy at this point is not crisis or collapse but prolonged decay—the declining efficiency and effectiveness of policy tools, producing weaker economic growth as a result.

The roots of this decay can be found in China’s fiscal and financial systems. Beijing primarily influences the domestic economy through controls on the direction of domestic credit and government spending. But the overextension of these tools for political purposes over the past two decades has exhausted their effectiveness and capacity to guide China’s economy today. The financial system lends rising proportions of a smaller volume of new credit to unproductive local government and state-owned enterprises simply to prevent them from collapsing, while fiscal spending is largely executed via those same indebted institutions. The net result is a declining payoff in terms of investment and economic activity for the same volume of lending or fiscal spending, while private sector investment remains weak. As production outstrips domestic demand, domestic prices fall and surplus output must be sold abroad, widening China’s external imbalances.

[...]

China’s domestic economy will remain weak this year, and export performance will be far more important for cyclical activity. China will unveil policies to support economic growth—interest rate cuts, special or single-purpose bond issues for fiscal spending, capital injections for banks—but none of these will provide anything more than a temporary break from previous trendlines toward deflation and economic stagnation.

[...]

Banks are finding fewer clients willing to borrow at interest rates above 3% [which is China's loan prime rate, or LPR for short]. The more significant change is that this actually reflects a rising proportion of lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and a declining proportion of lending to private enterprises. SOEs can typically pressure banks more effectively to reduce borrowing rates, particularly local SOEs and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). The rise in the proportion of loans extended at or below the LPR points to the declining efficiency of the banking system in financing productive investments—the data has been consistent for years that state firms are far less efficient than private firms.

[...]

The bottom line is that China’s commercial banks have been lending to the same borrowers in recent years, but even less efficiently. They are producing less investment growth with fewer loans, and generating lower profits per loan, and lower profits overall. That declining profitability will impact their capacity to recapitalize out of retained earnings and make more new loans, which means that investment growth and economic growth will stay weak.

[...]

The deterioration in China’s fiscal conditions in 2025 was arguably more severe than the decay within the financial system. Tax revenues rose by 0.8% for the full year after a 3.4% decline in 2024, but non-tax revenues declined by 11.3%, after local governments were scolded for aggressively collecting one-off fines from businesses and entrepreneurs. The total decline in fiscal revenues was 1.7% outright. But as a proportion of GDP, tax and non-tax revenues fell nearly a full percentage point in 2025 to only 15.4%. This remains among the lowest recorded levels of the world’s economies (below Mexico and Colombia among OECD nations), and well-below OECD averages in the range of 34%.

[...]

The decline in investment activity along with falling domestic producer prices directly impacts China’s tax base and the capacity to collect taxes. Interestingly, the Ministry of Finance did crack down on underreporting of individual income taxes in 2025, and produced an 11.5% rise in individual income taxes for the year. But these only represented around 9% of China’s total tax intake.

[...]

The net result was a rapidly expanding overall government deficit, including both central and local government spending, reaching 9.0% of GDP for the full year [...] Should revenues continue declining in 2026, the deficit could widen to 9.5-10.0% of GDP this year. China can continue to finance widening deficits, but the commercial banks themselves are doing so. Hence there is little difference between fiscal spending and policy-driven lending within the Chinese system—they are executed by the same entities (local SOEs and LGFVs), and financed via the same banks, either in the form of a government bond or a loan. The only practical difference is the interest rate or profit to the banks.

[...]

The most important implication of all of these developments is that the era of fiscal trade-offs has already arrived, and the stress is deepening. 2025 was more difficult than 2024, and this year will likely be more difficult than 2025. Beijing’s spending capacity or wherewithal in absolute terms is declining. The channels through which Beijing can utilize that capacity are increasingly inefficient in generating growth as well. This is what fiscal and financial decay looks like based on the granular data within the Chinese system.

[...]

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Archived

China’s progress in building a modern economy, evident in its kung-fu fighting robots and self-parking cars, is hitting limits as a downturn in its housing industry drags on, small businesses suffer and young people struggle to find jobs.

The gap between Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s high-tech, artificial intelligence-driven ambitions and the hard realities of slowing growth is the backdrop for the annual meeting of the country’s largely ceremonial national legislature, the National People’s Congress, which begins Thursday.

During the meetings, which draw about 3,000 deputies to Beijing, top leaders will outline China’s annual target for growth and the congress will endorse a five-year blueprint of policy priorities until 2030.

“What we’ll see is the trade-off between whether it’s going to be industry and tech, or looking after domestic demand,” said Alexander Davey, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies. “These are the two priorities that are juggling for Xi Jinping right now.”

