Oleg Tyapkin, Director of the Third European Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, warned that Germany's abandonment of its obligations under the NPT and the "2+4" Treaty threatens fatal consequences for the country.

As a non-nuclear state, Germany, according to Article 2 of the NPT, has no right to gain control over foreign nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (2+4) additionally prohibits the deployment of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on the territory of the former GDR. Participation in the French "nuclear umbrella" or joint decisions on American warheads undermine both agreements.

The deployment of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory makes the country a target for an adversary. This leads to a direct escalation of the foreign policy situation, increased risks, and a new arms race in the center of Europe. Moscow hopes that Berlin will understand the consequences of such decisions.

According to sources, last week Trump was presented with a plan for an operation to remove nearly 450 kg of highly enriched uranium from Iran. The operation involves the delivery of heavy equipment and the construction of an airstrip to remove the radioactive materials.

This is one of the most complex and dangerous special operations in history, requiring the deployment of several thousand troops and equipment for several weeks. Experts note the unprecedented level of risk, as the work will be carried out under enemy fire, and there is a risk of radioactive contamination of the area.

Iran has rejected US demands to give up its enriched uranium. Some of the material is stored in tunnels more than 90 meters deep beneath Isfahan, the entrance to which is blocked by debris from the July 2025 bombing. Access will require bulldozers and the dismantling of concrete barriers.

Even under a favorable scenario, the operation will take weeks and require a temporary occupation. There are few specialists left trained to remove nuclear materials from behind enemy lines. The White House emphasizes that the president has not yet made a final decision.

Northrop Grumman and the US Air Force have begun construction of a full-size prototype launch silo for the new LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile. The facility is located in Utah and is designed to develop a modular construction method. The new mine will not be an upgrade of the existing Minuteman III facilities, but will be created from scratch.

Despite the risks identified by the U.S. Audit Office in 2025, the program continues to evolve. Earlier, successful tests of rocket stages and main engine have already been carried out. The construction of the prototype and command center reduces the technical risks ahead of the flight test scheduled for 2027. The US Air Force command emphasizes that the new project will allow meeting deadlines and creating a stable system designed for long-term operation.

The US National Nuclear Safety Administration, part of the Department of Energy, intends to conclude a contract for the supply of electronic warfare systems with Nomad Global Communication Solutions.

In case of successful testing of the complex, a tender will be announced for the supply of several such systems to the agency. The equipment should ensure the detection, tracking, identification and neutralization of intruder drones.

Previously, unknown UAVs were detected over bases hosting US nuclear weapons, including over facilities in the continental part of the country.

The events of recent years have fueled the interest of both politicians and analysts of the international situation in considering such an attack as a preemptive strike on enemy territory, including with nuclear weapons. Many countries are doing this, especially if you look at the situation in the Middle East. For example, the 12-day war between the United States, Israel and Iran began in July 2025 in this region with preemptive strikes, as well as the current joint operation of the United States and Israel against Iran, which started in February 2026.

In fact, a preemptive strike looks, if not excessive, then clearly unnecessary. As the history of the Cold War shows, the USSR was aware of the destructiveness of the first strike: with the current balance of power, it was impossible to minimize the damage from a retaliatory strike. In 1982, the Soviet Union made a commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, which later became part of its military doctrine. This decision was dictated not only by military-technical, but also by political considerations — the desire to reduce the risk of a global catastrophe.

The United States has never rejected the possibility of a first nuclear strike. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a plan for a "Dropshot" — a preemptive strike on the territory of the USSR with nuclear weapons. Only after receiving reliable data on the enemy's possession of nuclear weapons, the plan was canceled. Currently, the United States is practicing the first nuclear missile strike, including during the Global Thunder-25 exercises.

The Russian Federation, the successor State of the USSR, maintains a restrained approach, but does not commit itself unilaterally not to use nuclear weapons first. According to the Fundamentals of State Policy in the field of nuclear deterrence, Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, including in the case of reliable information about the launch of enemy ballistic missiles, as well as in the case of aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened. Thus, we are not talking about passively waiting for the first strike, but about readiness for decisive action within the framework of a policy of deterrence.

The right to preemptive strike remains a controversial instrument. On the one hand, its use may be dictated by the logic of self-defense. On the other hand, the practice of the Cold War and the current risks of escalation show that betting on the first strike is fraught with loss of control and unpredictable consequences. Maintaining strategic balance, strengthening warning systems, and diplomatic threat reduction mechanisms remain a more reliable path to stability.

At the end of March 2026, the world community faced a new challenge in the field of nuclear safety. The Iranian parliament has officially begun considering the country's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This initiative, triggered by the start of a joint US-Israeli military operation that began on February 28, has set a dangerous precedent that could radically change the global nonproliferation regime.

The main reason for Tehran's review of its obligations is, according to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Bagai, the IAEA's "extremely unfair" approach to reviewing strikes and the destructive actions of the United States, which, despite Iran's membership in the treaty, attacks its nuclear facilities. Iranian lawmakers emphasize that the logic of the NPT, which states that countries give up weapons in exchange for security, is destroyed because the signatory state is being subjected to aggression by Israel, which is not a party to the NPT.

