[–] 3 points 2 days ago

Bold to say permanent given earths history. It wouldn't surprise me if Europe was frozen over in 20 years from now because amoc collapses. Nevertheless we could overshoot and still end up back in an ice age in 10k years or whatever the standard timeline is from now.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 weeks ago

    The actual anthropic paper is worth reading . Everyone in the comments didn't read it .

    If you have an adaptive llm with lamarckian evolution where it makes notes of it's successes and failures for the next agent you get cultural cumulativity which is precisely how homo sapiens out competed other species .

    Based on current capabilities and the delay of frontier abilities into smaller models this is at least a year to 2 years out from being really viable global disaster. The paper said end of year but my research says end of next year to be actually viable , assuming no s-curve saturation on small models intelligence .

    Wouldn't surprise me if someone was already working on it using an abliterated version of Kimi 3 or something.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 weeks ago

    Capitalist and socialist cornucopianism both ignore the fact carrying capacity is being degraded and we are in an intensification trap now dependent on unsustainable inputs in the middle of mass extinction of other species

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  • [–] 2 points 2 weeks ago (1 child)

    Military base biggest planes moving massive amounts of troops and hardware. Something is about to go down soon. Judging by the gear and planes its going to be some sort of ground deployment.

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  • [–] 3 points 3 weeks ago

    And morrocan phosphates high grades have already been spent and everything they are pumping out now are pretty high in heavy metals . Prices to clean it up can increase costs about 30% but don't worry they don't clean it up they just sell it in the fertilizer

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  • [–] 3 points 1 month ago (2 children)

    False. Money isn't food. You cannot print gasoline or fertilizer like you can print money. Money as a claim on real resources doesn't mean printing money prints resources. We definitely couldn't sustain 1 trillion people sustainably on earth because we can't even sustain the current population sustainably. Your hopium is copium bruh

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  • [–] 3 points 1 month ago (4 children)

    Your theory is magical thinking. It completely ignored the biophysical aspect. It doesn't matter how many thinking minds you have versus physics. Socialist cornucopianism has failed just like the capitalist version will fail, from inability to coordinate first then actual physics second

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    Americans enjoy a diverse abundance of relatively low-cost food, spending 9.7% of disposable income on food.1 However, store prices do not reflect the external economic, social, and environmental costs that affect the sustainability of the food system. Examining the full lifecycle of the U.S. food system reveals the connection between consumption behaviors and production practices.

    The Food System Life Cycle2 Image The Food System Life Cycle Patterns of Use Agricultural Production Socio-Economics In 2022, farmers were 1% of the U.S. population and 63% of these farmers were over the age of 55, up 2% from 2017.3,4,5 Large-scale family farms and industrial non-family farms account for under 8% of farms, but 65% of production (in $).6 Small-scale family farms represent 86% of U.S. farms, but only 11% of production.6 In 2024, only 11.8¢ of every dollar spent on food went back to the farm, compared to 40¢ in 1975.7,8 From 2020-2022, 42% of the hired agricultural labor force lacked authorization to work in the United States.9 Environmental Resources U.S. cropland declined by 14% between 1997 and 2022, from 445M to 382M acres, while the portion of irrigated cropland increased from 12.6% to 14.4%.3 Many agricultural regions face groundwater depletion, where water withdrawal exceeds recharge.10 In 2015, irrigation used 118B gal/day of water, 48% came from groundwater.11,12 Nutrient runoff from upper Mississippi River farms contributes to a hypoxic “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2017, it reached 8,776 mi²—the largest since 1985.13 From 2007 to 2012, pesticide use rose 10% while herbicide use increased 20% from 2010–2014.14 In 2012, U.S. agriculture used 899M lb of pesticides;14 use is now estimated at over 1B lb annually.15 The share of major crops that are genetically engineered increased from 25% of corn, 61% of cotton, and 54% of soybeans in 2000 to 94%, 96%, and 96% in 2024.16 In the U.S. Midwest, more than 57B tons of soil have eroded over the past 150 years,17 with future scenarios predicting an additional 8–21% increase.18 Erosion was highest in croplands cultivated with corn, soybean, sorghum, and wheat.18 In 2022, agriculture accounted for 10% of total U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The sector’s primary emissions include methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and carbon dioxide (CO2), mainly from livestock and soil management.20 Consumption Patterns In 2010, the U.S. food supply provided 4,000 calories per person per day.21 Accounting for waste, the average American consumed 2,501 calories per day, up 22% from 1970.22 In 2021, 185 lb of meat per person were available for consumption, up 11.6 lb from 1969.23 Red meat consumption declined 24% since 1970, while chicken consumption more than doubled.23 Americans have access to 22.3 tsp of sweeteners per day, while the American Heart Association recommends limiting added sugars to 6–9 tsp.24,25 Approximately 41.9% of U.S. adults and 19.7% of 2-19 year-olds are obese (BMI > 30).26 Poor diets—especially those low in fruits and vegetables—are linked to higher risks of heart disease, certain cancers, and stroke.27,28 Ultraprocessed food consumption is associated with adverse health outcomes like obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.29 30–40% of the 2023 food supply was lost as waste, 50% more than in 1970.30,31 Food accounts for more landfill waste than any other material,30 making up 22% of the municipal solid waste stream in 2018,32 a loss of $450 and around 350 lb of food per person annually.30,31 See MSW Factsheet. Producing food that is ultimately wasted accounts for 2% of total U.S. annual energy use.33 Material Flow in the U.S. Food System, 19952 Image Material Flow in the U.S. Food System Life Cycle Impacts Food accounts for over 12% of the U.S. energy budget.34 Every unit of food uses 13 units of (primarily) fossil energy.35,36 U.S. food production generates 4.7 kg CO2e in GHG emissions and uses 25.2 MJ of fossil fuel energy daily per capita.37 Reliance on fossil fuel inputs makes the food system vulnerable to oil price fluctuations.2 Consolidation in farming, processing, and distribution has increased the distance between food sources and consumers2 and concentrated management decisions into a few hands. Four firms control 85% of the beef packing market,39 two firms control 43.6% of the pork processing market,40 ten firms control 80% of the broiler chicken processing industry,40 and four firms control 82% of soybean crushing.56 The top four food retailers sold nearly 35% of U.S. food in 2019, compared to 15% in 1990.41 Energy Flow in the U.S. Food System2,22,35,36,38 Food Energy Consumed (14.2 Quads) Food Energy Available (1.75 Quads) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Quads Input Output Household Storage & Preparation Processing Industry Wholesale and Retail Agricultural Production Food Services Packaging Material Transportation Food Energy Available Consumed Food Energy Available Solutions and Sustainable Alternatives Check out the Foodprint Calculator for more information on the carbon, nitrogen, and water impacts of your diet.64