China’s economy is losing momentum

In a city in southern China’s Guangdong, families were cutting back on big purchases during last month’s Lunar New Year holidays. Even for auspicious houseplants like orchids, used as a symbol of abundance and prosperity, prices were slashed by as much as 40% from last year.

The penny pinching has small business owners complaining about hard times.

[...]

The relatively robust pace of growth was supported by strong manufacturing as exports surged, despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff hikes and other disruptions to trade.

[...]

“Hitting the 2025 growth target is hardly reassuring as the Chinese economy is losing growth momentum, with rising imbalances and enormous structural problems being papered over by a surge in export-driven growth,” Eswar Prasad, a professor of economics and trade policy at Cornell University, told The Associated Press in emailed comments.

[...]

A downturn in China’s housing market began several years ago and piecemeal efforts to revive the industry have made only fitful progress. Dozens of property developers defaulted on their debts as authorities cracked down on excessive borrowing. With overall home prices down 20% or more from 2021, a recovery remains elusive.

The meltdown in one of the country’s biggest industries eliminated hundreds of thousands of jobs and with 12.7 million graduates entering the job market this year, more than 16% of young Chinese are unemployed. Some just are giving up and opting out of the rat race, or “lying flat.”

Families whose main assets are their homes have grown cautious about spending, weakening consumer demand and confounding longstanding efforts to shift the economy to greater reliance on domestic investment.

[...]

China sticks to exports

Reliance on exports is what help keeps China’s economy buzzing, at least for now. China recorded a $1.2 trillion trade surplus in 2025, as exports kept its factories humming. Despite the China-U.S. trade war, it has been shipping more to regions including Europe and Latin America. But it’s facing pushback from its trading partners.

Under leader Xi, China has prioritized developing advanced technologies such as AI, robotics, computer chips, electric vehicles and renewable energy. Massive state support has companies churning out more EVs, TVs, solar panels and other products than China and its trading partners need.

“To achieve those goals, the government is going to have to continue to provide subsidies and preferential support for high-tech and strategic industries,” said Leah Fahy, a China economist at Capital Economics. “(That) will, in turn, continue to fuel overcapacity.”

[...]

Over the past few decades, China’s transformation into a manufacturing superpower was underpinned by booming construction of homes, office buildings, roads, ports and railways. But tech supply chains are narrower, providing fewer jobs. So the trickle down effect is much weaker, said Lynn Song, chief economist for Greater China at ING Bank.

“If anything, the more successful the so-called future industries become, the more they will draw resources away from the traditional sectors that still provide the bulk of employment and livelihoods for most people,” said Henry Gao, a professor of law at Singapore Management University.

[...]

Xi is expected to consolidate more power

The annual congress is an impressive show. Thousands of delegates fill the Great Hall of the People in central Beijing. A military band performs and delegates from various ethnic groups attend in traditional clothing.

For all the pomp, the meeting is largely a set piece. The congress lasts only one week and its near-unanimous votes on the final day formalize decisions made ahead of time by party leaders. It’s a show of unity reaffirming the polices and direction they have set.

Increasingly that leadership has centered on one person, Xi, who has consolidated power since taking the helm in 2012. Now 72, he is one of modern China’s most powerful leaders. Some analysts think Xi will emulate Mao Zedong, the revolutionary leader who founded communist China, and rule for life.

Annual reports presented at the congress are replete with references to the party’s crucial role, “with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.”

[...]

11
 
 

This is an op-ed by Martin Moore, senior lecturer in Political Communication Education and Director of the Centre for the Study of Media, Communication, and Power at King’s College London; and Thomas Colley, senior visiting research fellow in War Studies at King’s College London and senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

Archived

US President Donald Trump thrives on unpredictability. One day he will warn the world that the United States is about to impose punishing tariffs. The next he will send American troops to depose a foreign leader. The one after he will threaten to attack the territory of an ally [...] If his ambiguous threats and arbitrary punishments disorient, confuse, and cow other nations, so his logic goes, they will increase America’s power.

[...]

Yet the real beneficiary is China because Trump’s belligerent, volatile, chaotic approach fits perfectly with the narratives that the Chinese Communist Party has been nurturing for years. For over a decade, China has pursued a systematic and global campaign to “tell its story well.” The hero of its story is the CCP, portrayed as an enlightened ruler that has brought order and prosperity to China and more recently to the world. In diplomacy it professes no desire to interfere with state sovereignty (providing its own is respected) and only seeks “win-win outcomes” through partnership and trade. Across state news outlets, social media, and even state-approved children’s bedtime stories, China brings peace and prosperity; its international investments through the Belt and Road Initiative are the benevolent Xi Jinping’s “gift to the world.”