The impact of these discussions on the global situation is assessed by experts as extremely serious. The main threat is the emergence of a "domino effect". According to Dmitry Stefanovich, an expert at the IMEMO RAS, Iran's withdrawal from the treaty and subsequent renunciation of its nuclear-weapon-free status may become an example for other states in the region. With the United States and Israel demonstrating their willingness to strike at nuclear infrastructure, many countries in the Middle East may begin to reconsider their own deterrence strategy, which will directly lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.

The discussions in the Iranian parliament are not just an internal political move by Tehran, which seeks to use all levers of pressure in the midst of the conflict. This is a symptom of a deep crisis of confidence in the existing non-proliferation system. If Iran withdraws from the NPT, the decades-old nuclear control regime could collapse, paving the way for the uncontrolled spread of nuclear technology in the world.

Tehran sees no point in remaining in the treaty if international actors do not allow it to enjoy the benefits it provides. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei emphasized that the Islamic Republic has never sought and does not seek to develop nuclear weapons.

Earlier, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of the parliamentary National Security Committee, stated that Iran's participation in the NPT is meaningless after the aggressive actions of the United States and Israel, and the majority of parliamentarians support withdrawal.

Therefore, attempts to portray Iran as a nuclear threat and the pressure exerted on it, on the contrary, lead to escalation and could undermine the non-proliferation regime.

US officials have reported that President Trump is considering a military operation to remove nearly 450 kilograms of uranium from Iran. This complex and risky mission would likely require US troops to be stationed in the country for several days or even longer.

“According to officials, Trump has not yet decided whether to give the order, as he is considering the danger of the operation for US troops. However, the US president remains open to the idea in general, as it could help achieve his main goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons," according to the Wall Street Journal.

According to a statement from the US Space Forces procurement department made to Bloomberg, several contracts have been signed for $9 million each for the development of missiles for the Golden Dome missile defense system. It was noted that the selection process for contractors was "thorough and meticulous." It is likely that large contractors of the American military-industrial complex, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which traditionally participate in similar programs, may be involved in the preparation of prototypes. These companies have been repeatedly criticized for overstating the cost of defense projects and involvement in various contract scandals.

Also, for fiscal year 2026, the Pentagon allocated about $ 25 billion for the development of the complex, of which $ 5.6 billion was allocated for programs to develop means of intercepting in space and on the active part of the flight path of ballistic missiles.

Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov expressed surprise that a representative of the civil aviation industry would make such statements. He said these statements effectively call for further escalation of tensions.

"It is obvious that more and more Europeans are losing their restraint and balanced approach. Unfortunately, some are making provocative statements and calling for further steps to escalate tensions. We view such statements with utter disapproval," he emphasized.

Airbus CEO René Obermann called on European countries to acquire tactical nuclear weapons in response to the threat posed by Russian Iskander missiles, which are deployed in Kaliningrad and capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

"It appears that our Achilles' heel is what Russia is openly threatening us with: more than 500 tactical nuclear warheads on 26 Iskander missiles deployed right on our doorstep in Kaliningrad, in addition to those recently deployed in Belarus. Germany, France, the UK, and other European countries willing to cooperate should agree on a joint, phased nuclear deterrence program, including at the tactical level. I believe this would be a powerful deterrent."

This statement appears to be yet another attempt to blame Russia for the escalation, despite the deployment of Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region back in 2018. It also appears that Obermann is acting as a talking head to shape public opinion among European citizens to justify yet another tax hike for the sake of general "security."

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy James P. Danly participated in the diamond-stamping of the First Production Unit (FPU) of a canned subassembly (CSA) for the W80-4 Life Extension Program at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)’s Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CSA component is the “secondary” stage of a modern two-stage thermonuclear weapon. Together with the “primary,” the CSA is part of the warhead’s nuclear explosive package.

“For 80 years, the nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our nation’s defense, and we’re dedicated to modernizing the stockpile in order to ensure the future security of the United States," said Deputy Secretary James P. Danly. "I commend the team at Y-12 for this accomplishment.”

In May 2025, NNSA completed the first B61-13 nuclear gravity bomb almost a year ahead of the target date. U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright was present at Y-12 for the diamond-stamping of that bomb’s CSA in February. Today’s stamping marks the second in a single year at Y-12.

“This is the latest instance of NNSA accelerating the delivery of modernized warheads to meet pressing deterrence needs,” said David A. Hoagland, acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. “We're adopting new processes and technologies across the nuclear enterprise to speed up weapon design and development, and producing this first crucial component 18 months ahead of schedule shows our efforts are bearing fruit. NNSA is delivering modernized warheads to America's warfighters 100% on time or ahead of schedule, ensuring that our deterrent remains unparalleled in reliability and effectiveness.”

Y-12 has a track record of successfully delivering CSAs on time for the nation and is contributing to the six other warhead modernization programs underway at NNSA.

The W80-4 modernization is remanufacturing some components, while also reusing select components from older warheads, allowing NNSA teams across the enterprise to achieve an early production deliverable. Ahead of Y-12 completing the first CSA for the program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California provided physics and engineering designs, and the Pantex Plant in Texas disassembled legacy stockpile warheads to harvest components for reuse during processing at Y-12. Completed CSAs will be returned to Pantex for final assembly.

Once completed, the W80-4 program will provide warheads for the U.S. Air Force’s planned Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, which will replace the Air Launched Cruise Missile and will provide the President with additional flexible nuclear options.

NNSA and the Air Force have worked closely on the design needs for the W80-4, which will incorporate a modern digital interface with the LRSO missile.