[–] 0 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago) (2 children)

I am still looking for the cited source of this USSR prop. Usually I take the time to do so, but Russian isn't a language I am familiar with. Bottom right has the watermark of the artist.

I am using it as a rhetorical comparison: “people that compare their work as better than others generally do not try to comprehend the validities of another perspective.”

Later I got curious to see if he makes his own website, to confirm my suspicion that he does indeed use third party libraries.

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  • [–] 4 points 3 months ago

    That’s a lot to ask! So to be clear: this scenario is completely unrealistic. There’s no practical attack here. AES remains fine.

    I'm glad they stuck this nearish to the top.

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  • [–] 7 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago)

    ...Report initially closed as Informative and out of scope...
    Report reopened...
    ...
    2026-02-16 - Update requested, no response received
    2026-03-03 - Update requested, no response received
    ...
    2023-03-17 - Direct outreach to Cursor CISO requesting update
    2026-03-18 - HackerOne indicates Cursor has been contacted
    2026-04-01 - Update requested, no response received...

    Source

    Thankfully, never used, will never use.

    Related: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48913340

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago

    The attack vector highlights a critical gap in supply chain security where a single compromised write credential can pivot to force-update malicious tags. This incident underscores the necessity of implementing strict least-privilege access controls and read-only defaults for CI/CD dependencies to prevent similar credential-based pivots.

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  • [–] 6 points 5 months ago*

    Disclaimer: Docker, Red Hat, Bitnami by VMware/Broadcom, Google, AWS, and Chainguard are all RedMonk clients.

    Real good of them to throw that in at the very end of a lengthy article promoting their products.

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  • [–] 1 point 5 months ago

    IDK how other people are, but to me solving a problem with a single #include just feels right. Less code to maintain, responsibility is shifted to a dedicated person, obviously much faster.. But also constant anxiety and daily monitoring of security blogs, so I'm trying to cut back

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  • [–] 6 points 5 months ago (4 children)

    Running actions on your own machine doesn't solve cache poisoning or supply chain attacks, your VM will download compromised npm package or github actions the same way GH runner does.

    Version pinning/script disabling makes a compromise slightly less likely, rolling your own package server helps a lot (but who got time to maintain version whitelist).

    Honestly the best solution is to have minimum amount of dependencies. You don't need a GH action to ping indexers or generic foreign key library for your backed, hammer one yourself.

    That and scope all your keys so the leak won't be as devastating 🤷‍♀️

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  • [–] 7 points 6 months ago

    ... just don't read that part and miss the following:

    Not using AI code analyzers in your project means that you leave adversaries and attackers time and opportunity to find and exploit the flaws you don’t find.

    Daniel's saying that on a codebase already having been analyzed with good LLMs Mythos didn't additionally find much the others had missed.

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