In the CCP-constructed version of reality, the United States is the global villain. Washington is a militaristic, destabilizing international actor that seeks not partnership but subjugation. Its political system is not democratic but plutocratic (ruled for the 1 percent, not the 99). When it does not get its way internationally, it imposes it by force—be it in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, or more recently Venezuela.

[...]

The CCP’s propaganda wins extend to domestic US politics too, where every street protest, ICE killing, or government shutdown reinforces Beijing’s claims that its political system brings stability and growth while US-style democracy brings dysfunction and division. In Trump’s reality, that disorder is a means to an end—an authoritarian-populist doom loop in which he portrays “American carnage” so that he can position himself as the country’s only savior. But for Beijing, it is ammunition for an alternative reality that it has been promoting enthusiastically: that China is now the preeminent force for global order and the “democracy” the world should emulate.

[...]

To many this may read as Orwellian Doublespeak—dictatorship = democracy. By most indicators—freedom of expression, judicial independence, individual human rights, repression of minorities—China is a world-leading dictatorship, not a world-leading democracy. Yet the CCP claims that, unlike the US, China’s political system is genuinely responsive to people’s needs. The party says that it maintains a constant dialogue with the public and is always sensitive to public sentiment. So even if Chinese citizens cannot vote for their leaders (apart from local elections where they can select from a clutch of party-approved CCP candidates), democracy with “Chinese characteristics” is superior to US democracy because the CCP actually represents the Chinese people.

[...]

The result of this is unlikely to be that global citizens start believing that China is democratic. But that is not the CCP’s priority. What it wants more—and appears to be achieving—is to minimize international criticism of its political system and its actions. Across much of the Global South, and indeed in the West, it is becoming increasingly rare to read news about domestic repression in China, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, or popular protests across China’s vast hinterland. People are more likely to read about the latest Trump threat or his latest slur about their country than news critical of Beijing.

Yet Trump risks giving China an even greater victory. One of the CCP’s longstanding aims has been to marginalize Western ideas like individual human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly in Chinese political discourse and international diplomacy. In showing open contempt for these values at home and abroad, Trump is giving China a bigger propaganda victory than the CCP’s often bland propaganda could ever have achieved by itself. In Trump’s reality he is making America great again. But in actual reality he is doing far more to make China great again.

[...]

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The EU has imposed tighter border controls on imports of a baby milk ingredient from China after it was singled out as the source of a major contamination scare, according to a text published this week.

Archived

The toxin cereulide, which can cause nausea and diarrhoea, was first detected in December in batches of formula containing arachidonic acid oil, triggering recalls in dozens of countries.

The deaths of three infants are suspected to be linked to the consumption of recalled infant formula in France where authorities have launched a probe.

The European Commission said in its Official Journal that it was "necessary to provide for an increased level of official controls and special conditions in relation to the importation of consignments of arachidonic acid oil from China".

Consignments entering the bloc from China will need an official certificate showing they have been tested and found to be cereulide toxin-free.

To account for shipments that may have already left China, the commission said for the next two months half of the consignments entering the bloc from the Asian powerhouse should be physically checked.

Manufacturers including European giants like Nestle, Danone and Lactalis, have recalled formula in more than 60 countries including several EU states since December.

[...]

The EU did not name any company but the Wuhan, China-based firm Cabio Biotech has come under scrutiny as the supplier of the ingredient suspected of being tainted.

[...]

2008 China milk powder scandal

It is not the first time that China is mentioned in relation to baby milk safety standards. The 2008 Chinese baby milk powder scandal laid bare deep flaws in that country’s food safety oversight and corporate responsibility.

In September that year it emerged that infant formula, chiefly produced by the Sanlu Group, had been adulterated with melamine, an industrial chemical added to diluted milk to falsify protein readings in quality tests.

More than 300,000 infants were affected, tens of thousands were admitted to hospital with kidney stones and other renal damage, and at least six deaths were officially linked to the contamination.

Investigations later showed that Sanlu had received consumer complaints months earlier but failed to halt production or swiftly inform higher authorities, while regulators did not detect or disclose the problem in time.

The scandal triggered a massive recall, the withdrawal of thousands of tonnes of dairy products, and import bans on Chinese dairy, severely undermining confidence in the country’s food exports.

In the aftermath, Chinese parents increasingly turned to foreign-made baby formula, prompting China to import large quantities of baby milk powder and contributing to shortages and rationing measures in several European countries.

[...]

