▲ 70 ▼ WhatsApp, Signal, untraceable security risk (www.techradar.com) submitted 10 months ago by Spot@startrek.website to c/cybersecurity@sh.itjust.works 17 comments fedilink hide all child comments Three billion WhatsApp users are at risk - an expert has developed a tool that could spy on everyone, and you would never know about it
[+] Nomad@infosec.pub 37 points 10 months ago (7 children) [deleted] permalink fedilink source hideshow 7 child comments replies: [–] hoshikarakitaridia@lemmy.world 13 points 10 months ago (2 children) IT hobbyist here. This guy knows his stuff. Dangerous attacks are the ones that are very low effort with medium to high reward. This attack is high effort and low reward. This is one of these trivia things, that you will virtually never see in the wild. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] Tinidril@midwest.social 4 points 10 months ago High effort is not a great thing to count on. Once these things are discovered there are all sorts of clever (or not so clever) ways to automate the effort away. Especially now with AI. permalink fedilink source parent [–] pcouy@lemmy.pierre-couy.fr 4 points 10 months ago* This is not high effort. Starting from an open source WhatsApp client library, reproducing the attacks described in the research paper is trivial. There are even a few public github repos implementing PoCs of this. Whether the reward should be considered high or low is ultimately subjective. What is objectively verifiable, however, is that an attacker can continuously (and silently) monitor several aspects of a target’s environment, including: the number of devices linked to the target’s account, along with fingerprints that allow differentiation between operating systems and browsers the locked or unlocked state of the target’s phone whether the phone is connected via Wi-Fi or a mobile network whether the WhatsApp application or browser tab is running in the foreground or background. In addition, an attacker could deliberately drain the target’s phone battery and consume their mobile data allowance. permalink fedilink source parent [–] halfdane@lemmy.world 5 points 10 months ago (1 child) While I appreciate your refusal to spread panic, would you mind explaining what the attack does and why it's a nothingburger, maybe even why it's not practical? Because right now, you assert a lot of things without any explanation. Not saying you're wrong, but I think it's good practice to not just rely on claims of authority permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment load more comments (1 reply) [–] MostlyBlindGamer@rblind.com 4 points 10 months ago It’s also worth considering the Signal threat model: a contact you communicate with is not considered an adversary. You can choose not to accept an initial message request. permalink fedilink source parent [–] pcouy@lemmy.pierre-couy.fr 4 points 10 months ago I believe Signal has already fixed it, while meta said they won't fix this in WhatsApp. This side channel can be used to infer more than a rough timezone, specifically, an attacker could continuously monitor : the number of devices linked to the target’s account, along with fingerprints that allow differentiation between operating systems and browsers the locked or unlocked state of the target’s phone whether the phone is connected via Wi-Fi or a mobile network whether the WhatsApp application or browser tab is running in the foreground or background. In addition, an attacker could deliberately drain the target’s phone battery and consume their mobile data allowance I've tested this on myself and can confirm all of this can be done reliably permalink fedilink source parent
[–] hoshikarakitaridia@lemmy.world 13 points 10 months ago (2 children) IT hobbyist here. This guy knows his stuff. Dangerous attacks are the ones that are very low effort with medium to high reward. This attack is high effort and low reward. This is one of these trivia things, that you will virtually never see in the wild. permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 2 child comments replies: [–] Tinidril@midwest.social 4 points 10 months ago High effort is not a great thing to count on. Once these things are discovered there are all sorts of clever (or not so clever) ways to automate the effort away. Especially now with AI. permalink fedilink source parent [–] pcouy@lemmy.pierre-couy.fr 4 points 10 months ago* This is not high effort. Starting from an open source WhatsApp client library, reproducing the attacks described in the research paper is trivial. There are even a few public github repos implementing PoCs of this. Whether the reward should be considered high or low is ultimately subjective. What is objectively verifiable, however, is that an attacker can continuously (and silently) monitor several aspects of a target’s environment, including: the number of devices linked to the target’s account, along with fingerprints that allow differentiation between operating systems and browsers the locked or unlocked state of the target’s phone whether the phone is connected via Wi-Fi or a mobile network whether the WhatsApp application or browser tab is running in the foreground or background. In addition, an attacker could deliberately drain the target’s phone battery and consume their mobile data allowance. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] Tinidril@midwest.social 4 points 10 months ago High effort is not a great thing to count on. Once these things are discovered there are all sorts of clever (or not so clever) ways to automate the effort away. Especially now with AI. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] pcouy@lemmy.pierre-couy.fr 4 points 10 months ago* This is not high effort. Starting from an open source WhatsApp client library, reproducing the attacks described in the research paper is trivial. There are even a few public github repos implementing PoCs of this. Whether the reward should be considered high or low is ultimately subjective. What is objectively verifiable, however, is that an attacker can continuously (and silently) monitor several aspects of a target’s environment, including: the number of devices linked to the target’s account, along with fingerprints that allow differentiation between operating systems and browsers the locked or unlocked state of the target’s phone whether the phone is connected via Wi-Fi or a mobile network whether the WhatsApp application or browser tab is running in the foreground or background. In addition, an attacker could deliberately drain the target’s phone battery and consume their mobile data allowance. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] halfdane@lemmy.world 5 points 10 months ago (1 child) While I appreciate your refusal to spread panic, would you mind explaining what the attack does and why it's a nothingburger, maybe even why it's not practical? Because right now, you assert a lot of things without any explanation. Not saying you're wrong, but I think it's good practice to not just rely on claims of authority permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 1 child comment load more comments (1 reply)
[–] MostlyBlindGamer@rblind.com 4 points 10 months ago It’s also worth considering the Signal threat model: a contact you communicate with is not considered an adversary. You can choose not to accept an initial message request. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] pcouy@lemmy.pierre-couy.fr 4 points 10 months ago I believe Signal has already fixed it, while meta said they won't fix this in WhatsApp. This side channel can be used to infer more than a rough timezone, specifically, an attacker could continuously monitor : the number of devices linked to the target’s account, along with fingerprints that allow differentiation between operating systems and browsers the locked or unlocked state of the target’s phone whether the phone is connected via Wi-Fi or a mobile network whether the WhatsApp application or browser tab is running in the foreground or background. In addition, an attacker could deliberately drain the target’s phone battery and consume their mobile data allowance I've tested this on myself and can confirm all of this can be done reliably permalink fedilink source parent