    Policy U.S. federal nutritional guidelines are influenced by industry lobbies42,43 that possibly overstate the benefits of red meat42 and lead to excess saturated fat consumption from dairy.44 Eat Less Meat Beef generate 36 times more GHG per g of protein than plant-based alternatives.47 Meat production significantly impacts land use, water use, and water pollution.48 In an average diet, meat accounts for 31% of the water scarcity footprint— the water use that accounts for regional depletion.49 Meat-based diets use twice as much more energy to produce as vegetarian diets,2 and produce double the carbon emissions.45 Vegetarian diets reduce carbon emissions by 1,500kg annually, and vegan diets reduce carbon emissions by 2,100 kg annually.46 The top 20% of U.S. diets cause half of food-related GHG emissions; a shift away from meat reduces this up to 73%.37,47 Between 2003–2018, changes in U.S. eating habits cut diet-related GHG emissions by over 35%.50 Reduce Waste Much of household food waste is due to spoilage. To prevent this, buy smaller quantities, plan meals, stick to shopping lists, and freeze, can, or preserve excess produce.51 Confusion over “sell-by” and “use-by” dates leads to unnecessary disposal of safe food. Consult USDA guidelines for clarity.52 “Best before” only refers to taste.53 Direct-to-consumer meal services streamline supply chains, reduce last-mile transportation, and produce 25% fewer GHG emissions than store-bought meals.54 To save water and energy while washing dishes—whether by hand or machine—avoid running water continuously, rinse with cold water, run full dishwasher loads, and skip pre-rinsing.55 Use Refrigeration Efficiently Home refrigeration accounts for 13% of total energy use in the U.S. food system.2 Refrigerator efficiency more than doubled from 1972 to 1990, when the first set of efficiency standards took effect, but increases in size have largely offset this improvement.2,57 Improved refrigeration could prevent 620M tons of global food waste each year.58 Replacing old refrigerators with Energy Star models saves 20% more energy and about $150 over the appliance’s lifetime. To further reduce waste and energy use, consider purchasing smaller quantities of fresh produce more frequently.2,59 Eat Organic Organic farms do not use chemicals that require large amounts of energy to produce, pollute soil and water, and cause human health impacts. U.S. sales of organic food in 2025 were $76.6B;60 organic food now accounts for roughly 6% of all food sold in the U.S.61 Both organic and non-organic food provide important nutrients. The term “organic” does not describe the quality of the food.62 Eat Local Transportation accounts for approximately 14% of the total energy used in the U.S. food system.63 Buying local food and promoting farm-to-table supply chains can save large quantities of food from wasting.58 There is much room for improvement in how people acquire their food. Community Supported Agriculture and Farmers Markets are great ways to support local food systems.