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Archived

  • Protest increased markedly in 2025. The China Dissent Monitor (CDM) logged 1,363 dissent events in the fourth quarter of 2025, an 8 percent year-on-year increase. CDM counted 5,343 events in total during 2025, a 44 percent rise over the 3,704 events documented in 2024. In the fourth quarter of 2025, workers led more than half of protest events (54 percent), followed by property owners (22 percent), and rural residents (14 percent). The remainder were led by diverse groups such as victims of injury and their families, small business owners, investors, retirees, consumers, students, petitioners, and activists. The top provinces for protest events were Guangdong (16 percent), followed by Henan, Hunan, Shaanxi, and Zhejiang. CDM has logged a total of 14,347 cases of dissent since data collection began in June 2022.
  • Wage protests reach new peak. Labor protests over unpaid wages have risen before each Lunar New Year since 2023. During the four months before the 2026 holiday, CDM documented a 60 percent increase in such events compared to the same period a year ago. This new peak reflects a slowing Chinese economy and the rising number of firms that are unable to pay workers their due wages.
  • Widespread censorship of protest on Douyin. A CDM analysis of 2,970 Douyin posts about protest in China published from June to December 2025 found that two-thirds had been deleted. The highest rates of censorship are associated with posts about offline protests by petitioners, or by victims of injury and their families; posts about protests in Beijing or Xinjiang; and posts depicting authorities detaining or using violence against protesters.

[...]

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A decision not to charge a man who fathered children with a woman with a mental illness has set off a debate about rape, consent and China’s push for babies.

Archived

Years ago, a disheveled woman with signs of mental illness appeared in a village in northern China. One man decided to bring her home and, over the next 13 years, he had several children with her. He was later detained on suspicion of rape.

Recently, prosecutors reached a conclusion that stunned many Chinese. They determined that the woman’s mental illness left her unable to defend herself from sexual assault, but said the man had not committed any crime.

[...]

The decision in Heshun County, a rural area of Shanxi Province, provoked widespread outrage. On social media, critics said it suggested that when a sexual relationship produces children, the authorities are willing to overlook a woman’s possible lack of consent.

Further stoking anger was the fact that prosecutors did charge two other male villagers with raping her, specifically citing a doctor’s assessment that the woman, identified by her surname, Bu, had “no sexual self-defense capacity.”

The term comes from Chinese official guidelines about how to evaluate women with mental disorders who are potential victims of rape; it means that the woman has “lost the ability to recognize and protect her own right to sexual inviolability.” Chinese criminal law does not explicitly define sexual consent, but says that rape involves “violence, coercion or other means.”

[...]

For many women, the [Chinese] prosecutors’ decision confirmed their fears about how far the government will go to promote childbearing. As China’s birthrate plunges, the government told women to see starting a family as a patriotic duty. Marital rape is not defined as a crime in China. (Prosecutors said the man, identified by the surname Zhang, held a wedding celebration for himself and Ms. Bu but did not say if they were ever legally married.)

[...]

Ms. Bu’s story first came to light in 2024, when a woman in Heshun contacted a blogger who specializes in helping Chinese people find lost relatives. The woman said that her uncle had been living with a woman — who was known only as Hua Hua — for over a decade, but no one in the family knew anything about her background.

The blogger soon announced that he had discovered Hua Hua’s birth family. Her surname was Bu and, 13 years earlier, she left her home in the city of Jinzhong, 90 miles away. At the time she disappeared, she was a 32-year-old university graduate who had been hospitalized multiple times for schizophrenia, her brother told Chinese news outlets. Her family had reported her missing.

According to a government investigation, Ms. Bu eventually arrived in Heshun County, where she encountered Mr. Zhang. He “took her in,” the police initially said.

On social media, people accused the police of using a euphemism for human trafficking or illegal detention.

[...]

The government has long turned a blind eye to the trafficking of women, especially because of the country’s surplus of tens of millions of men, many of whom cannot find wives.

“For women with mental disabilities, whether or not rape has occurred no longer depends on their capacity for consent, but rather on whether the other party has successfully packaged the sexual relationship within a seemingly normal, stable and socially acceptable relationship,” a lawyer, Yan Senlin, wrote in a post that was later censored.

[...]

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Archived

According to the documents posted online, the “digital profile” system will be a vast repository of information about individual foreign nationals and stateless persons entering, exiting, and residing in Russia. Various federal agencies will be required to feed their existing data on foreigners into a single, centralized database operated by the Interior Ministry.

Officials will compile a unique dossier for every foreigner, assigning a “trust level” based on the availability of the individual’s biometric data (photos and fingerprints).

[...]

The authorities are already collecting biometric personal data from visiting foreigners. Since the start of 2025, foreigners’ access to Russian phone numbers has been restricted to those who create an account on the State Services online portal and visit a bank to submit photographs and voice recordings in person. Since December 1, 2024, foreigners landing at Moscow airports have also been required to provide biometric data (including fingerprints) upon entry.

