At least you admit implicitly that there is no known deanonymization attack on Monero.

There is very little overlap between respected cryptography researchers and bitcoin developers. The chain between theory to implementation to practice is difficult enough for state actors to handle reliably. The history of Enigma, Type B, JN-25, soviet one-time pads, and modern schemes like DES, 2-DES, FEAL, KASUMI, and BassOMatic, suggest not only that encryption isn't a guarantee, but conspiracies to keep a scheme popular long after it has been broken are common and widely successful.

I don't know a deanonymization attack on Monero. If that's all it took to make you feel Monero is secure, you're in for trouble. Encrypted or not, every transaction is immutably stored in the blockchain and replicated in millions of times to any bad actor who wants a copy. Even if there was no currently known deanonymization attack, that would not mean that a deanonymization attack is impossible for everyone and for all time.