     

    This study explores the connection between changing environmental and climatic conditions and dynastic conflict in late medieval Ireland, with a particular focus on the Uí Dhomhnaill (O'Donnell) dynasty in the kingdom of Tír Chonaill. By drawing on a range of paleoclimatic and historical sources, the study examines how the onset of the Little Ice Age after 1300 may have contributed to reduced agricultural output in this marginal region, thus intensifying competition among its ruling elites and their expansive networks of clients and kin. Traditionally, studies of segmentary conflict amongst Gaelic elites have focused on the more immediate political and interpersonal drivers of such conflicts. This study examines how the two great late medieval periods of conflict that split the Uí Dhomhnaill coincided with the two major medieval cold phases of the Little Ice Age. By using the Uí Dhomhnaill as a case study, this study proposes that the politics of Late Medieval Ireland was deeply affected by changes in the natural world, upon which the agricultural systems that underpinned Gaelic political and social structures relied.

     

    Summary

    Acemoglu, Gitmez, and Shadmehr (MIT, Bilkent, UNC — published June 2026) build a formal economic model of what happens when automation keeps expanding and the people displaced by it can organize a revolt. The paper's question: will capital owners respond with redistribution (taxes funding public goods) or repression (surveillance, policing, force)?

    The core mechanism. Every dollar of output divides between capital owners and workers. Automation shifts that division toward capital — machines replace tasks that workers used to perform, so the workers' share of total income falls. As that share falls, workers have less to lose by revolting and more to gain, so the probability of a successful revolt rises. Capital owners, acting through the state, have two ways to reduce that probability. They can redistribute: tax some of their income and spend it on public goods that workers would lose access to if a revolt disrupted the system. Or they can repress: fund a security apparatus that raises the personal cost of participating in collective action.

    Why repression wins over time. Redistribution has a scaling problem. Each additional wave of automation pushes labor's income share further down, which requires more redistribution to keep revolt probability low, which means higher taxes on capital owners. Repression does not have this scaling problem — its cost is roughly fixed regardless of how automated the economy becomes. The result is a complementarity: more automation makes repression cheaper relative to redistribution. As the total capital stock grows — and it grows continuously because owners reinvest profits — automation becomes more profitable, which makes repression more attractive, which permits still more automation. The cycle reinforces itself.

    The dynamic prediction. The model tracks two possible long-run paths. If the threat of revolt is very weak (workers are poorly organized, benefits of revolt are low), then low-cost redistribution suffices indefinitely. In every other case — which the authors treat as the realistic one — the economy converges to repression. This convergence can happen two ways: either repression is chosen immediately, or the economy begins with redistribution and then switches to repression once the capital stock crosses a threshold. The authors also show that even if the economy starts as a democracy, capitalists will eventually prefer to overthrow it. Democracy imposes taxes; the higher automation goes, the more those taxes cost relative to the fixed cost of a coup followed by repression. Once capital accumulation passes the threshold, democracy becomes more expensive than dictatorship from the capitalists' perspective.

    An additional remark in the paper notes that AI itself reduces the cost of repression — automated surveillance, predictive policing, behavioral monitoring — which accelerates the threshold crossing.

    What this predicts for you. The model says working-class people face a narrowing window. Early in the automation curve, when capital is still moderate, redistribution is the cheaper option for owners, so political pressure for taxes, public goods, and income support can succeed — owners prefer paying those costs to funding a security state. That is the period where organizing, electoral politics, and demands for redistribution align with what the model says capital owners will accept. As capital accumulates and automation deepens, that alignment disappears. The cost of buying off displacement through redistribution rises past the cost of suppressing it through force. After the threshold, the model predicts owners will prefer surveillance and coercion to taxation — and in the democracy extension, will prefer ending democratic governance itself to continuing to pay the redistribution bill.

    The practical implication: the working-class interest is to use the redistribution-favorable period to lock in structural changes — wealth distribution, ownership stakes in automated production, institutional constraints on repressive capacity — before the capital stock crosses the threshold where redistribution stops being the path of least resistance for owners. The model does not predict when that threshold arrives in calendar years, but it does predict the direction: every year of capital accumulation without structural redistribution brings the threshold closer.

     

    Abstract Ecological economists aim to transform our economic institutions so that society can flourish within planetary boundaries. The central message of this article is that private rent extraction forms a key barrier to the realisation of that goal. I define rent as an economic reward which is sustained through control of assets that cannot be quickly and widely replicated, and which exceeds proportionate compensation for the labour of the recipient. I argue that unless we close opportunities for rent extraction, and socialise unavoidable rents, our governments will be compelled to pursue output growth, regardless of its environmental consequences, in order to prevent spiralling inequality and unemployment. The positive proposition in this article is that the concept of rent can help us to identify, and build democratic support for, the institutional transformations necessary to prepare for a resource-constrained future. Measures to reduce and redistribute rentier power could be emancipatory for the poorest in society, whilst making more feasible many proposals that have been advocated already in this journal, including reduced working hours and resource caps. By contrast, if environmental protections are introduced before opportunities for private rent extraction are closed, we could see intensified rent-seeking, asset price bubbles, poverty and economic insecurity.

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