This is just poor security. Not like in TV/Movies where an "AI" was found "breaking layers of firewalls and encryption" or whatever 🤣
Somebody fucked up. Plain and simple.
This is just poor security. Not like in TV/Movies where an "AI" was found "breaking layers of firewalls and encryption" or whatever 🤣
Somebody fucked up. Plain and simple.
Y'all obviously lead with AI and you're bad at propaganda.
The attackers initially gained access by stealing valid test credentials from public Amazon S3 buckets. The credentials belonged to an identity and access management (IAM) user with multiple read and write permissions on AWS Lambda and restricted permissions on AWS Bedrock
Run your shit against tenable once in a while.
Given how much AWS is pushing vibe-coding, we're now in the Leopard-Face-Eating territory.
Vibe hacking is the future. Really.
It’s going to be vibe hackers hacking vibe coded systems. Caaaaaant waaaaaiiiiit!
From the report that's the source of this Register article (emphasis added):
The threat actor infiltrated the victim’s environments using valid test credentials stolen from public S3 buckets. These buckets contained Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) data for AI models , and the compromised credentials belonged to an Identity and Access Management (IAM) user that had multiple read and write permissions on AWS Lambda and restricted permissions on AWS Bedrock. This user was likely intentionally created by the victim organization to automate Bedrock tasks with Lambda functions across the environment.
It is also important to note that the affected S3 buckets were named using common AI tool naming conventions, which the attackers actively searched for during reconnaissance.
https://www.sysdig.com/blog/ai-assisted-cloud-intrusion-achieves-admin-access-in-8-minutes
It’s absolutely one of the strongest applications of LLMs right now.
Very interested to see how things develop long-term though, since theoretically we should start seeing red team tools developed that can close the holes an attacker would be hunting. Granted, I think we’ll need at least another five years for true high-quality pentest agents, and offense will have the upper hand in the cat & mouse until then.
If your operation can be hacked by Clippy on Acid then it was not exactly Fort Knox to begin with.
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