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I think the same, therefore I am I? (lemmy.world)
submitted 5 months ago by to c/antiquememesroadshow@lemmy.world
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Some extra context for the curious: https://pdf.stafforini.com/parfit-1995-unimportance-identity.pdf

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[–] 6 points 5 months ago (1 child)

To expand on this, all that we really have is a feeling of self-awareness, and a memory of a continuous series of events leading up to this moment. Both teleporter clones would have the same subjective-I feeling, and the memories. Which one is "real" is a meaningless distinction.

It's like how I woke up this morning, and I have the memory of going to bed last night, but I am no longer that person who went to bed; I cannot know his mind other than in the memories that I have. Did my consciousness in this moment come from him? Clearly not! If he was conscious (which I cannot actually prove now), there was a gap of many hours. (Actually, neuroscience tells us our consciousness dips out every ~90 seconds, so our brains can attend to other tasks. As a 'fun' experiement, try to wait out an itch without scratching it, and pinpoint the moment it goes away. Or just have ADHD.)

Same thing with the transporter clones. Each would "come to" in the moment, with the illusion of continuous, conscious experience. The original would be just as "dead" as the me that went to sleep last night.

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  • [–] 2 points 5 months ago

    To expand on this, all that we really have is a feeling of self-awareness, and a memory of a continuous series of events leading up to this moment. Both teleporter clones would have the same subjective-I feeling, and the memories. Which one is “real” is a meaningless distinction.

    I disagree, at least if we're talking star trek transporter. For the person who stepped into the transporter, their conscious experience ends forever. The person who steps out the other side has the illusion of continuity and will understandably believe themselves to be the same person, but it won't be the same person. As I see it, the original person's life experience ended permanently when they were "destroyed" by the transporter. The fact that the copy will perceive itself to be the original doesn't change this.

    In some hypothetical where you are magically moved without being destroyed, I could accept that the same person who teleports from spot A is the same person who arrives at spot B, but so far I have heard of no technological idea of teleportation that convinces me people aren't dying every time they teleport. (I know we're just debating fiction so it's arguably meaningless, but I'd for sure be the guy in Star Trek who refused to use the transporter.)

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