Officials record a wide range of information, from the basics such as name, birthdate, gender, citizenship, phone number, and email address, to details as specific as the medical condition for which a visitor was denied entry into the country. (Russia prohibits entry to foreigners carrying any of 16 diseases considered dangerous to the public, ranging from HIV to coronavirus infections.) Foreigners’ digital profiles will also document all family ties, with separate dossiers for immediate family members, including children.

[...]

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Archived

purge that raises concerns about the country’s stability. President Xi has sacked his most senior general and political confidant, Zhang Youxia, apparently in connection with corruption allegations and, according to some reports, for betraying nuclear secrets to the United States.

As a result of the clean-out, China’s central military commission, the body that controls its armed forces on behalf of the Communist party, now has only two out of seven of its original ­members still in place: Mr Xi himself and a general who has ­overseen the purges.

[...]

The official explanation in most of the cases is a crackdown on corruption in the procurement of weapons, or profiting from the sale of commissions to ambitious young officers. But in closed authoritarian societies, corruption charges are ­often used by nervous leaders to neutralise rivals.

[...]

Certainly the timing of the move, coming hard on the heels of the Davos gathering of business and political leaders, is striking. The divisions between the US and Europe, exposed in public and private, suggested that a significant number of western participants anticipate a future rupture in Nato. While the immediate prospect of a hostile takeover of Greenland by the Trump administration appears to have been set aside for now, there is nonetheless deep scepticism in Europe and ­elsewhere about the reliability of the US as the ­primary guarantor of western security. The point was made most clearly in Davos by Mark Carney, the prime minister of Canada, who had just flown in to the Swiss ski resort from China.

Much of this thinking leans heavily on the imagined stability and reliability of China in comparison with the unpredictability of Mr Trump and his lieutenants. But western powers should be aware that the more they distance themselves from Washington, the more they risk creeping subordination to China. When European elites talk in glowing terms about China’s environmental policies and technological prowess, they are making false assumptions about its political robustness.

[...]

The friction within China’s elites reflects tensions nationally, caused by relatively low growth, a weak property market, pressures on wages, lay-offs and high youth unemployment. The corruption in the military top brass also mirrors systemic corruption in wider society.

China’s dictatorship is not a satisfactory haven for Trump sceptics.

[...]

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Guan Heng, who exposed human rights abuses in his native China, has been in U.S. custody since being swept up in an immigration enforcement operation in August. He says he dares not even think about what would happen to him if he were sent back.

“I would be prosecuted, I would be jailed, I would be tortured. All of that could happen,” Guan, 38, told The Associated Press in a recent call from the Broome County Correctional Facility in New York.

A judge on Monday is to consider his appeal to remain in the United States, where he sought asylum after fleeing his homeland more than four years ago to publish video footage of detention facilities in China’s Xinjiang region.

The Department of Homeland Security initially sought to deport him to Uganda, but dropped the plan in December after his plight raised public concerns and attracted attention on Capitol Hill. But his future remains unclear.

[...]

Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, a member of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, has urged Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to release Guan and approve his asylum request.

In a statement to the AP on Friday in reference to Guan's case, the Illinois Democrat called for “careful adherence to due process and America’s long-standing commitment to protecting human rights whistleblowers.”

Immigrants can apply for asylum when there’s a fear of harm back home because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49043370

Archived

Full report download

[...]

The investigation identified the following major labor issues:

  • Employment of workers aged 16 without legally required special protections
  • Blank or incomplete labor contracts
  • Nominal and inadequate onboarding “training”
  • Unclear and inconsistently applied resignation procedures
  • Excessive use of labor dispatch beyond legal limits
  • Overtime far exceeding legal limits, including unpaid meetings
  • Wage deductions and lack of overtime pay for dispatched workers
  • Fines and penalties imposed for minor infractions
  • Verbal sexual harassment by management
  • Absence of paid leave, including sick leave
  • Unrealistic production targets
  • Lack of social insurance and statutory benefits
  • Unhygienic food and living conditions
  • Occupational health and safety deficiencies
  • Inadequate fire safety and emergency preparedness
  • Absence of labor union and grievance mechanisms
  • Recruitment discrimination
  • Difficulty obtaining reimbursement for pre-paid medical expenses

While no child labor was identified, the factory employed workers aged 16 as long-term production workers under the same conditions as adults, without providing the special protections required under Chinese law.

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48982720

Archived

The president of Chile, who will leave office on March 11, is an unusual figure in his political sphere. EL PAÍS spoke with him in three meetings. He will work from the opposition and could run again in four years

[...]

"Democratic politics is not about heroism, but about consistency, responsibility, and a real transformation of people’s living conditions. I can give inflammatory speeches, find antagonists, promise anything, but if the quality of life doesn’t improve, it’s irrelevant."

