Did you answer your own comment?

oh..!!!

in the given example (linked wikipedia page) i clearly see the issue of not having the condorcet criterion!

curious at how i'd solve this. how would you?

100 voters rank three candidates (Alice Bob Cecilia) by three grades (1st 2nd 3rd) and these are the votes

• 35 voted A > B > C
• 34 voted C > B > A
• 31 voted B > C > A

according to the instant-runoff (also called single transferrable vote) type of systems the winner would be decided by elimination of first grade votes - Bob would lose the first round of tallying votes - then from the defeated Bob is siphoned voters to those left standing: Alice & Cecilia. In this scenario all of Bob's voters are siphoned to Cecilia who then wins the next and final round of tallying votes. However this, if i understand correctly, is called adheering to mutual majority criterion and not the majority criterion.

so i could go on but i am typing on a phone and the Blorb client is laggy to type into. tldw i thought to assign 3 points to the 1st grade votes ... etc ... 1 point to the 3rd grade votes. adding the points dedicated to each candidate as a total value of popularity in this election then reflects B as most popular, C as next and A as least. it's the same result as what the majority criterion demands. would this system of adding points according to rank hold up? open question. is there a name of this system already? i'd call it Concord Voting hehe but i doubt i'm the first to think of that