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Google quantum-proofs HTTPS by squeezing 15kB of data into 700-byte space (arstechnica.com)
submitted 8 months ago by to c/security@programming.dev
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[–] 3 points 8 months ago (3 children)

Quantum computers will not solve the discrete log or factor a large prime(*) in our lifetimes.

  • faster than a contemporaneous classical computer, for a practical key size and algorithm with full iterations

If they do then I will eat my hat.

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  • [–] 1 point 8 months ago (2 children)

    Based on what? Field has been progressing steadily for a decade.

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  • [–] 3 points 8 months ago* (1 child)

    On one hand yeah there's been progress, but on the other we're still not anywhere close to having any useful computation done on them.
    It's difficult to predict if the technology will come close enough for a state actor like the NSA to build something capable of attacking current modern encryption. I suspect if it does, they'll be the first to build one and we still won't know if it's possible.

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  • [–] 1 point 8 months ago

    Small numbers factored. Error correcting progressing, material science and they just got qbits needed to crack RSA in theory under 100k. And yes NSA is expected to build one early. And China and GHCQ wanted to start on one a few years ago.

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    • [–] 2 points 8 months ago

    which are append-only distributed ledgers

    Lol, couldn't bring themselves to say "blockchain".

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    2 comments in c/technology@lemmy.world view that post
    [–] 26 points 8 months ago (1 child)

    I hope there's more to it than presented here, because this can be summarized as "64 bytes is too weak, so we make it bigger. Solved. The big is too big so we reduce it to 64 bytes. Solved."

    The strong certificate is not part of the end check, but proven via merkle tree reference. At the end of the day the end user check is only verifying 64 bytes of proof.

    So it is kinda pointless? Can I attack the merkle tree reference to claim the strong certificate is used when it is not?

    What am I missing?

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  • [–] 6 points 8 months ago

    The server still has to send its own key, so that part is bigger. They're making up the space by replacing traditional CA signatures and intermediate certificates with merkle tree hash-based signatures.

    Raw number of bytes can't be directly compared between cryptography schemes, cryptographic hashes make very efficient use of space and don't have the same quantum weaknesses that old public key cryptography has. The quantum-unsafe RSA signatures being replaced are about 256 bytes, the new ML-DSA signatures are about 2400 bytes, and SHA-256 Merkle tree references are 32 bytes for the same level of security and quantum-proofness.

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