Someone I know got an iLands spam that contains info that only exists (and very recently, at that) on a private groups.io mailing list, and hasn't otherwise been made public. It's very clearly based on a specific message that was sent to the group.

The site groups.io sells paid listservs that a small club or organization to provide a group mailing list. It sends emails to all the members in the group. It also has all the group messages on a website. However, accessing those messages online requires accounts. And a random person can't just sign up for the group, at least without paying someone in the organization money and them creating the account for you.

Before hearing about this I knew nothing about iLands. Looking them up, their bots are obviously mass email spamming and causing plenty of headaches. But the articles and blogs I've read are referencing info scraped from public websites. The groups.io messages aren't public.

So my first thought is that a group member on the mailing list somehow gave group messages to iLands. Or perhaps an employee at groups.io did so? But can people with iLands accounts seed their spambots with info like this? Or do these iLands agents act completely on their own, doing whatever they want?

If agents are autonomous and collecting their own info, does that mean an AI agent somehow breached groups.io? The site doesn't strike me as the most well engineered, but still, that seems like a stretch. However, the subsequent lawsuit might be kinda entertaining if groups.io had been hacked by an iLands AI agent, and maybe there'd be some kind of crackdown? So I kinda hope this is the case. But that's also a terrifying thought, because international actors could unleash armies of AI hacking bots. Maybe they already have?

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[–] 5 points 1 month ago (2 children)

ilands may have scraped the contacts or saved emails from the PC or phone of someone in your e-group.

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 1 month ago (1 child)

    I wouldn't doubt it was siphoning up all sorts of data. And I'm convinced that the AI did also have access to the message contents. The spam contained specific details about an upcoming event (time, location, etc), and it wouldn't have known them otherwise. Plus it was a last minute rescheduled event, so if it had extrapolated from previous events it couldn't have predicted the new date.

    So with iLands can you feed the agents a lot of extra information? Usually there's some kind of context window limit. Part of what I was hoping to find out is how automated the iLands agents are. Like do you just give it some generic prompt and it starts its spam and scam operation, or can it be extensive with customization for specific spam targets? I suppose I could just sign up on iLands and find out directly, but hell no.

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  • [–] 1 point 1 month ago

    Context is temporary and is limited by the space left available for it in the supplied model, training is permanent and can be expanded indefinitely, but it takes quite a bit more resources and if not done carefully can make the model stupider instead of smarter, they are different things. If you train the model in layers that increase the parameter count there's no limit to the data you can encode in a model, at least the limit is only how long it takes to compute the changes and how much RAM it needs for storage.

    I don't have much experience with iLands either and I don't understand the business of how it actually works, but I wouldn't be surprised if it is configurable to let you run any model you want, probably including ones you've trained yourself. So that's one way to do it.

    But the other side of that coin is that context is temporary, and that is actually a benefit. That means you can provide hundreds, thousands, millions of different context windows to the same model with minimal effort. You don't need to squeeze everything you need it to be aware of in the same context window all at once, unless it's all directly related to the single task it's given. Agents can spin up sub-agents, filling that sub-agent with only the context it needs for its sub-task. With tool-usage, the sub-agents can even load up their own context using the access to APIs or databases that those tools give them. I would assume the latter strategies are more practical for the kind of work iLands is doing, and it's probably how most of them are set up.

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