"Strangely, in Latin America at least, there were sectors that were unable to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine [...] What I saw was that one country was invading another sovereign nation with the intention of seizing its territory, violating international law. And that — regardless of the political affiliation of the current leader of Ukraine and the permanent leader of Russia — was wrong.”

[...]

[Boric's] outspoken stance against Venezuela and Nicaragua made him a favorite target of Nicolás Maduro’s regime. However, he criticizes Trump’s operation to arrest the Chavista leader: “That a foreign state would attempt to exert direct control over Venezuelan territory, administer the country, and, eventually, as its president [Trump] indicated, continue military operations until imposing a political transition, sets an extremely dangerous precedent for regional and global stability.”

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48930044

Archived

Russia’s military and aviation manufacturing machine has been functioning throughout its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has surprised some. For example, the Russian defense industry has been creating and selling Su-35s to Iran and other equipment to various allies. However, according to an exclusive document we acquired, the costs the manufacturers set for some jet components are not competitive, having increased by almost 200% at a time when Russian economic stability is wavering.

The contract in question concerns China, one of Russia's larger and more reliable trading partners for military equipment. If Moscow refuses to sell these goods at the price Beijing originally expected, the China-Russia relationship could deteriorate, and Russia risks its reputation, while profits would be significantly reduced. This shows Russia is facing difficult decisions: reputation and cooperation vs profit.

[...]

The letter we have acquired concerns a pricing dispute. It is internal correspondence, dated March 7th, 2025, from A.A. Kucherenko at the Russian state-controlled aircraft manufacturing corporation United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to A.V. Martynenko, director of the Second Moscow Instrument-Making Plant (2 MPZ) that produces aircraft instruments and sensors.

[...]

Other bodies mentioned in the documents are the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), which regulates arms exports and provides oversight to the export of these parts to China, and JSC “NASK,” a Russian export logistics and intermediary company.An application was started for procuring aviation parts for Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets as part of ongoing support for previously exported jets. The order in question is related to a contract signed on November 8, 2024, for “Foreign Customer 156.” This designation is how official Russian export documentation refers to China. The parts listed include pressure-measurement and relay systems required for the aircraft's operation and maintenance.

[...]

Essentially, this indicates that the parts for the jets are manufactured at a higher export cost than the one set in the 2016 deal, and are no longer competitive for buyers. The document states that costs have risen by 193.66% since 2022 and have exceeded contractual prices by 8.3 times. This pricing assessment was undertaken by JSC “NASK,” meaning there’s significant oversight of the manufacturing and pricing processes.

[...]

In the document, they explain that the higher prices could risk the contract altogether, and that:

“This customer reacts negatively to sharp price fluctuations, and an unjustified proposal to increase contractual prices will be regarded as an unwillingness to develop long-established, long-term partnership relations, which may ultimately lead to the failure to sign the planned contract.”

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48642311

Archived

[...]

China’s information warfare is as much about shaping, disciplining, and pre-empting domestic opinion as it is about manipulating foreign audiences, blurring the boundary between internal social management and external strategic communication.

[...]

Information Warfare as State Doctrine

China’s leadership regards information not as a neutral public good but as a strategic resource. Both the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) identify information dominance, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare as core apparatuses of contemporary conflict. Managing information flow, its framing, and emotional impact has thus become essential to maintaining internal legitimacy and projecting external influence.

Domestically, this manifests as strict control over media, academia, and digital platforms. The aim is not only to suppress dissent but to proactively shape public perception and cultivate national cohesion around Party-defined ideals. Internationally, these same principles inform Beijing’s influence operations outside its territory, state media outreach, and strategic communication campaigns, demonstrating that control of information, both within and beyond China’s borders, is integral to its national strategy.

[...]

Surveillance as the Operational Arm of Information Warfare

In Chinese strategic thought, surveillance is the operational backbone of information warfare. Technologies such as real-time facial recognition, digital identity systems, and algorithmic content filtering provide the infrastructure through which information warfare principles are embedded into daily governance.

[...]

Introduced under the National Credit Information Sharing Platform (NCISP) after the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006), the SCS was originally presented as a framework to enhance commercial trust and civic responsibility. In practice, it integrates judicial, administrative, and commercial data to rank individuals, corporations, and organisations based on their “trustworthiness.”

The SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

Rather than relying on a single numerical score, the SCS functions through blacklists and redlists. Those who violate regulations or fail to comply with court judgments are blacklisted, facing restrictions on employment, mobility, credit, and government services. Conversely, those considered exemplary citizens are rewarded with privileges. By 2022, official data indicated that over 7.2 million individuals had been designated “untrustworthy persons subject to enforcement,” illustrating the expanding reach of the system.

