154
The security situation with the Arch Linux AUR got a lot worse (www.gamingonlinux.com)
submitted 4 months ago by to c/linux@lemmy.ml
47 comments fedilink hide all child comments
you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[–] 15 points 4 months ago (2 children)

It's just a repository of user-contributed packages. It's no different malware-ability-wise to, say, GitHub. If you are running code you found from a stranger on the internet then you are liable for it, and you need to do your due diligence in checking that you are not running malware. It is a good thing that the AUR exists because it means Arch user packages are all in one centralised repository instead of scattered across GitHub, Sourceforge, Codeberg, Pastebin, forums, whatever. If you are just installing random AUR packages then that's on you. It's basic internet safety to not automatically trust random scripts you find on the internet.

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 2 child comments
    •
  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    I never said that GitHub was better. I just don't feel like using a package maintained by a stranger with no tied to neither the software I want to install nor the distribution packages repository.

    Of course installing random code from stranger is never great advice regardless of the distribution source. But AUR is simply not for me, and many users don't understand the risk or let's say responsabilities it involves while installing packages from that source.

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • parent
  • hideshow 1 child comment
    •
  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago

    I agree about the risks in terms of the way some sources present the AUR as just extra packages. But I don't think you can object to the AUR more than any other place on the internet where anyone can upload software; unfortunately, the onus is going to be on the user to verify what they install. The AUR is moderated by volunteers and it wouldn't be fair to expect them to vet all of the high volume of commits to the AUR. Possibly they could vet new maintainers or new packages or newly adopted packages, but nothing would stop someone from initially uploading a genuine package and then replacing it with something malicious. Or they could require identity verification to be an AUR maintainer but then far fewer genuine packages would be on there because people don't want to give their real identity to contribute (I maintain some AUR packages, and would stop if required to verify my IRL identity).

    I can totally understand if the AUR is not for you; it's more time-consuming as you have to read PKGBUILDs (I always do). But that doesn't make it bad that it exists at all. I think there should be more warnings about it for new users, and possibly some more moderation, though like I said above there's no perfect moderation solution that would simultaneously forgo users' responsibility to check and keep the AUR as large as it is today. Ultimately the option should still exist for users who want it. If it didn't exist, I'd have to hand-package every program that's not in the official repos, and that's even more time-consuming than pulling and reading through a PKGBUILD that someone else already wrote and shared.

  • permalink
  • fedilink
  • source
  • parent