The author makes the argument that we shouldn't update the hashing algorithm because an adversary has simpler, cheaper means to achieve the same goal of injecting malicious code into a project. I don't find this a convincing reason. People say the same about Wayland. As I understand it, Wayland makes it so that processes can't see inside windows in other processes or observe the keyboard when one of its windows is not in focus, something X11 apparently doesn't guarantee. They say we shouldn't switch because it would achieve nothing: an adversarial program could just as easily do similar snooping because it has access to the user's home directory. I think that just means we need to also patch the other holes. You can't improve security by doing nothing. It's like you have two insecure doors in your home and you don't bother installing a lock on one because an intruder could easily get through the other one. You have to start somewhere. You can strengthen the hashes and try to patch the other holes (social engineering, etc.) at a later point.
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