Beyond its regulatory function, the SCS operates as a narrative enforcement tool. It rewards those who echo state-sanctioned narratives and penalises those who question them, effectively linking political conformity with social mobility through preferential access to school admissions, employment opportunities, and access to cash loans and consumer credit. In this sense, the SCS embeds the doctrines of information warfare within domestic governance, using surveillance to convert ideological loyalty into measurable social capital and dissent into quantifiable risk.

[...]

Information Control Beyond Borders

China’s information warfare strategy does not stop at its borders. The same tools of surveillance and narrative management that govern domestic society are increasingly applied to global audiences. Through state media expansion, technology exports, academic collaborations, and coordinated online campaigns, Beijing seeks to influence external perceptions of its governance model and strategic intentions.

[...]

Diaspora communities have become specific targets of this strategy. Reports suggest that Chinese citizens abroad face pressure through family connections, social networks, or economic motivations, indicating how domestic surveillance practices can exert mental influence beyond national boundaries. The logic of the SCS, which links loyalty with trustworthiness, thus extends internationally, functioning both as a domestic control mechanism and a model for global narrative influence.

[...]

The Social Credit System stands at the intersection of surveillance and information warfare. It extends the logic of battlefield information dominance into civilian governance, transforming citizens into participants in a perpetual system of ideological evaluation and control.

[...]

For policymakers and scholars worldwide, China’s governance model offers a cautionary lesson. As technology amplifies state capacity for observation and prediction, the central question is not whether surveillance can be achieved—but whether it can be restrained. The equilibrium between security and dignity, control and freedom, will shape not only China’s political future but the global norms of digital governance in the twenty-first century.

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48461821

Archived

In mid-December 2025, officials from the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations paid a courtesy call on newly appointed Chinese ambassador to Manila, Jing Quan. After the usual pleasantries, the association’s chairman, Zhao Qiping, told Jing that overseas Chinese serve “as the most natural and stable link in the relationship” between China and the Philippines. He then went further, stressing that the association “has always maintained a firm stance on major issues and has always stood with the Chinese Embassy.”

Zhao vowed that his group would:

… continue to firmly support the one-China principle and resolutely oppose any separatist activities; under the guidance of the embassy, promote positive social values and unity within the overseas Chinese community; strengthen cultural exchanges, youth cooperation, and public welfare; uphold patriotic traditions; and continue to serve as a solid bridge between the embassy and overseas Chinese in the Philippines, taking concrete actions to safeguard the stability of the overseas Chinese community and the overall situation of China-Philippines friendship.

The Federation of Filipino-Chinese Associations – formally registered as the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Association of the Philippines Foundation, Inc. – is, based on business records, a non-stock corporation with a mix of Filipino and Chinese citizens among its officers. Its stated aim is “to promote and encourage good relations and camaraderie among Filipino-Chinese associations in the Philippines and its members.” It rarely appears in mainstream Philippine news coverage.

[...]

Yet in 2024, the federation sent a delegation to Hefei, the capital of China’s Anhui Province, where members met Zhang Ximing, a Standing Committee member of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee and head of the Anhui United Front Work Department (UFWD), along with other officials.

[...]

“United front work,” a long-standing instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), refers to a broad set of influence activities designed to advance the party’s political objectives domestically and overseas. The UFWD, in particular, works to co-opt or neutralize potential sources of opposition. It has been described by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a “magic weapon” for advancing the CCP’s goals abroad.

[...]

While the UFWD works to cultivate relationships with people of all ethnicities, overseas Chinese communities – regardless of citizenship – are a central focus of this effort.

Among the most sensitive issues Beijing seeks to control are public discussions of the One China policy and Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by China. In his New Year’s Eve address, Xi reiterated his commitment to reunification, declaring, “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable.” That message was preceded by two days of military drills around Taipei simulating the seizure and blockade of key areas, widely seen as a warning against what Beijing labels “separatist forces.”

[...]

This matters because China-Philippine relations today are defined by economic interdependence alongside strategic distrust. China is among the Philippines’ top trading partners, yet tensions in the South China Sea have deepened mistrust through overlapping claims, aggressive coast guard and militia actions, and concerns over sovereignty and international law. These dynamics have fueled growing public skepticism toward Beijing.

Despite this, the Philippines has yet to enact comprehensive laws addressing foreign interference and other forms of malign influence by external state actors. SeaLight’s James Carouso and Ray Powell – both of whom served in the U.S. Embassy in Australia – argued that Canberra’s experience offers a cautionary blueprint. “Australia’s parliament moved in 2018 when a series of interference scandals catalysed public opinion and legislative attention to produce the necessary call to action,” they wrote in an opinion piece recently published by the Australia Strategic Policy Institute. “The threat of foreign interference is not theoretical; it is happening now and the stakes for the Philippines are very high."

[...]

The challenge is protecting ethnically Chinese Philippine citizens – most of whom are patriotic Filipinos who have contributed immeasurably to the nation – from exploitation by a foreign adversary. Beijing’s United Front apparatus wants to further its goals on Taiwan and beyond through a highly developed state-directed influence network inside this politically and economically significant population.

[...]

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48368462

Iranian authorities are refusing to allow an independent medical examination of Nobel Peace Prize winner Narges Mohammadi after she was beaten during her arrest last week, her family said on Tuesday.

Her brother Hamid Reza Mohammadi, who lives in Norway, told reporters in Paris via video link that she had informed her other brother in Iran in a brief telephone call late on Sunday that police had beaten her with truncheons on her face, head, and neck.

Mohammadi, who won the prize in 2023, was detained along with dozens of activists on Friday after addressing a memorial ceremony in the eastern city of Mashhad for the lawyer Khosrow Alikordi, who was found dead earlier this month.

“She has bruises on her neck and face,” Hamid Reza Mohammadi said. “She was in a very bad condition physically.”

“My brother [inside Iran] has tried to convince them to agree for an independent doctor to examine her to make sure she has no internal bleeding in the head or any other organ,” he said.

“But they have not agreed to it. We are very worried about how she is being held, where she is being held and how she is treated,” he added.

...

Mohammadi won the Nobel Peace Prize while in prison in 2023, following her three-decade campaign for women’s rights and the abolition of the death penalty in Iran.

...

24
 
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48301399

The daughter of Jimmy Lai, the pro-democracy tycoon jailed in Hong Kong, has expressed concerns about her father's deteriorating health in prison, saying that his fingernails "sometimes fall off" and his teeth are rotting.

Lai, 78, has been detained since December 2020 and faces life in prison. Earlier this month he was convicted of colluding with foreign forces under the city's controversial national security law (NSL).

Hong Kong and Chinese authorities have denied that Lai has been mistreated in prison, saying he is in "good health".

The BBC has seen a letter written by Lai's family urging UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer to call for Lai's release when he meets Chinese President Xi Jinping next month.

His daughter Claire Lai, who is in exile in London, told the BBC that she fears she "may never see him again".

"Of course I worry that my father is going to be a martyr, and I don't want him to be a martyr. But I would not be here today, I would not be speaking out if I didn't think this was his best chance of reuniting with our family."

She described her father as an "extremely robust and strong man" when he went to prison, but said over the last year he has "lost a significant amount of weight".

"He is diabetic, he has heart issues which he never had in the past. He has fingernails that turn purplish grey and sometimes fall off. He has teeth that are rotting.

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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/48188735

Archived

The death of a former head of China’s one-child policy has been met not by tributes but by castigation of the abandoned policy on social media this week.

State media praised Peng Peiyun, head of China’s Family Planning Commission from 1988 to 1998, as “an outstanding leader” in her work related to women and children.

The reaction on China’s social media to Peng’s death in Beijing on Sunday, just shy of her 96th birthday, was less positive.

“Those children who were lost, naked, are waiting for you over there” in the afterlife, one person posted on China’s popular micro-blog Weibo.

China’s near-universal mandate of just one child per couple from 1980 through 2015 prompted local officials to compel women to undergo abortions and sterilisations.

Beijing launched the one-child policy as leaders worried about population growth potentially spiralling out of control. But China’s population, long the world’s highest, later slowed and last year tumbled for the third year in a row.

“If the one-child policy had been implemented for 10 years less, China’s population would not have plummeted like this!” a Weibo post said.

After falling behind India’s in 2023, China’s population declined last year to 1.39 billion. Experts warn the downtrend will accelerate in coming years. Data for 2025 will be released next month.

As population czar, Peng focused her commission’s work on the countryside.

In rural China, large families were once seen as a goal for couples looking to ensure that they would be taken care of in their old age. Sons who could carry on the family name were also favoured, leading to unwanted infant girls and even aborted female foetuses.

“Those children, if they were born, would be almost 40 years old, in the prime of their lives,” one person posted on Weibo.

[...]

The shrinking and greying of the population has spurred worries that the world’s second-biggest economy will struggle as the number of workers declines. Rising costs from elderly care and retirement benefits will also likely create additional budgetary strains for already indebted local governments.

[...]

Social media platforms such as Weibo and X were flooded with posts condemning Peng’s role in implementing what many described as a brutal state policy. Users recalled stories of forced abortions, sterilisations and family trauma experienced by their mothers, relatives and neighbours, according to reports.

“Yesterday this world-class monster died,” wrote user Bin Xie on X. “During her 10 years of leadership, tens of millions of government-forced abortions were performed. May hell hold her tight forever!”

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